Naval War College Review

Volume 27
Number 1 *January-February*

Article 16

1974

January & February 1974 Review

The U.S. Naval War College

JANUARY – FEBRUARY 1974

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

FIRST ANNIVERSARY OF THE RELEASE OF PRISONERS OF WAR

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

FOREWORD

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CHALLENGE!

In this issue the *Naval War College Review* commemorates the first anniversary of the return of our prisoners of war from North Vietnam. All of us in the military are honored to know these men, servicemen who have been asked to give more than any of us living today. I recommend, though, that we all take a cue from one of Rear Adm. Jim Stockdale's remarks in the lead article in this issue. The time has come to stop regarding these men as ex-POW's. Their interests and ours will be served best by welcoming them back to the ranks and not dwelling on the past.

The year that has passed since their release has seen great changes in the orientation of public attention. ROTC is again respected and unmolested on college campuses. Past fixations on Vietnam and the resultant antimilitary domestic turmoil have abated. The "public" has proven to have a short attention span and is now concerned with oil, the realities of détente, and the realization that last October our military forces might have been tried and found wanting. Our ex-POW's never knew the realities of our national unrest over Vietnam. They were fed only selected propagandistic morsels on which to chew. When they returned, it was history. They were exploited by their captors for years; for us to further exploit their return as the only heroes of an unpopular war would be both untimely and insensitive.

We all lost in Vietnam; these men lost much more than most. It was for them a bitter but beneficial experience. Their courage in adhering to the finest in traditional military discipline should be an example to all of us as we face the challenge of the next decade. Those with whom I have talked do not feel that they need more recuperation. They wish to join with the rest of our military in facing tomorrow's challenge. Let us honor them by respecting their desires.

STANSFIELD TURNER
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College

EXPERIENCES AS A POW IN VIETNAM

Enduring the years as a POW in Vietnam hinged upon self-discipline, communications, and, in many cases, a viable personal philosophy. For this officer, it also meant maintaining the integrity of command.

An address given to the Executives' Club of Chicago

by

Rear Admiral James B. Stockdale, U.S. Navy

Last February, when I first touched foot on American soil, I was asked to make a few remarks on behalf of the ex-POW's who were embarked in the airplane with me. An ancient verse came to mind that best summarized my relief at dropping the mantle of leadership and responsibility I had held during 7½ years of imprisonment, four of them in solitary. These lines are attributed to Homer; I remember them well because of their modern ring: "Nothing is so sweet as to return from sea and listen to the raindrops on the rooftops of home."

Well, I was dreaming. I had forgotten that an old sea captain's job does not end when he anchors in homeport.

My wife Sybil and I have a private joke. Before I returned she was advised by a Navy psychiatrist: "The fellow will probably make a quick readjustment to modern society if you will remember one rule for the first few months: Don't put him in decisionmaking situations." Well, the reality of my postconfinement simply did not allow such an environment. In the past year I have probably made more important decisions than in any like period in my life.

Today I find myself truly back home. I am back with old friends, back in my native Middle West, and I have decided that this is my last public speech as an ex-POW. I have no ambition to become a professional ex-prisoner. As soon as I finish today, I am going down to my farm in Knox County for a couple of days, then to Colorado to spend the weekend with my second son who is in college there, then back to San Diego. Next week I hope to check out of the hospital, and, hopefully, I will be ready for a good seagoing job.

Incidentally, before we were released by the North Vietnamese, I had occasion to be approached by other prisoners who were thinking about their careers. We were all more or less pessimistic about our future utility to our services. Not with any malice; it was just that we had been used to living that stoic life and faced up to the fact that

there was a good chance that our service careers had been overcome by time.

We came home to find that the service was devoted to giving us every chance to regain that time. I am informed, as our Navy ex-POW's duty assignments are made, and their orders are good, that each man has been given the personal attention his devotion to duty deserves.

As a theme for this audience, I will address the subject of how a group of middle Americans—average American guys who have chosen military life as a profession—survived in a POW situation and returned home with honor.

The conditions under which American POW's existed have changed radically since World War II. It is no longer a matter of simply being shot into your parachute, going to a reasonably pleasant "Hogan's Heroes" prison camp, and sweating out the end of the war. At least it was not that way in Vietnam. In Vietnam the American POW did not suddenly find himself on the war's sidelines. Rather, he found himself on one of the major battlefronts—the propaganda battlefront.

Our enemy in Vietnam hoped to win his war with propaganda. It was his main weapon. Our captors told us they never expected to defeat us on the battlefield, but did believe they could defeat us on the propaganda front.

Unlike the World War II POW, who was considered a liability, a drain on enemy resources and manpower, the American POW in Vietnam was considered a prime political asset. The enemy believed that sooner or later every one of us could be broken to his will and used as ammunition on the propaganda front. Some of us might take more breaking than others, but all of us could be broken.

Thus, for Americans who became POW's in Vietnam, capture meant not that we had been neutralized, but that a different kind of war had begun—a war of extortion.

For the sane man there is always an element of fear involved when he is captured in war. In Vietnam the enemy capitalized on this fear to an extreme degree. We were told we must live by sets of rules and regulations no normal American could possibly live by. When we violated these rules and regulations, we gave our captors what they considered sufficient moral justification for punishing us—binding us in ropes, locking us in stocks for days and weeks on end, locking us in torture cuffs for weeks at a time, and beating us to bloody pulps. As we reached our various breaking points, we were "allowed" to apologize for our transgressions and to atone for them by "confessing our crimes" and condemning our Government.

At this point you may be asking the question, Had the POW's received any training to prepare themselves for possible capture? The answer is yes, and it was based on two things that I have come to respect very, very much.

One was on the taking of physical abuse. I think if you were to prepare yourself to be a prisoner of war, and I cannot imagine anybody going about that methodically, one should include a course of familiarization with pain. For what it is worth, I learned the merits of men having taken the physical abuse of body contact as in sports.

It is a very important experience; you have to practice hurting. There is no question about it.

Second, survival school was based on taking mental harassment. Also, I came out of prison being very happy about the merits of plebe year at the Naval Academy. I hope we do not ever dilute those things. You have to practice being hazed. You have to learn to take a bunch of junk and accept it with a sense of humor.

On the subject of education, beyond the scope of survival school, there is always the question: Do we need to start giving a sort of counterpropaganda

course? Should we go into the political indoctrination business?

I am not very enthusiastic about that. I think the best preparation for an American officer who may be subjected to political imprisonment is a broad, liberal education that gives the man at least enough historical perspective to realize that those who excelled in life before him were, in the last essence, committed to play a role. He learns that though it is interesting to speculate about the heavens and the earth and the areas under the earth and so forth, when it comes right down to it, men are more or less obliged to play certain roles, and they do not necessarily have to commit themselves on issues that do not affect that role.

Now, how does the average American—which is what the POW is—deal with his world? On a day to day basis, the POW must somehow communicate with his fellows. Together they must establish a viable set of rules and regulations to live by. We were military men. We knew we were in a combat situation and that the essential element of survival and success in a combat situation is military discipline. That meant isolated though we were from each other, we could not afford to live in a democracy. We had no choice but to live in a strictly disciplined military organization—if you will, a military dictatorship.

Our captors knew this as well as we did. Several members of Hanoi's Central Committee had spent long periods in confinement as political prisoners. They felt that we too were political prisoners. They held as their highest priority the prevention of a prisoner organization because they knew an organized body of prisoners could beat their system. If they were to get what they wanted from us, they had to isolate every American who showed a spark of leadership. They did so. They plunged many of us into a dark solitary confinement that lasted, in some cases, for years.

For us the Code of Conduct became the ground we walked on. I am not aware that any POW was able, in the face of severe punishment and torture, to adhere strictly to name, rank, and serial number, as the heroes always did in the old-fashioned war movies, but I saw a lot of Americans do better. I saw men scoff at the threats and return to torture 10 and 15 times. I saw men perform in ways no one would have ever thought to put in a movie, and because they did perform that way, we were able to establish communication, organization, a chain of command and effective combat unit. We lost some battles, but I believe we won the war.

In fact, I am not so sure we lost many battles. Unless you have been there, it is difficult to imagine the grievous insult to the spirit that comes from breaking under torture and saying something the torturer wants you to say. For example, "My government is conducting a criminal war. I am a war criminal. I bomb churches, schools, and pagodas." Does that sound silly to you? It does to me. But I and many others were tortured in ropes for that statement. The reason it was important to take torture for that statement was to establish the credibility of our defiance—for personal credibility—so that the enemy would know that they must pay a high price to get us into public if they ever could. Needless to say, in a POW situation, viable leadership is not possible without example. In a unit with good communication, almost everyone knows what everyone else is doing or not doing most of the time.

In short, what I am saying is that we communicated. Most of the time most of us knew what was happening to those Americans around us. POW's risked military interrogation, pain, and public humiliation to stay in touch with each other, to maintain group integrity, to retain combat effectiveness.

We built a successful military organization and in doing so created a counterculture. It was a society of intense

loyalty—loyalty of men one to another, of rigid military authoritarianism that would have warmed the cockles of the heart of Frederick the Great, of status—with such unlikely items as years in solitary, number of times tortured, and months in irons as status symbols.

Most men need some kind of personal philosophy to endure what the Vietnam POW's endured. For many it is religion; for many it is patriotic cause; for some it is simply a question of doing their jobs even though the result—confinement as a POW—may not seem necessarily fair. For myself it seemed that becoming a POW somewhere, someday, was a risk I accepted when I entered the Naval Academy. I think it is fair to say that most POW's—including, certainly, those who did not attend service academies—felt the same way. They accepted this as a risk they undertook when they took their oath as officers. To be sure, very few sat around bemoaning their fate, asking the heavens, "Why me?"

As POW's who were treated not as POW's but as common criminals, we sailed uncharted waters. The Code of Conduct was the star that guided us, although several of us are making recommendations for its modification, particularly in the area of a prisoner's legal status. The Code did not provide for our day to day existence; we wrote the laws we had to live by. We established means for determining seniority. We wrote criteria and provided mechanisms for relieving men of command for good and sufficient cause—and we used those mechanisms. We set a line of resistance we thought was within the capability of each POW to hold, and we ruled that no man would cross that line without significant torture. Thus, in effect, we ordered men to torture. This was what I remembered when I finally made the extremely difficult decision to prefer charges in two cases. I think that I was justified. I also think that the Secretary of the Navy's action was justified. We each served our proper function in this.

From what I have said here tody, I think you can realize that as we prison leaders developed this organization, this unity, this mutual trust and confidence, this loyalty that permitted us to ask a guy to give his all sometimes, we acquired a couple of things. We acquired a lot of close friends, but in addition we acquired constituency. Now life has to make sense to that constituency. And that constituency comes home and says to itself: You spoke with force of law, and at great personal pain and inconvenience I obeyed that law, and now I come home and no one seems interested in whether everybody obeyed it, or not.

What kind of a deal is that? This is not a personal grudge thing at all. I hope you all understand that.

I'm too closely involved to be objective on some of these issues. I'm often asked how I feel about amnesty. It is a complicated question; I appreciate and understand it. Thank goodness I'm not going to have to decide it. I don't resent amnesty—not personally—I simply don't have a position on the subject.

A couple of final comments: Self-discipline was vital to self-respect, which in turn is vital to survival and meaningful participation in a POW organization.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

Rear Adm. James B. Stockdale, U.S. Navy, is a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy and before entering flight training served 3 years in destroyers. His operational expertise was in attack carrier operations, and, when shot down over North Vietnam in 1965, he was in command of Carrier Air Wing 16 aboard the U.S.S. *Oriskany*. Admiral Stockdale is currently serving as Commander, Antisubmarine Warfare Wing Pacific.

Self-indulgence is fatal. Daily ritual seems essential to mental and spiritual health. I would do 400 pushups a day, even when I had leg irons on, and would feel guilty when I failed to do them. This ritual paid valuable dividends in self-respect, and, incidentally, I learned yesterday at Mayo Clinic that it also paid physical dividends.

I thank God for the other Americans I was imprisoned with. The respect one develops for others in a POW situation is really indescribable. I think it might be best illustrated with a story of something that happened once when I was in solitary and under extremely close surveillance. I was in dire need of a morale boost when two other POW's, Dave Hatcher and Jerry Coffee, sent me a hope our experience will help to guide note at great risk to themselves. I opened it and found written the complete poem, "Invictus."

"Out of the night that covers me,
Black as the Pit from pole to pole,
I thank whatever gods may be
For my unconquerable soul."

In our effort to survive and return with honor, we drew on the totality of our American heritage. We hope we added something to that heritage. God forbid that it should ever happen to other Americans—to your sons and grandsons and mine—but if it does, we them and will give them the heart and hope they will need.

Ψ

Self-discipline is that which, next to virtue, truly and essentially raises one man above another.

Joseph Addison, 1672-1719

Although many of the reasons for Arab success in the latest outbreak of the seemingly interminable Arab-Israeli conflict are not yet clear, several general observations are possible. First, a combination of preconditioning and Israeli complacency contributed to the achievement of complete Arab surprise. Second, the Israeli command did not fully realize the capabilities of Arab weapons, particularly those of the antiaircraft and antitank variety. And finally, the Arabs were able to successfully compensate for the "qualitative" shortcomings of their army with overwhelming "quantitative" superiority. These successes have all added new unknowns to the Middle East balance of power equation, and the volatile nature of the situation at present seems to indicate that some new action may further add to the number of as yet unresolved questions.

ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT FOUR:

A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT

An article prepared by

Commander Samuel W. Sax, U.S. Naval Reserve

and

Professor Avigdor Levy

Introduction. The dust on the latest Arab-Israeli war has not yet settled. The combatants and their supporters brace themselves for the oncoming political or, possibly, military struggle. Many questions raised during the conduct of hostilities are still unanswered, and others will undoubtedly remain so for time to come. Yet, a preliminary assessment of some of the general characteristics of the last war is already possible.

The successes of the Arab armies during the initial stages of the war came as a surprise to Israel, to the world, and probably to the Arabs themselves. These successes were heralded by the international press as having exploded some commonly accepted myths. Everywhere, but particularly in Israel and the Arab countries, some crucial questions were raised. Did a new generation of Arab warriors emerge? Is the "qualitative gap" between Israel and the Arabs narrowing? Is Israeli military superiority still assured and for how much longer?

It may be said that Arab early successes were due to a strategic surprise caused by three principal factors:

- mistakes at the political-military decisionmaking level in Israel,
- Israeli unpreparedness on the military tactical level,
- *quantitative compensation* by the Arabs for the *qualitative gap* between them and Israel.

These will be discussed below, along with an assessment of the naval aspects of the war.

Mistakes at the Political-Military Decisionmaking Level. Since Israel's standing army is a mere fraction of the Arab forces surrounding it, Israel's deterrent capability always heavily relied on the

efficiency of its intelligence services. These were required to forewarn the political-military leadership of any approaching danger in order to place on alert the small standing army and allow for a mobilization of Israel's reserve units which constitute the bulk of the country's armed forces.

The Egyptian and Syrian Armies could not entirely cover up their military preparations for the Yom Kippur attack. The massing of troops and equipment on Israel's lines could not have escaped aerial reconnaissance and other means of detection. Therefore Israel's intelligence organizations certainly had plenty of evidence of the Egyptian-Syrian buildup. Yet, on the highest level of assessment and decision-making, both Jerusalem and Washington failed to draw the proper conclusions, and the question is why.

The Egyptian-Syrian leadership deserves much of the credit for achieving the surprise. Although they could not conceal their physical preparations on the field, they nevertheless managed to cover up the purpose of their moves with an effective smokescreen. Part of this smokescreen resulted from a process of preconditioning. In the past, and especially during the last year, the Egyptians and Syrians had carried out similar military buildups without attacking. These were commonly explained as "routine" maneuvers and gestures intended to maintain the pressure on Israel and the United States so as not to allow the Middle East situation to become permanently frozen. Past troop concentrations ended indeed in dissolution and a return to "normalcy."

But the success of the strategic surprise was predicated even to a larger extent on the psychopolitical changes which took place in Israel following the Six Day War. With the passing of time, Israel remembered its victory in 1967 not so much for its tremendous preparations and the bitter fighting that took place on virtually all fronts, as for its speed and decisive results. The outcome of the war of attrition strengthened what the Arabs called "the myth of Israel's invincibility." Indeed, many Israelis felt that their country's military superiority over the Arabs was increasing because of their conviction that the "qualitative gap" between Israel and the Arabs was widening. Such assertions assumed that as warfare becomes more sophisticated, Israel increases its edge over the Arabs because of her more advanced technology. As proof of this conviction, Israelis cited their country's successful breakthrough into the production of sophisticated weapons.

In addition, Israel's control of the territories occupied in 1967 strengthened the nation's feeling of security and resulted in changing national defense concepts. Instead of thinking in terms of a "preemptive" strike as prior to 1967, Israel prepared for a defensive posture which would allow her to absorb a "first strike" and then proceed to counterattack. Israeli leaders could argue therefore that the country's "strategic depth" made it possible for Israel not to mobilize even when the Arabs concentrated force on the cease-fire lines. This theory also had its obvious attractions for Israel's economic planners.

Political developments in the last year tended to strengthen this feeling of complacency in Israel. Admittedly, the Arabs would not likely give up and accept forever the political-military stalemate, but for the time being, at least, their major efforts were expected to take place in the political-diplomatic sphere. Similar beliefs were also prevalent in Washington, what with the growing spirit of détente with the Communist camp. Although the Soviets have, in the last year, increased arms shipments to their Arab clients, the Soviet interest in the Middle East was considered as declining. In view of the many gains which Moscow could reap from the process of détente, Washington and

Jerusalem thought it highly unlikely that the Russians would encourage yet another Arab military adventure in the Middle East.

The general juxtaposition of conflicting forces in the Arab world in the last year also failed to indicate the possibility of a renewal of hostilities on a large scale. For one thing the Arab world continued to suffer from numerous dissensions. Egypt and the radical Arab elements appeared to be losing ground to more conservative forces. The pro-Western King Faisal of Saudi Arabia seemed to emerge as a central factor in inter-Arab politics. The Arabs seemed to be concentrating on the use of oil as an economic-political weapon rather than military action to bring about Israeli concessions. Last summer there were growing indications of Egyptian willingness to improve relations with the United States, and in September an American concern was awarded the contract to construct an oil pipeline from the Gulf of Suez to the Mediterranean.

All these developments seemed to indicate that while the Arab States did not entirely give up their military option, for the moment they were concentrating on nonmilitary means to bring about Israeli concessions. Against this background a number of Arab Foreign Ministers attending the opening session of the U.N. General Assembly in September asked to discuss the Middle East situation with the U.S. administration—still another factor in the lack of concern about a quick resumption of military operations.

In Israel several additional factors deterred any "hasty" military steps: In the last year, certain military measures were subject to intense criticism both at home and abroad. The two most famous incidents were the shooting down of a Lybian airliner over Sinai and the forcing down of a Lebanese airliner suspected of carrying the extremist Palestinian leader George Habash. Against this background, as well as the growing international "energy crisis," Israel's leadership was painfully aware of the country's growing political isolation. To underscore this isolation, some friendly countries in Africa had recently severed their relations with Jerusalem.

In addition, while Cairo's policy aimed to underscore the urgency of the Middle East situation through occasional bellicose pronouncements and military maneuvers, Jerusalem played it down. Stressing the role of the Israeli deterrent as a stabilizing factor in Middle Eastern politics, Israeli leaders generally labeled these pronouncements no more than idle talk. In September, Israel's belief in its role as a deterrent factor became even stronger when, in an air battle, its air force destroyed 13 Syrian planes against the loss of only 1 Israeli aircraft. They therefore believed that taking any serious countermeasures to Arab threats, such as mobilization of the reserves, would play into the hands of the Arabs by admitting the gravity of the situation. Consequently, Israel's interests would be served best by remaining calm and playing down the Arab claims of the urgency of the situation.

Furthermore, the country was on the eve of general elections to be held at the end of October. By the beginning of that month, all of Israel's politicians, including members of the government, were preoccupied with the upcoming elections. To mobilize the reserves on the eve of the elections, and especially during the High Holiday season, might have appeared as a political maneuver by the government, damaging their parties' political interests. It could also prove economically costly and lend credence to charges that the government's claims of having successfully built up Israel's deterrent forces were exaggerated. Consequently, when on the eve of the Day of Atonement the danger signals increased, the government essentially decided to sit this one out, contenting itself with a partial mobilization

of reserve units and placing the frontline troops on alert.

It could prove ironic if future disclosures indicate that two events which prompted the Israeli Government to take the least precautionary measures against a possible Arab attack convinced the latter that their only recourse was war. The first of these came within the context of the upcoming Israeli elections. The formation of the rightist coalition (Likkud) which adopted a hard line on the question of the occupied territories, also forced the Labor Alignment to adopt a tougher line on this issue. The press reported that American diplomats had counseled the Arabs to wait until after the Israeli elections before taking any meaningful political steps toward the solution of the Middle East crisis, but since the two major political parties were both committed to a harder line on the issue of the territories, the Arabs could easily contend that there was no reason to wait.

The second incident was the downing of the Syrian planes in September. In Arab eyes, and especially to Damascus, this incident provided further proof of Israel's recalcitrance and, as a result, the die was cast in favor of war.

Israel's Tactical Unpreparedness. In theory, the small Israeli forces on the line could check an Arab surprise offensive, at least temporarily, until the arrival of larger reserve forces. The Bar-Lev line on the Suez Canal was hardly the Israeli equivalent of the maginot line. It consisted of a thin line of isolated fortified bunkers separated by miles of wasteland and held together by patrol roads running parallel to the canal. The Bar-Lev line had many critics in Israel who opposed any static defensive system. These critics argued that the Israeli forces were not accustomed to such warfare and in the end holding a static line could prove too expensive, both in material and in manpower.

Actually, the Bar-Lev line came into being during the war of attrition (1968-1970), when Egyptian artillery pounded the exposed Israeli positions strung along the canal, causing numerous casualties. Israel thus confronted a dilemma. On the one hand, it could pull its forces away from the canal to a safe distance from the range of Egyptian fire and, if necessary, move in with strong armored forces to smash any Egyptian attempt to cross the waterway. On the other hand, it could dig in and build heavily fortified positions that could protect Israeli soldiers under the heaviest artillery barrages. Partly for political reasons, Israel adopted the second alternative.

The purpose of the Israeli positions on the canal was thus mainly to show the flag, to serve as forward observation posts and as midway stops for Israeli patrols along the canal. The real role of driving off an enemy bridgehead or slowing down a large scale offensive was allocated to the armored forces behind the Bar-Lev line, part of which were in constant readiness a few miles behind the forward positions. The Israelis used a somewhat similar deployment in the Golan Heights.

The attractive aspects of this system to Israeli planners were that the Israelis could show its flag up to the last foot of occupied territory; the system was not entirely static but combined mobile elements more suited to the Israeli fighting tradition; and, most important, it seemed possible to hold the line with as few troops as possible. In fact, as time went on and the Israeli belief in its deterrent capability increased, they thinned down their forces on the line even further.

But, if on the eve of the Day of Atonement, the Israeli Government counted on its troops on the line to counter any sneak attack, it soon discovered to its dismay that even these limited forces were anything but prepared. The Israeli Army, basically a

civilian army, tends to reflect the views and moods of the entire nation. The "mood of complacency," as it is called in Israel, which prevailed in Israeli society for some time also prevailed in the army.

Moreover, in the last year the General Headquarters issued several high alerts during which nothing happened. So when on the eve of the Day of Atonement General Headquarters passed down a high alert order to the troops on the line, its most important message to the Israeli soldiers was that all leaves were cancelled and that they could not get home for the High Holiday. Unfortunately, this did not eliminate the holiday spirit and many of the troops spent the morning praying, reading, writing letters, playing volleyball, and even swimming. In short, the troops on the lines were psychologically totally unprepared for what lay ahead.

Moreover, in the last moment the Arabs reaped still another advantage. On Saturday morning, 6 October, Israeli intelligence apparently learned that the Egyptian and Syrian armies planned to attack at 6 p.m. While mobilization of reserves was accelerated, Israel also made diplomatic efforts to avert the war through the mediation of the United States. Orders were also passed down to the troops on the lines to prepare for an evening attack. While the orders traveled down the pyramid of command, they were often understood to mean "a possible enemy attack at 6 p.m." In many posts, a 21- or 22-year-old officer assembled his men at noon, informed them of the "possible enemy attack," and ordered them to be combat ready by 4 p.m. Life in the Israeli posts on the Bar-Lev line and on the Golan Heights generally continued, therefore, at its relaxed Yom Kippur pace. Meanwhile, however, in view of the accelerated Israeli military and diplomatic activity, the Arabs decided to advance the hour of attack. Consequently, when they opened fire at 2 p.m. the attack totally surprised the Israeli forces on the lines. The Egyptians later declared that it took their first units only 7 minutes to cross the canal and attack the Israeli positions on the east bank.

Quantitative Compensation for the Qualitative Gap. The early Arab successes resulted directly from the political and tactical surprise. But, in addition, it appears that Israeli intelligence of the enemy's tactical capabilities did not provide a complete picture. Israel undoubtedly had accurate information about the technical capabilities of the Soviet supplied modern weapons in the Arab arsenals. It probably had also a fairly accurate knowledge of their quantity and information on their tactical use by the Egyptian and Syrian armies. What apparently was missing was an accurate assessment of their operations –tactical capabilities, something which can be fully assessed only under battlefield conditions.

For example, Israeli military planners probably did not fully understand the potential performance of the Soviet bridging equipment. The bridges which the Egyptians threw across the canal were highly mobile and easily constructed. Moreover, since they consisted of replaceable segments, even when damaged, they could be easily reassembled and put back in use within a short time. Thus, when in the early stages of the war the Israeli Air Force announced the destruction of most of the bridges, the statements, based on aerial photographs, were probably accurate, but only temporarily so. The pilots brought back photographs of direct hits, but by the time these photographs were studied, the Egyptians had repaired their bridges and continued to push men, arms, and supplies eastward.

During the war of attrition, the Israeli Air Force became painfully aware of the deadly capabilities of the Soviet made ground-to-air missile system, and it is safe to assume that the air force

developed its own countertactics. What Israel did not fully realize, because of lack of experience, was the deadly effectiveness of light antitank missiles operated by masses of infantry. The Israeli armored units which rushed to stem the attacking Arab forces found that their heaviest casualties resulted not from clashes with enemy armor but rather from these missiles operated by infantry. In addition, during the first stage of the fighting, the Arab forces enjoyed overwhelming numerical superiority over the Israelis, estimated at 14 or 15 to 1.

Given these odds, it was not surprising that the Egyptians badly mauled the first Israeli ground forces to race to the front. The Israeli Air Force also suffered heavy losses in the initial stage of the fighting. The planned strategy of the air force was to knock out the antiaircraft missiles before flying ground support missions. But since at the initial stage of the war the situation of the Israeli ground forces was so perilous, the air force was required to change its order of priorities and first support the ground forces. As a result, it suffered numerous losses to the enemy's missile batteries.

But the Arab initial offensive exhausted itself during the first 2 days of the fighting. In the first place, Egyptian attempts to seize the passes and other strategic points in Sinai and Syrian efforts to capture the Jordan bridges by helicopter-borne troops totally miscarried. The Israelis shot down many helicopters with their human loads on the way to their destination and wiped out those forces which reached their objective. Then, although greatly outnumbered, the Israeli forces managed to stop the advancing Arab columns before they reached their initial objectives—probably the line of the Sinai passes in the south and the Jordan River in the north.

The Arab forces were also hampered by the inflexibility of their offensive strategy. Following the Soviet fighting doctrine, the Arabs attacked with huge masses of armor and artillery which complicated logistics problems. More important, however, the qualitative superiority of the Israeli Air Force led the Arabs to give up the use of their own air forces for the protection of their ground troops and, instead, rely heavily on their missile umbrella. Consequently, the Arab armies, and especially the Egyptians, had to bring forward their missile batteries before making any deeper thrusts. This gave Israel sufficient time to rush in more troops, consolidate a second line of defense, and prepare to take the initiative.

At this juncture, however, the major decision faced the Israeli Government: which front would receive first priority? Israeli strategists always considered Egypt as the more dangerous enemy by far. In 1967 Israel gave first priority to the Egyptian front and only after the crushing victory in the south did the Israeli Army take up the initiative in other fronts. This time, however, with the lines stabilized, the Egyptian Army was effectively blocked far from Israel's population centers while the Syrian advance brought the northern enemy within dangerous range of towns and villages in the Jordan valley. Also, with another effort, the Syrians could have pushed the Israeli forces off the rim of the Golan Heights, and a later Israeli attempt to retake the Heights could have proved extremely difficult and costly. Consequently, Israel decided to first fight a holding operation in Sinai while taking the offensive against the Syrians in the north.

Nevertheless, the Israeli counterthrust was relatively slow in unfolding. The lightening warfare which had characterized the Israeli Army did not materialize for a variety of psychological, political, and military factors. In the first place, Israel's leadership probably had to recover from the shock created by the surprise attack, the enemy's

initial successes, and, most important, the blow of many casualties. Militarily, since many units were badly mauled in the initial stage of fighting, Israel needed a longer period to regroup and organize. Politically, according to a number of public statements made by government ministers, it seemed that this time, with American backing, Israel would not have to fight against the clock. Since the country already had sufferd an unprecedented heavy toll of casualties, another consideration was to spare lives.

Consequently, Israel seemed to employ on the Syrian front a cautious campaign, using what might be termed as "steamroller tactics." Close air support and artillery barrages heavily pounded the Syrian positions, while armor supported by infantry carefully picked its way through the Syrian lines. By the beginning of the second week of fighting, the Syrians were not only pushed back to the former cease-fire lines, but Israeli forces captured a wide salient on the Kuneitra-Damascus axis up to the town of Sasa, a point almost midway between the prewar lines and the Syrian capital. In the process, the Syrian armed forces suffered very heavy losses, and an Israeli military breakthrough on this front was probably within reach.

But for political as well as military reasons, Israel opted to restrain its advance. An Israeli breakthrough on the Syrian Southern Sector in the direction of Suweida could have forced Jordan to take a more active role in the war, while a continued advance on Damascus might have triggered Soviet intervention and result in a cessation of hostilities. Such a possibility would have been most unwelcome to Israel with Egyptian troops entrenched on both banks of the canal. Later, with the threat in the north reduced and the Syrian Army forced to fall back on the defensive, Israel shifted its attention to the south.

In Sinai, meanwhile, the situation appeared static. Several Egyptian offensives and probes during the first 10 days of the fighting were repulsed by Israel's forces. But in the meanwhile, the Egyptians had massed large forces on the eastern bank of the canal and had dug in. Past experience taught Israel that the Egyptian Army fights best when in a defensive position.

Given their missile umbrella and their numerical superiority in ground forces, any attempt to dislodge the Egyptians through a frontal attack could prove very costly, if not altogether impossible. Israel had, therefore, to choose a more mobile type of operation which would throw the Egyptians off their balance and force them to give up their static defensive position.

The only area which had sufficient depth for such a mobile maneuver was the west bank of the canal. The added attraction for Israel of fighting on the west bank were the options created by such a maneuver allowing for quick thrusts and improvised operations. An operation on the west bank could cut off all, or part, of the Egyptian Army from its bases of supply; it could threaten Cairo, and, most important, it would create havoc among the Egyptian missile batteries, most of which remained on the west bank. With the missile forces weakened, the sky would be open to the Israeli Air Force and with control of the skies, the collapse of the Egyptian Army could be within reach.

These were the general objectives of the Israeli penetration into Egypt which began early in the second week of the war. Partly for reasons mentioned above, this operation also unfolded cautiously and with uncharacteristic slowness. The Egyptian reaction was, however, even more sluggish. At first the Egyptian command seemed to have misunderstood the intentions of the Israeli task force on the west bank, and later it underestimated the task force's size. Although the Israeli task force met with

stubborn resistance throughout the operation, the Egyptians failed to take effective countermeasures. Consequently, by the time the fighting died out in the beginning of the fourth week of the war, the Egyptian Third Corps, a force variably estimated between 20,000-30,000 men, became completely encircled by the Israeli maneuver.

Why the Egyptian command allowed this force to become trapped when it still possessed the option to evacuate it will probably remain an enigma for some time. Three possible explanations come to mind. First, the Egyptian communication and intelligence system had probably broken down due to inaccurate, or misleading, reports by the local commanders. This phenomenon had taken place in all previous wars between Israel and Egypt. If this happened then the high command lacked an accurate picture of the situation on the field. Second, the high command may have known the true state of affairs, but feared that a withdrawal of Egyptian troops under pressure might result in disorder and end as a rout. As a third possibility, President Sadat may have decided to keep the Third Corps on the east bank for political considerations even when he knew that he risked its encirclement. Since it is commonly agreed that the entire purpose of the war was political, it would appear reasonable that the Egyptian leader counted heavily on his troops holding as much as possible of the eastern bank so that he could negotiate from a position of strength.

The War at Sea. It is interesting to note that Israel's performance on the sea was the most successful aspect of its operations in the war. The navy had always found itself in Israel as an auxiliary and supportive branch. Until 1967 the Israel Navy lagged at the bottom of the nation's defense priorities and, as a result, it fell considerably behind the Arab navies in equipment and manpower. But several tragedies, especially the sinking of the destroyer *Eilat* in 1967, resulted in a growing concentration on developing Israel's naval forces.

To be sure, the navy in Israel still comes far behind such vaunted arms as the air force and the tank corps. Nevertheless, fresh thinking, the allocation of greater budgets, and the concentration on technologically intense weapon systems made the Israeli Navy a respectable force for its size. The Israeli designed—and some also locally built—missiles succeeded remarkably and demonstrated clear-cut superiority over their Soviet-built counterparts.

The most spectacular achievement of the Israeli Navy may well have been the events that did not happen. The quiet that prevailed over their highly vulnerable coastline with its rich targets of population centers, power stations, and essential oil installations resulted from Israel's superior performance on the sea.

The naval war with Syria had two phases; open sea engagements and harbor entrance confrontations. The initial combat at sea occurred on the first night of the war, 6 October 1973, at 2230, when five Israeli missile boats met a Syrian torpedo boat, a minelayer, and several missile boats in Syrian waters near Latakia. In this successful encounter the Israeli force learned that proper maneuvering, well aimed fire, and electronic countermeasures could deter enemy missiles. Two nights later, on the 8th and 9th of October after further Syrian losses in the battle of Damiet, the Egyptians and Syrians realized the advantages of fighting Israeli boats under the cover of shore batteries rather than on the open sea. They also used merchant ships as a buffer for hiding, firing, and cover at the entrance of harbors.

This second phase of the naval war, fighting at the mouth of enemy harbors, began on the 10th and 11th of October. The Syrians proclaimed their waters as a

battle zone and closed navigation. Pressure from the sea on the Syrian coast did not ease until the end of the war.

Israeli naval forces encountered the same two-phase behavior with the Egyptians. In addition, they faced a third phase of static defense supported by naval missile launchings, activated coastal guns, and coastal defense missile batteries. However, these did not deter Israel from shelling various targets between Port Said and an area west of Alexandria.

In the southern region of the Red Sea, the Egyptians enforced an effective blockade by placing destroyers in the Bab El Mandab Straits and submarines in the center of the Red Sea. However, with the single exception of a missed torpedo firing at a tanker bound for the Israeli port of Eilat, no naval engagements took place in that area. In the northern region, from the Gulf of Suez to Safaga, Israeli attacks on commando and auxiliary vessel concentrations thwarted Egyptian maneuvers. Israel's *Swift* patrol boats dominated the entire Gulf of Suez. In addition, several Israeli Commando naval raids on the forward base of Hurghada sunk half of the Egyptian missile boat force in the Red Sea and prevented the Egyptians from using it in the second half of the war.

At the cease-fire, it was clear the Egyptians had mined the Jubal Straits. Since the cease-fire, the Egyptian blockade continues with destroyers at the Bab El Mandab Straits and submarines in the Red Sea.

The naval war was decidedly one sided. Israel naval superiority totally restricted enemy naval offensive activities and gave Israel freedom of action on the sea. The Egyptian submarines deployed in the Mediterranean did not succeed in attacking Israeli merchant shipping. Continuous Israeli naval pressure on the enemy coasts forced them to redeploy their vital troops from the frontlines to defend the coastline. Sea and air cooperation succeeded in keeping the enemy far from the Israel coast throughout the war.

Israel's success may have weakened the idea that the day of surface vessels, other than nuclear-powered aircraft carriers or submarines, are numbered. It further illustrates that even small countries can afford to maintain punchy, if modest, navies capable of repelling forces many times their size.

Summary. From the purely military point of view, the fighting ended with a clear-cut Israeli victory. Syria's forces not only were driven back, but Israel occupied important territories, giving it additional strategic advantage. In the south, Israel's military gains on the west bank of the Suez Canal, and especially the encirclement of the Third Corps, far outweigh its territorial losses.

Nevertheless, the war ended without a crushing victory as in 1956 and 1967. At the time of writing, the Arab armies still held their field positions and their material losses are being rapidly replenished by a generous patron. These facts combined with the scrambled cease-fire lines on the Suez Canal, untenable to both Egypt and Israel, keep the present situation highly flammable. Whether this will lead to peaceful negotiations or to a renewal of hostilities will become clearer as times goes on.

In the meanwhile we may draw several conclusions. First, we should not draw a simple comparison of this war to the one of 1967. In 1967 Israel fought under optimal military conditions. From mid-May and until the beginning of June 1967, the Israeli reserve army had some 3 weeks to mobilize, organize, become properly equipped, and even allow its men some last minute training. In addition, from the very beginning of the campaign, Israel held the initiative.

In 1973 it was the Arabs who fought under optimal conditions. They had fully mobilized and held the initiative at least during the first stages of the war. It is therefore a moot question whether

the Arab soldier became a better fighter. What is clear is that under the circumstances of the last war, he fought better. Surprise and initial success served him well and undoubtedly boosted his morale. He was perhaps even more motivated than in previous wars not so much because "he fought for his own land," but because of a more intensive indoctrination for this particular confrontation.

Perhaps more significant, this war demonstrated that the Arabs can narrow the intrinsic "qualitative gap" between them and Israel through the massive supply of sophisticated yet "foolproof" and simple to operate weapons. The initial success of the Arabs owed heavily to Soviet doctrines and planning up to the last minute detail. Apparently, however, the Soviet advisers did not cross over the Israeli lines with their Arab students, and after the initial successful stages, the fumblings and hesitations of the Arab command became evident. As in past wars, the Arab command betrayed a lack of initiative and not much capability for improvisation and maneuver on the front.

As far as Israel is concerned, it has lost its "mood of complacency," or "Israel cockiness," for a long time to come. Also, some of its military conservatism and "chivalrous" concepts, such as "armor against armor" warfare, will come under very close scrutiny. As much as it may hurt its "fighting mystique," Israel may have to put some greater stress on "gadgetry" and change its fighting methods.

But, above all, Israel may find it necessary to create new and well defined institutions for policy planning and decisionmaking on issues of national security that will leave no room for future mistaken assumptions.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

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BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

Professor Avigdor Levy, a native of Israel, received his B.A. from the Hebrew University in Jerusalem and his Ph.D. from Harvard University. He is a professor of Middle Eastern history and politics at Tel Aviv University and served as visiting professor at Brandeis University and the University of Chicago. He is a reserve officer with the Israeli General Staff and served in this capacity during the last war.

WELLINGTON

Europe, during the years of the Napoleonic Wars, was a continent rife with political competition and social discontent but was also a continent populated by men who stand as giants of history. Not the least of these men was Arthur Wellesley, first Duke of Wellington. The Iron Duke, or "Nosey," as he was fondly called by his troops, represented the best of British aristocratic leadership. A general with great respect for human life, his attention to the welfare of his men won from them perhaps as much devotion as did his ability to lead them to victory. In battle, Wellington's cautious nature contrasted sharply with the flamboyancy of Napoleon. Indeed, "their only common characteristic" seemed to be an "overwhelming tendency to be victorious." Napoleon and the Duke met in battle only once, at Waterloo, but acting independently of one another they dominated the political and military affairs of Europe for almost 20 years.

A lecture given in the Strategy and Policy Course
at the Naval War College
by
Lady Elizabeth Longford

You may be wondering which aspects of Wellington I shall tackle within the brief period of one lecture. This was rather an easy decision for me. A month ago a stimulating letter arrived from Admiral Turner outlining what you would like to hear. This immediately brought to my recollection the reasons Wellington gave for rating Fitzroy Somerset as the ideal aide-de-camp; he was absolutely truthful and utterly obedient. I do not imply that I shall always arrive at the absolute truth in this lecture. Far less do I venture to offer myself as an ADC Extraordinary to any military men present. Incidentally, Wellington did not favor lady ADC's like his great opponent Marshal Massena, though he did once appoint a woman to be Inspector of Hospitals. But no one discovered she was a woman till after her death. If Wellington had been told she was a woman he might have retorted, "If you believe that you'll believe anything!"

Nevertheless, I at least can obey the wishes Admiral Turner has expressed. Therefore I shall consider seven themes: Wellington the man, the commander, the tactician; his relations with Parliament, the Horse Guards, and the navy; and, finally, a comparison with Napoleon.

Wellington the Man. "I am but a man . . . " When my *Years of the Sword* was first published, reviewers were surprised to discover this hitherto unknown or ignored saying of Wellington's. Yet its genuine modesty sums him up. Only a genius would need to emphasize his common humanity. Only a good man would want to. Examples of his modesty are his frank admissions of near misses. He was the first to call the Battle of Sorauren "a close run thing" and Waterloo "the nearest run thing you ever saw in your life." Wellington also had the failings of a man. He could be irascible and autocratic; he could

womanize; he would demand the same obedience from politicians as he had received from soldiers. Because he had a brilliant tactical imagination, he believed he could also correctly guess what lay on the other side of the hill in politics. His opposition to the Reform Bill proved him wrong.

Nevertheless, he had all the insignia of a man of genius. In his own words, he considered "nothing impossible." He took proper pride in his own achievements, finally in his indispensability. On meeting Nelson in 1805 he felt himself "a some-body"—a somebody being high-hatted by a hero. After Waterloo he said, "By God! I don't think it would have been done if I had not been there!"

His energy and decisiveness were the results of self-discipline and disposition. Having trained himself to be methodical, he once said, "I always did the business of the day *in* the day." This was his watchword, the very antithesis of the more usual motto, "Never do today what you can put off till tomorrow."

Temperamentally he had no nerves. He could take a catnap on the field before an engagement and always slept soundly during the 3 hours he allotted himself on the eve of battle. "I don't like lying awake;" he said, "it does no good. I make a point never to lie awake." This quotation reminds me to add that he had a sharp wit. His remark when seeing off a blackmailer—"Publish and be damned!"—has passed into the language. My own favorite is his reply to King George IV who habitually boasted of having led the "Heavy Germans'" charge at Salamanca in disguise and once turned to Wellington for confirmation. "Isn't it so, Arthur?" Arthur replied, "I have often heard Your Majesty say so."

Loyalty to the throne, duty to the public, this was Wellington's lifelong inspiration. In the language of medieval chivalry, he called himself their "retained servant." For this reason, though not a born politician, he reentered Parliament after the war, holding the Premiership for 35 months.

Lastly, the man Wellington had a streak of mysticism which made him believe in his star. A practicing Christian, he felt that the Almighty was protecting him for a purpose. As early as the Battle of Vimeiro (1808) he called himself "the Child of Fortune." Having retreated from the siege of Burgos in 1812, he repeated the phrase, adding defiantly, "I propose to get into fortune's way." The victory of Sorauren (1813) inspired the comment, ". . . I begin to believe that the finger of God is upon me." Waterloo (1815) wrung from him not only soldierly tears and the famous saying, "Nothing but a battle lost, is worse than a battle won," but also frequent references to "the finger of Providence" and "the hand of Almighty God."

He was to become the Iron Duke not by temperament but by will.

Wellington the Commander. In turning to Wellington the Commander, I would again like to begin with one of his own self-revelations: "I like to walk alone." This was an early intimation that he did not suffer superiors gladly. "We want no Major-Generals in Mysore," he remarked in India, having just reached that rank himself. The bleak side of this "walking alone" was shown by secretiveness and failure to get the best out of his staff, as at Almeida (1811), on the 1812 retreat, or in the Pyrenean passes (1813). Of this last occasion he said: "There is nothing I dislike so much as these extended operations, which I cannot direct myself." After Almeida he had exploded: "there is nothing so stupid as a *Gallant Officer.*"

In Wellington's defense it must be admitted that his generals included too many aging, shortsighted, slightly dotty drunks. The made him tremble, and he

only hoped they made the enemy tremble too. Why, then, did he not begin to democratize the army? For most of these stupidly gallant officers were gentlemen, often aristocrats. There are many answers. The basic one is that Wellington was an aristocrat himself. His belief in the caste system went too deep with him for questioning. If forced to rationalize, he would say that in the wine-growing Peninsula gentlemen could hold their wine rather better, that democracy was a French invention, and that the aristocratic Guards were his best regiments. But he did not say, or think, that the Battle of Waterloo was won on the playing fields of Eton.

The credit side of his "walking alone" is illustrated by another quotation: "The real reason why I succeeded in my own campaigns is because I was always on the spot—I saw everything; and did everything for myself." If a subordinate asked his advice, he would reply, "I will get upon my horse and take a look; and then tell you!" I suspect it was his sturdy individualism which caused him to appreciate the Spanish guerrillas and so organize Spain's toughest force.

Independence, self-reliance, and self-confidence all built up in him simultaneously. This and other spirited qualities eventually produced the famous "Nosey," the "long-nosed b------" whom his soldiers idolized. They liked his way of giving orders: "so decided, so manly," yet "he has nothing of the truncheon about him; nothing foul-mouthed, important or fussy . . . all short, quick, clear and to the purpose." They liked his care of the wounded, his attention to detail, including their rations, tents, cantonments, transport animals, and forage. That he did not care about their dress endeared him to the British, though a Swiss officer preferred Sir John Moore's extreme meticulousness. No doubt there was a minority who disliked his wearing civilian dress (for comfort) on the battlefield; a minority also who found him curt, lacking in "affability," prone to haughtiness, scant with praise. And many, of course, objected to his flogging and calling them "the scum of the earth" after their orgy at Vitoria—though he admitted afterwards that army discipline had turned them into "the fine fellows they are." But to the vast majority he was their incomparable Nosey, and they "would rather see his long nose in the fight than a reinforcement of ten thousand men any day." He was a safe general and he was a war-winner; he never lost a gun or threw away a human life. He favored the advance posts giving each other warning of an attack: "the killing of a poor fellow of a vedette," he said, "could not influence the battle." In the end it all came back to his unique self-confidence which, from the beginning, had launched him buoyantly against the French. "I am not afraid of them."

Wellington the Tactician. It is as a battlefield tactician that Wellington's military genius must be judged. For him there were to be no sweeping intercontinental designs. By nature he was not inspired to conquer the world but to restore order. By government mandate in 1809 he was to defend Portugal and possibly—only possibly—to liberate Spain. Always bearing in mind these politico-military circumstances, historians have agreed that the technique for which he is remembered was a dazzlingly successful form of active defense.

With his "hawk's eye" for terrain, he would choose a ridge to defend with a "reverse slope," behind which the mass of his army would lie concealed. How original were these tactics can be judged by General Gneisenau's reaction when Wellington recommended them to the German Army before the battle of Ligny. "My men like to see their enemy," growled Gneisenau. It was the last thing many of his soldiers were to

see. Wellington, having concealed his guns and infantry, would wait until the French and allied skirmishers had given place to the artillery duel and then to the awe-inspiring advance of dense French columns, perhaps 40 deep, up the slope. "The rum dum, the rum dum, the rummadum dummadum, dum dum." The air would vibrate, the earth shake. Any but Wellington's miraculously steady troops would be more than half beaten before the battle was begun. Suddenly his infantry would spring to their feet, a thin red line along the crest. Every musket of every company would bring its rolling fire to bear against the massed French columns, only the first two of whose ranks could safely reply. Inexorably the line would lap round the column's flanks, and the column would break and hurl itself headlong in an avalanche of struggling bodies to the bottom of the hill.

With many variants this was the story of Wellington's great defensive victories: of Vimeiro and Bussaco in Portugal, of Fuentes de Onoro and Sorauren in Spain, of Waterloo itself. We must add two other facts to these peculiarly Wellingtonian tactics if we are to understand why he has been called a defensive general. First, from 1810 to 1812 he practiced what he deliberately termed "my defensive" or "cautious system" in the Peninsula, never cutting himself adrift from, and indeed three times retreating to, his strategic base in Portugal. Second, the retreat of 1810 culminated in the most memorable of Wellington's Peninsular triumphs—the renowned Lines of Torres Vedras. These incredibly ingenious fortifications, devised and supervised in secret by Wellington, said once and for all to his enemy Massena, "You shall not pass."

Did all this nail Wellington down, so to speak, in a static box? Not so. His battlefield tactics were essentially flexible and as mobile as he was himself, always turning up exactly at the critical spots where he was most needed. He compared his own tactics to a knotted rope, the French to a magnificent harness. When the harness broke it was done for. But when the English rope snapped, as at Quatre Bras, he tied a knot or two and went on. And when circumstances were inviting, he could be a dashing commander; at Salamanca 40,000 Frenchmen defeated in 40 minutes; at Oporto a most audacious coup, crossing the River Douro in wine barges by day under Soult's nose.

Finally, a word on his tactical weaknesses: the pursuit and the siege. Despite some victorious cavalry charges, he never got his officers to control themselves or their superb mounts and so never trusted this arm to the full. The pursuit after Vitoria, however, was a failure because, unlike Gneisenau after Waterloo, Wellington did not drive his army on to "hunt by moonlight." Again, despite Ciudad Rodrigo, a flawless siege, Padajoz and San Sebastian were near misses, Almeida and Burgos fiascos. For this I offer two explanations. He underestimated French siege tactics, comparing them with Indian, and he was let down by the Government over equipment.

Wellington and Parliament. That brings me to Parliament. As regards weaponry, the Ordnance Department was quite independent of the War Office and often drove Wellington mad with frustration. Nevertheless, he did obtain from them his splendid "carronades" and shrapnel; the rockets which they foisted on him he distrusted because of their undisciplined behavior. However, the acid test of Wellington's relations with Parliament came over high policy.

Here he found Lord Liverpool, as War Minister and afterwards Prime Minister, both pusillanimous and vacillating. Wellington's bad patch between his victories of Talavera (July 1809) and Bussaco (September 1810) provoked Liverpool into suggesting that Wellington should bring his army home—better

too early than too late—sneaking out from some small port rather than in full view at Lisbon. Wellington replied passionately that if he were forced to embark it would be "like a gentleman out of the hall door . . . and not out of the back door, or by the area." This was April 1810. Six months later Parliament's "creaking" had swung round to bombast. Exalted by Wellington's "Bussaco spectacular," they expected immediate news of another victory, this time a knockout. Imperturbably Wellington replied, "I shall either fight a battle or not as I shall find it advantageous." Ignoring armchair critics at home, he was to find the Lines of Torres Vedras far more "advantageous" than any pitched battle fought to please Parliament.

At the same time Wellington realized that the Government was doing a better job for him than the opposition would, many of whom favored peace with Napoleon. Therefore, during the 1812 campaign he went out of his way—literally as well as metaphorically—to support the Government with military successes. His much criticized strategy after Salamanca, involving the triumphal entry into Madrid and march towards the River Ebro, instead of the preliminary destruction of General Clausel's Army of the North, in my opinion, can largely be explained in that way.

Another difference with Parliament concerned discipline. While Wellington was away in India, various philosophical ideas had percolated through to England from France, introducing the germs of a changed attitude toward common soldiers and citizens. A crusade against savage corporal punishments resulted, as well as the arrival of some "soft" officers on the field, who proved themselves unwilling or unable to maintain order. Hence the early tendency to looting, often winked at by officers right up to Vitoria, but after that eradicated by Wellington's exertions. For these things he blamed Parliament, especially the radicals. His own solution was such perfect discipline that punishments would become unnecessary. He practically achieved this in the Pyrenees.

In concluding this section it must be noted that Wellington was ahead of his time in visualizing a suspension of the party system during war. He would have approved the British coalition governments of Asquith or Churchill in World Wars I or II. As things were in 1809, however, he could only lament that "the country cannot be served in Parliament excepting by people acting in Parties." Far better a "compounding of all parties to support the Government against the Jacobins." By "the Jacobins" Wellington meant what General Montgomery once called "the Stinkers." Indeed Wellington, like many servicemen and most monarchs, neither valued nor properly understood—as he himself admitted—the reason for party politics. His young comrade Charles Napier was warned what to expect if he entered Parliament as an M.P.; after hearing parliamentary debates, "you will probably be as estounded as I have been, how England came by her greatness."

Wellington and the Horse Guards. We must now pass on to the Horse Guards, i.e., War Office, where many of Wellington's brushes with Parliament were fought out. The Horse Guards was presided over by the Commander in Chief of the Army, the noble Duke of York in 1808; and then, after he was caught letting his mistress, Mary Ann Clarke, sell promotions, by a certain old boy named Sir David Dundas. It was over promotions that Wellington first crossed swords with Dundas, finding him understandably cagey on this subject. Wellington was collecting ADC's, having been put in command of the 1809 expeditionary force to Portugal. He had been recommended a likely young fellow, by the name of Alexander Gordon, son of Lord Aberdeen. "But old David is so costive," grumbled Wel-

lington, "that it is difficult to get anything out of him." Maj. George Napier was to find the same difficulty. When trying to ask for promotion, Dundas forestalled him with repeated advice on his health: "Wear flannel, Major, wear flannel." Wellington did eventually succeed in getting Gordon, only to lose him tragically on the field of Waterloo. He also got brevet promotions out of old Dundas after the liberation of Portugal—six majors and 12 captains!

Almost worse than not getting the staff he wanted was receiving military heroes he would have done anything to avoid. Four officers whose advent he particularly dreaded in 1810 were Generals Erskine, Lumley, and Lightburne and Colonel Landers. Erskine and Lumley were inevitable, but "I pray God and the Horse Guards to deliver me from General Lightburne and Colonel Landers." Neither God nor the Horse Guards spared him. However, Erskine, after 3 years of devastating incompetence, including blunders at Sabugal and Almeida, finally delivered Wellington by throwing himself out of a window in a drunken fever.

Another running complaint against the Horse Guards was over reinforcements. Being an exceptionally young general at the beginning of the war, Wellington was considered worthy to command only a small army. Again, the Horse Guards frequently granted leave to his officers at crucial moments. Wellington himself took no leave whatever between 1809 and 1814. Lastly, inefficient siege artillery and tools terribly hampered operations, especially at Badajoz. He never got enough of his favorite siege guns (carronades) from the Ordnance Department. When a rough but good general, Thomas Picton, caught him weeping over the dead in the breaches and exclaimed, "Good God! What's the matter?" Wellington covered his embarrassment by cursing his lack of professional sappers. The eve of Waterloo saw all these War Office sins at their most scarlet—commanders, manpower, equipment, all deficient. "I have got an infamous army," he groaned, "very weak and ill equipped, and a very inexperienced Staff." Yet he always got on well personally with the War Office secretary, Col. Henry Torrens. Well enough to tell him in 1814 that unless positively ordered to do so, he would not command in America, repeat not command against "Jonathan," who needed only one good thrashing, suggested Torrens, to make peace. Wellington had always disapproved of the Anglo-American war of 1812; more so, after his brother-in-law General Pakenham fell at New Orleans.

Wellington and the Navy. The Battle of New Orleans provides a tempting opportunity for moving on to Wellington and the navy. Nevertheless I have to crave indulgence. You will see why. Assuming that navies stick together the world over, you may not wish to hear that Wellington believed Pakenham's defeat had been caused by Admiral Cochrane. In his eagerness to chase prizes, he dumped Pakenham in a hopeless position, either for attack or retreat. From this distance of time, however, the present lecturer, who is Pakenham's great-greatniece by marriage, cannot regret the denouement and Andrew Jackson's victory.

Before leaving the subject of prizes, I must add that during the Peninsular War, Wellington had occasion to criticize the navy for plundering, though of course not nearly so often as he trounced the army for pillaging. He believed the naval blockade of San Sebastian to be relatively ineffective partly because it was more fun to run after prizes. He even had a flaming row about it with his lifelong friend J.W. Croker, the Naval Secretary, in the course of which Croker dared to write officially to the formidable Nosey: "I will take your opinion . . . as to the

most effectual mode of beating a French army, but I have no confidence in your seamanship or nautical skill."

Wellington had been interested in naval plundering ever since he talked to Admiral Nelson at that accidental and strangely undocumented meeting shortly before Trafalgar. Wellington seems to have learned much: that vanity could go with a charisma as unique as Nelson's; that a genius like Nelson could be both "an officer and a statesman"; that Admiral Calder had failed to catch Villeneuve perhaps because prize-ships were easier prey.

Returning to the Peninsular War, I get the impression that Wellington occasionally found sailors just a bit too talented! We hear of marines inventing a new bayonet exercise which would put Burgos at the army's mercy and also an "artificial hill"—to be exact, a tall pole—from which Wellington could survey the field. Adm. Sir Home-Popham at Santander was confident he could get heavy siege guns to Burgos in time. Wellington was not. Earlier, Admiral Berkeley had maddened Wellington by coming up with novel ways of rescuing his army if Napoleon succeeded in driving the English "Leopards," as Napoleon called them, into the sea. "I tremble," wrote Wellington, "when I think I shall have to embark the Leopards in front of Bonaparte aided by such a man, who has already invented twenty new modes of putting Leopards into Boats . . .." In time Wellington learned to work well with Berkeley, though still wishing the admiral "was not so great a General."

The superficial rivalries between the Royal Navy and British Army were notorious. Long ago in India Arthur Wellesley had disliked the idea of serving under Admiral Rainier, and later Admiral Rainier refused to serve under Wellesley. That said, the navy was indispensable to Wellington and he knew it. Without ships the island power could not have undertaken the war or carried it on or brought it to a victorious conclusion. Together the dispatches of Wellington and the French make this clear. Instances of essential cooperation abound. I will only quote the original landings at Mondego Bay in Portugal in 1808 and Wellesley's first march southwards by the coast road in order to keep near his storeships. This meant parting from his Portuguese ally who preferred to march close to the mountains. But proximity to his ships was well worth a tiff with the Portuguese general. It was the navy who prevented Cadiz from ever falling into French hands and thus preserved a Spanish Government. It was the navy who supplied Wellington inside the Lines of Torres Vedras with food, money, ammunition, and reinforcements, so that in the end Massena was besieged, not Wellington. The River Tagus was always full of British gunboats and that part of the Atlantic was what the Romans would have called *mare nostrum*—"our sea." Triumphantly, it was the navy who enabled Wellington to perform his most daring operation of the war—changing his base from Lisbon in the east to Santander in the northwest. While Wellington was making his wonderful march to Vitoria, it was the navy whom he requested to convoy certain vessels from Corunna to Santander loaded with biscuit, flour, heavy artillery, and ammunition.

Wellington and Napoleon. It remains to compare Wellington with Napoleon, if indeed such an operation is possible. Like comparing a lion—or even leopard—with an eagle. A young military historian, Michael Glover, has sagely observed, "their only common characteristic was an overwhelming tendency to be victorious." So much of their genius never overlapped, from Napoleon's dynamic pursuits to Wellington's monolithic prudence. Though born in the same year (1769), their stars decreed that one should be an aristocrat, the other self-made; one in favor of officers being gentlemen, the other of careers

open to the talents. Glancing for a moment a little further down this vista, it is fascinating to contrast Napoleon's flair for gunnery—he commanded the French artillery in Toulon at 25—with Wellington's suspicion of artillery officers. These officers believed more in Woolwich Military Academy than in his ideal of a gentleman's education at the university capped by experience on the field. Of psychological warfare the Corsican was a past master, the Englishman a despiser. When Napoleon announced in December 1809 his imminent arrival "beyond the Pyrenees" and the consequent dash of the "frightened leopard" to his ships, no one knew, or knows even now, whether he really meant to reenter Spain in person or simply to frighten the leopards. Certain it is that though he frightened the British Government, he only made Wellington's "leopards" laugh. Wellington was utterly impervious to that sort of bluff—if bluff it was. Unsusceptible to propaganda, he was, however, once humbugged by Napoleonic strategy. This was just before Waterloo when he confessed frankly, "Napoleon has humbugged me, by God!"

There is no question but that Napoleon had the bigger range of the two. When they were both 35, Napoleon crowned himself Emperor; Wellington was given the Order of the Bath. Was it symbolic? Napoleon was the servant of none; Wellington wrestled with a variety of masters: Parliament, War Office, Ordnance, Monarch, allies, public opinion. True, Napoleon's generals often gave him trouble, but that was not always their fault. In the Peninsula it is hard to decide whether he treated Marshal Soult or his own brother King Joseph worse. Soult retaliated by treating Joseph worse still. The range of Napoleon's mistakes was also greater, such as his strategy in Spain, which he called the "Spanish ulcer."

Napoleon could afford to sacrifice thousands of lives if his grand strategy demanded. Wellington would be on his knees before the Bar of the House of Commons, as he himself said, if he threw away 500. Even the prospect of a great victory had to be renounced if it meant "great loss"—as at San Cristobal before the battle of Salamanca.

Napoleon was a colossus, a tyrant. His ambitions were limitless. Wellington's were properly circumscribed by his country's strong tradition of constitutional government, where great men were welcome but expected to slake their ambitions in service to the state. The steady infantryman to whom Wellington paid such a moving tribute just before Waterloo—"There, it all depends on that article whether we do the business or not. Give me enough of it, and I am sure"—this small scarlet figure and the great duke were drawn together by many homely virtues: patience, steadiness, above all, attention to duty. Napoleon, only half the physical size of his gigantic Grenadiers, shared their scale of values. It was summed up in the Napoleonic battle-cry, "Vive l'Empereur!"

Tolstoy has said that Napoleon was mere moonlight to Lincoln's sun. Wellington had a touch of true sunlight, though it might seem no more at times than a wintry ray. Are great men born,

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

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he was once asked, in response to the needs of the times? No, he replied with characteristic realism: Napoleon was not a man but a principle (the principle of absolute power) and could have appeared at any period. Yet the times had brought forth Wellington, that freedom should not perish from the earth.

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. . . that long-nosed Bugger [Wellington] that beats the French.

Remark by a British private in the Peninsula, 1811

A key issue that confronts naval strategists in every age is whether they are planning for tomorrow or for yesterday—Are the weapons, ships, aircraft, and tactical doctrine suitable to achieve victory in combat or are they the product of precedent and familiarity? One of the progressive thinkers in the Japanese Navy prior to World War II, Adm. Shigeyoshi Inoue, held that the Imperial Navy was not recognizing the impact of the submarine and aircraft on naval warfare. He contended that the Japanese building program, which centered on battleships, was looking in the wrong direction. What lessons can we learn from Admiral Inoue's example?

A CHESS GAME WITH NO CHECKMATE:

ADMIRAL INOUE AND THE PACIFIC WAR

An article prepared

by

Commander Sadao Seno, Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force

At the eve of World War II, the Japanese Navy was one of the three largest navies of the world and was perhaps "number one" in real power among the big three. By August 1945, after 3½ years of continuous war in the Pacific, this formidable naval force lay decimated, possessing almost no power. At the opening of the war, the Imperial Japanese Navy had 10 aircraft carriers, 10 battleships, 41 cruisers, 111 destroyers, 64 submarines, 29 auxiliary ships, four coastal defense units, et cetera—a total of 396 ships with a displacement of 1,429,000 tons—and 3,302 aircraft. Its aircraft carriers outnumbered those of both the fleets of the U.S. Navy and the Royal Navy; in battleships the *Yamato* and *Musashi*, displacing 70,000 tons and carrying nine 18-inch main batteries, were much more powerful than those of other navies.

Since 1,187 vessels totaling 1,137,000 tons and 30,295 aircraft were constructed during the war, the total force available to the Imperial Navy was 1,583 ships of 2,566,000 tons and 33,597 aircraft. In this struggle, in which hundreds of thousands of patriots were to die in vain, the final tally of the operating force was one small aircraft carrier, no battleships or heavy cruisers, three light cruisers, 30 destroyers, 12 submarines, and three auxiliaries—a total of 49 vessels of 96,000 tons—and 5,886 aircraft. Among the personnel casualties suffered in action were two full admirals, nine vice admirals, 56 rear

admirals and 259 captains. The loss of naval personnel totaled more than 466,000. No such a debacle in history can be found. This raises the question, Could no Japanese naval officer foresee such a tragedy before the war?

Some 28 years have passed since the war ended. As a Japanese naval officer who has carefully studied a massive amount of United States and Japanese related material concerning the war, the conflict seems to have been predestined. However, even though it was predestined, one wonders if there was not a strategy available by which Japan could have escaped such a miserable defeat. Didn't any of the excellent line or staff officers of the Japanese Navy develop suitable plans to avoid defeat, fully realizing what seemed to be the inevitability of the approaching war?

Since the war many have claimed that they had recommended courses of action to the leadership before or during the war which, if followed, would have saved Japan from a humiliating defeat. Comparing these claims with the actual recorded facts reveals that in many cases the postwar critics were only partially reliable. In some cases it is apparent that the recommendations some officers claimed to have made before or during the war were, in fact, the lessons they had learned in combat and in defeat.

Nevertheless, there was one admiral who submitted to the Minister of the Navy an official naval plan with specific and concrete recommendations for the conduct of the coming war, recommendations which apparently would have been able to overcome many hard lessons Japan learned in the war. This plan seems to have gauged with amazing foresight the essence of the coming war as viewed in January 1941. In the same month a conference between the leaders of the Navy Ministry and the Navy General Staff was convened to discuss a proposal for naval procurement in the period 1942-1946. The draft was prepared by the General Staff of the Navy. The plan, named "Maru Go" (literally Number Five) Supplementary Armament Plan, called for the following:

Ship/Aircraft	Number
Battleship (*Yamato* type)	3
Supercruiser*	2
Aircraft Carrier	3
Cruiser (medium)	5
Cruiser (small)	4
Destroyer	32
Submarine	45
Miscellaneous	65
Total Displacement	about 650,000 tons
Operational Air Squadron	67 squadrons 1,320 aircraft (132 squadrons total at completion)
Training Air Squadron	93 squadrons 2,138 aircraft (156 squadrons total at completion)

*Supercruisers were scheduled to be 17,000 tons displacement with six 12-inch main batteries. (They were never built.)

Source: "Maru Go" Preliminary Requirement Armament Plan of the General Staff of the Navy (contained in official records of the Second Demobilization Liquidation Bureau, Liquidation Division, Repatriation Relief Agency, Welfare Ministry. This bureau is the last remnant of the Imperial Navy Ministry).

The head of the Second Department of the Navy General Staff, who was in charge of making up the supplemental armament plan, explained its contents. He strongly recommended that the Navy Ministry staff seek budget support to implement this plan in the following fiscal year, in view of the deteriorating international situation.

The Strategic Concept of the Imperial Japanese Navy. It was not until 1907 that an imperial defense policy was enacted, but once this policy was set, forces necessary to defend the Japanese Empire were established and a principle of operation (*Yohei-Koryo*) was drawn up. The latter became the fundamental national strategy for the deployment of forces. At that time Russia, the United States, Germany, and France were listed as hypothetical enemies. The Imperial Army was assigned the leading role in operations against Russia and the Imperial Navy against the United States, a decision based on the geography and principal armaments of these potential enemies. In view of the potential difference in power between these adversaries and Japan, it was considered risky to fight more than one enemy at the same time. Therefore, the objective of Japanese diplomacy was to ensure that no more than one enemy would be engaged militarily. Making it a general rule to fight a lightning-quick war, it was believed that the Empire would be able to manage singular conflict situations if the Imperial Army could gain victory in a war with Russia or if the Imperial Navy could do the same against the United States. In planning its naval campaign against the United States, the Imperial Navy would assume a strategic defense posture. Under such a concept the enemy would be drawn into the Western Pacific and given a fatal blow when exhausted at the extremity of his journey. This strategy was necessary to provide Japan with a favorable margin of strength necessary to compensate for smaller or, at best, equal naval force compared to that of the U.S. Navy.

After 1907 Japanese defense policy was revised three times—at the close of World War I, again in 1922 after the Washington Naval Conference, and for the third time in 1936 when the naval building holidays were about to expire. In 1917 Germany and France were deleted from the list of hypothetical enemies. China was added to the list in 1917 and Great Britain in 1936. The procedure of operation in a war with the United States was described by the *Yohei-Koryo* of 1917 as follows:

> In the outset of a war, the Navy will gain control over the United States fleet in the Orient, and at the same time destroy the enemy's naval bases in Luzon and Guam in co-operation with the Army. The Navy will try to reduce gradually the force of the enemy fleet units in transit and destroy them totally with our capital fleet units, seizing an opportunity when the main body of the enemy fleet proceeds toward the Orient.

The Imperial Navy had drawn up its war plan on the assumption that the United States would invade Japan. The Japanese believed the invasion inevitable, owing to the strategic commitment of the U.S. Navy to support U.S. Far Eastern policy. They believed that the enemy would strike soon after war broke out, and their suspicions were believed verified by intelligence information gathered on a continuing basis.[1] In actual fact, the U.S. Navy had had such an invasion strategy since it first began to write war plans against Japan.[2]

The operational doctrine of the Imperial Navy employed the interception battle principle. In its early days this principle envisioned:

- The dominant U.S. fleet with a main body consisting of battleships

advancing to fight a decisive battle with the Imperial Navy.

- The Imperial Navy setting up early warning lines in the vicinity of the Bonin Islands.
- In full strength, the Imperial Navy intercepting and destroying the enemy fleet with a decisive blow in the seas adjacent to mainland Japan.

Later -because of changes in strategic thinking brought about by developments in weaponry and by the Japanese acquisition of the Marianas, Marshall, and Caroline Islands following World War I--the operational doctrine was revised. However, the principle that the Imperial Navy would destroy the enemy fleet in a decisive battle was kept intact. The outline of the interception operational procedure was as follows:

> a. At the opening of war the Imperial Navy destroys the U.S. Fleet in the Orient. The Imperial Army and Navy co-operate to capture Luzon and neighboring strategic points including Guam in order to completely destroy enemy bases in the Western Pacific.
>
> b. The Imperial Navy dispatches its submarine force to the vicinity of the main units of the United States Fleet to watch the movement of the enemy. The submarine force shadows the enemy fleet when it sorties, trying to reduce the enemy force by repeated attack while shadowing.
>
> c. The Imperial Navy deploys to the Marianas, Marshall and Caroline Islands its land-based naval air forces which attack the enemy fleet jointly with aircraft carrier forces when the enemy fleet enters within range and tries to further reduce the enemy forces thereby.
>
> d. The Imperial Navy carries out a night attack supported by high-speed battleships and strikes a heavy blow at the enemy. At dawn, following the night encounter, the Japanese Fleet fights a decisive battle with all its forces, the nucleus of which is battleships, and destroys the enemy.[3]

The military preparations, fleet organization, education, and discipline stressing such a strategy had been in effect for more than 30 years prior to the actual outbreak of hostilities. The greater part of the Imperial Navy officers believed that if Japan were to engage in a war with the United States that this operational doctrine should be followed exclusively. As such, they devoted themselves to the study of how to best apply advances in weapons to support this basic operational doctrine. While this concept of interception had been generally accepted as doctrine, the development of naval aviation sponsored serious objections to it.

Since the Washington and London Conferences relegated the Imperial Navy to a position of relative inferiority, certain elements in naval leadership strove to develop an air arm that would make up for the inferior numbers of combatant ships. By 1934 the progress made in aircraft, aerial weapons, and aeronautical technology became so rapid as to convince officers engaged in aircraft development that battleships could be sunk by air attack. When word of the construction of super battleships leaked within navy circles, some air-oriented officers argued that the money could be better spent for aircraft and associated equipment. They criticized the battleship plan as obsolete and urged the abolishment of the battleship in lieu of aircraft as the principal weapon of the fleet. Because of insufficient research, however, even those who supported adoption of aircraft as the principal combatant could only envision using the aircraft in a combat environment. There were almost none among them who urged changing the basic pattern of naval warfare because of the development of aircraft. As might be expected,

this opinion—aircraft as the principal weapon—was being sponsored by persons concerned with aviation, especially the young officers, and their impact had little effect on the important decision-makers of the navy who felt the opinions of the young officers to be like the barking of young pups.

Military Preparations in the Era of Showa (1926-1945) Planned by the Minds of the Meiji Era (1868-1912). All the attendants from Navy Ministry who were involved in the draft of the Supplementary Armament Plan in January 1941 thought it would be very difficult to enact because of its huge budgetary requirement. Those who might have taken issue with it thought there was no use complaining, even though it greatly bothered them, because of the simple fact that the plan was prepared by the Navy General Staff which was extremely powerful. With one exception, there was no person from the Navy Ministry who dared to criticize, and the general atmosphere of the conference made ministry representatives feel that the draft was an accomplished fact.

Vice Adm. Shigeyoshi Inoue attended the conference as Chief of the Department of Naval Aeronautics, Navy Ministry. Although Lt. Comdr. James E. Auer, USN, who studied the history of the postwar Japanese Navy calls Admiral Inoue the "General Billy Mitchell" of Japan, Inoue was never a "brown-shoe" admiral.[4] He was instead considered a political-military expert because he had served as Chief of the Military Affairs Section and of the Military Affairs Bureau of the Ministry. He never had duty in the naval air force but, realizing the importance of naval airpower and desiring to gain a position of command concerned with the air force, he was appointed Chief of the Department of Naval Aeronautics in the fall of 1940. He harbored strong convictions that naval warfare would be fundamentally changed by the developments in naval aircraft and that the days of the battleship had already passed away. The supplementary draft seemed unwise to Inoue who considered it to be a case of making military preparations for the Era of Showa using old Meiji Era thinking. He doubted whether the General Staff had studied the problem of national defense in sufficient depth. He said:

> I have read the plan and have heard the explanation of it, but, allow me to tell you that the plan is too old-fashioned. It looks like military preparation plans of the era of Meiji or Taisho [1912-1926]. According to your explanation, we need to have .8 "A" battleships because the United States Navy will have "A" battleships, we must have .8 "B" carriers because the United States Navy will have "B" aircraft carriers. The plan aims to have a certain rate of various type of ships maintained by the United States Navy. The plan is very mediocre, blindly following the American ship construction program. The plan calls for the construction of ships, but contains no explanation as to what kind of war we are to wage, what weaponry is necessary for victory, or what category or quantity of weapons is necessary. Such a country as Japan has special characteristics which require creative thinking; this plan has nothing unique or suitable to Japan's peculiarities. Our country is not rich enough that we can appropriate the massive budget necessary for a defective plan such as this. We will not be able to win a war with the United States with such a plan even if it be carried out completely. Even if we spend the money required by this plan, I think it can be more wisely utilized. I think the General Staff

should withdraw this plan and study the situation more carefully.[5]

Inoue's comments were so critical that the members of the General Staff suffered a complete loss of face. However, the proponents of the plan could not find any way to answer his charges, and the conference was adjourned without discussing the plan further.

"Shingunbi Keikaku Ron"—A Thesis for Modern Military Procurement Planning. Admiral Inoue had intended to express his own views on the major weak points in the Navy General Staff plan after its representatives responded to his criticism, but the sponsors of the plan did not provide him with that opportunity. Since the drafting of new military procurement plans was a primary job of the General Staff and not a subject to be addressed by the Department of Naval Aeronautics, Inoue did not pursue the matter further at the time, leaving the immediate restudy effort to the General Staff. Nevertheless, Inoue was aware that his criticism had become a bombshell but did not want to be known as a critic for criticism's sake and took no satisfaction in destroying the hard work of other men.

As such, Inoue continued to ponder over the problem and several weeks later wrote a thesis entitled "Shingunbi Keikaku Ron" (Modern Military Procurement Planning). The principal points of this paper were "the obsolescence of the battleship" and "the conversion of the Navy to an Air Force." He submitted the document to the Navy Minister, describing his ideas on the coming war as follows:

> In considering the conduct of a war the Empire might fight with the United States, depending on military preparations, it is possible that the Empire might not be defeated, and such must by all means be the case, but it is impossible for Japan to defeat America and obtain that nation's surrender. The reasons which are listed below are very clear and simple:
>
> a. It is impossible to capture all American territory because the United States is extremely large.
>
> b. It is also impossible to capture the capital of the U.S. for the same reason listed in item "a" above.
>
> c. It is impossible for Japan to destroy all America's operational forces.
>
> d. Since the United States has abundant natural resources and strategic materials and does not therefore rely on foreign imports to any great extent, Japan will be unable to exert significant pressure on the U.S. by means of a blockade.
>
> e. It would be almost impossible for Japan to blockade the United States by sea in any case because of America's long Atlantic and Pacific coastlines which are located far away from the Empire.
>
> f. Further, it is impossible for Japan to completely blockade the U.S. since that nation occupies the central position of the North American continent and has land borders with other nations.

Although operational difficulties resulting from the long distance between the United States and Japan across the Pacific are common to both countries, Inoue believed that an American invasion of Japan would be much different in character than any attempted Japanese invasion of the United States. He listed the enemy's capabilities as follows:

- It is possible for the U.S. to occupy all Japanese territory.

- It is thus also possible for the U.S. to take Japan's capital.
- It is possible for the U.S. to destroy all of Japan's operational forces.
- The United States has the golden opportunity to drain Japan's resources and strategic materials with a sea blockade or by controlling the sealanes.
- It is not technically impossible for the U.S. to carry out a sea blockade of Japan.

Viewing Admiral Inoue's points today, it seems that he only listed self-evident truths, but it is necessary to review the international and domestic situations of the time to understand why he described his idea so basically. The European war had begun in September 1939 with the Nazi invasion of Poland, and following the successful blitzkrieg of the European Continent, Great Britain was considered to be in a very precarious position. These events, coupled with the signing of the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy in September 1940, evoked a euphoria in the leadership of the Imperial Japanese Army and in the majority of Japanese people.[6] They believed that with Germany on the side of Japan neither the United States nor Great Britain could take any effective action against Japan.

Inoue warned that the time of a great revolution in naval strategy had already come, brought about by the progress in aircraft- and submarine technology. He stated:

> In former times we could compensate for all our deficiencies and provide for our national defense by possessing a naval force which could not be defeated in a decisive battle with the United States. Progress in the development of the submarine and the aircraft, however, have brought about a great revolution in naval strategy. We must be aware of the fact that we cannot any longer evaluate the outcome of a war only by the concept of major sea battles as in the past.

Since war is relative, he stated, situational rather than following a fixed pattern, it is very difficult to predict the exact nature of a future war. Nevertheless, he confidently predicted the general outline as follows:

> a. The United States will deploy many submarines in the seas adjacent to Japan and across Japan's vital sealanes, blockading Japan and tenaciously destroying its sea commerce jointly with American aircraft. To continue to exist and carry on the war, Japan must certainly secure its sea routes from attacks by U.S. submarines and aircraft. The securing of sea routes will be one of the most important operations in a war between the United States and Japan.
>
> b. Japan will deploy many submarines and aircraft to counter attacks from the sea, and the enemy will take measures to capture our bases with aircraft attacks. Operations of this type will take place in the Philippines, Formosa, the Palau Islands, the Micronesian Islands, and in the Northern Pacific, the latter only in some seasons. The United States will attempt to make air raids to the Japanese mainland when it has good opportunities . . . *It is quite unlikely a decisive fleet battle involving battleships will take place unless the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Fleet is very ignorant and reckless* [Italics added] . . . instead this struggle over island bases will be the primary mode of operations in the war between the United States and Japan. It is no exaggeration to say that the future of the Empire depends on the success or failure of this operation, the importance

of which is equal to that of the decisive battles between fleets of capital ships in the old days.

c. The Empire will virtually rule the Western Pacific by capturing all U.S. territories in the area such as the Philippines, etc. and the battles [in the Western Pacific area] can be almost brought to their final issue. It should of course be remembered that the meaning of control of the sea is not as absolute in the days of the submarine as it was in the old days.

d. Japan should offensively deploy as many submarines as possible around Hawaii and the American mainland and attack enemy's ships as well as interrupting its sealanes at every opportunity. Since submarines will scarcely ever succeed in detecting a west bound sortie of enemy warships and then be able to shadow and report such movements, we should employ our submarines exclusively in an offensive attack role.

By Inoue's reasoning the United States-Japanese clash would have the characteristics of a protracted war with repetitious situations as neither the United States nor Japan would be able to gain a predominant advantage. Following this logic, it becomes obvious that the lightning quick war which had long been studied would not take place. Thus, even if Japan actually would acquire those forces necessary for the decisive fleet encounter, they would not be adequate. Inoue considered that Japan's preoccupation with the decisive fleet encounter failed to take into consideration other serious strategic threats and thus placed the Empire in jeopardy. "We must recognize the danger," he warned, "that the Empire might have to yield to the enemy by being attacked at its weakest points while we have no opportunity to execute the decisive fleet encounter.

He specified the military preparations the Imperial Navy should take:

a. The Empire should prepare forces necessary to secure the sea routes the nation needs for its existence and for the conduct of the war. Since the Empire needs to hold the lines connecting Japan, Manchuria, and China as well as those in the Western Pacific including the Dutch East Indies, it is absolutely necessary to protect them during the war. In order to do this we can expect to be opposed by aircraft, submarines, and mobile ship task forces. We thus should maintain and operate forces to cope with these threats.

b. Since the Imperial Navy needs to secure its own strategic lines of communications for its forces which will operate from sea and air bases in Western Pacific islands and from other bases, we should maintain forces necessary to do so. The enemy forces we can expect to be opposed by in these operations are the same as those listed in paragraph "a" above and our forces to oppose them should be similar. The point we must be very aware of is that we have had no experience in fighting enemies with submarines in either the Russo-Japanese War or in the China Incident [1937-present]; and since we have had the good fortune never to have been attacked on the communication routes listed in paragraphs "a" and "b" . . ., we are likely to ignore the problems involved should this come about. In a future war with the United States we have to very seriously consider this since it is very likely that the United States will stress

attacking the Empire at its weakest points.

c. The Imperial Navy should prepare forces necessary for defense (strategic not tactical defense) against enemy ships entering the Western Pacific. Since we have considered only that a decisive fleet encounter will resolve everything and have only tried to prepare for the moment of this battle, the concept of such a strategic defense has not been considered except by nations which are inferior seapowers. But in the present days with the rapid progress in submarine and aircraft technology, likelihood of a decisive fleet encounter involving battleships is virtually nonexistent if the Imperial Navy has powerful submarine and air forces. The dominant role of aircraft means that capital ships coming within range will be destroyed [before the large ships can engage each other].

d. The requirement of paragraphs "a"-"c" above can be met by securing control of the air with a dominant air force, by the operations of many submarines, and by building numerous convoy vessels and powerful mobile sea task forces.

e. The Imperial Navy should build submarines which can be deployed to the coastal areas of the United States to attack American ships and interrupt U.S. supply routes.

f. The Imperial Navy should build operational forces capable of capturing enemy island bases. As mentioned in the previous chapter, in a war with the United States our operations to seize American territories in the Pacific are of the highest importance for advancing and extending the range of our naval aircraft while hindering the operations of enemy aircraft, submarines and naval ships. Therefore, it is mandatory for the Empire to study and build the most suitable types and quantities of ships and aircraft to conduct such operations.

> The old idea [of the Imperial Navy] has been to maintain forces constructed for a decisive fleet battle. For capturing enemy territories and bases the Imperial Navy keeps the old plan of organizing an invasion fleet, using a portion of the decisive fleet encounter forces and older types of ships which cannot be used in the front lines. At the present time, when no decisive fleet encounter is likely, however, we should plan and construct forces designed for seizing bases from the outset, rejecting the old idea. The reason of course is that the invasion operations have come to supersede the old decisive fleet encounter operations as the most important.
>
> We should consider that the capture and use of enemy air bases is truly equal to the destruction of enemy battleships in former times.

In his conclusion Admiral Inoue emphasized that the Imperial Navy should have a strong air force. The reinforcement of air and submarine power, he strongly stated, was not only absolutely essential but also made "possible the reduction of other kinds of forces provided enough of those two vital forces were maintained."

Inoue appealed further for reconsideration of the concepts of sea and air control in light of new technology. He warned again of the obvious necessity of the Empire to control the Western Pacific but also cautioned paying heed to the following points:

> The meaning of control of the sea is hereafter a three dimensional one. In the day of the submarine

and the aircraft, control of the sea is not absolute as in the days before the submarine. We have no control of the sea without control of the air and considerable control of the sea if we can obtain control of the air . . .. The Empire should hold control of the air in the Western Pacific as a prerequisite to control of the sea. The concept of control of the air has not been emphasized. In former days when a decisive fleet encounter was all important, control of the air was limited to the local scene of the decisive battle and was not considered as the prerequisite to control of the sea. Air power has been regarded only as a contribution of our aircraft to a decisive fleet encounter at the scene of battle. Specifically, in former times when carrier aircraft were considered to be the prime element of naval air force, air power and sea power were considered to be mutually dependent and a naval air force without carrier aircraft was not contemplated. Consequently we could not gain control of the air in the fleet operating area until we obtained local control of the sea with seagoing forces. Recently, with the development of the land-based aircraft, however, these aircraft along with seaplanes have become the main element of air power and thus control of the air can be obtained without the prerequisite control of the sea. Control of the air can be obtained without naval ships but with an air force alone. It has come to pass that we should think of control of the air by such an air force independent of naval ships as prerequisite of control of the sea.

As seen from the foregoing, Inoue felt the Imperial Navy's preparatory plan had grave faults. While the plan should have been updated to implement the technical advances in submarine and aircraft technology, it remained unrevised. He attributed this static thinking to a carryover from the philosophy of capital ship production rations in the disarmament treaty days but warned of the danger "of even though acknowledging the recent progress of the medium-type, land-based attack aircraft, the excellent seaplanes, and other new aircraft, continuing to plan in outmoded military preparation concepts, overlooking defects and putting in effect a plan which will continue the already attained obsolescence into the future."

Deaf to Suggestion. Vice Admiral Inoue initially wanted to submit his thesis to the Navy Minister as a personal opinion, but at the request of Rear Admiral Yamagata, head of the Administrative Division, he personally delivered it to the Minister, Adm. Koshiro Oikawa, as an official document of the Department of Naval Aeronautics. When he handed it to the Minister, Inoue repeatedly requested, "Please do not pigeonhole it. If I were a merchant I would request a receipt but I cannot do that to the Navy Minister! But I would appreciate your acknowledgement of receipt."

The Minister stated, "I have received it."[7]

Although Admiral Inoue's recommendations were farsighted, predicting the subsequent events of the Pacific War accurately, they did not influence any change in thinking on the part of the Navy General Staff. The staff remained obsessed with the ideas of ratios, superiority of huge ships with big guns, and with the concept of a decisive fleet encounter.[8] Inoue was viewed coldly as a member of the anti-United States-Japanese war faction headed by Adm. Isoroku Yamamoto and was transferred (in reality, eased out of the Ministry) in August 1941 to the post of Commander in Chief, 4th Fleet.

Not only was Inoue transferred, but his "Modern Military Procurement Planning" thesis was never found later in the official documents of the Imperial Navy, and there is no indication that it ever was reviewed by naval leadership. The only reference to the manuscript to be found was in a change of command record of the Department of Naval Aeronautics of August 1941 when Vice Admiral Inoue was succeeded by Vice Admiral Katagiri. The manuscript was almost destroyed after the war but fortunately was salvaged and is now in the War History Office of the Japan Defense Agency in Tokyo. It shows evidence of having been recorded as Department of Naval Aeronautics top secret document number 798. Six typewritten copies were made; the original was given to the Navy Minister, and one copy was sent to the Vice Minister, Vice Adm. Teijiro Toyota, on 30 January 1941, and four copies were retained in the files of the Department of Naval Aeronautics.

The concept of a decisive fleet encounter which had been taught as gospel at the Imperial Navy War College, in the fleet, and the other echelons of the navy would not die easily. The General Staff —whose "Maru Go" Supplementary Armament Plan had been thoroughly criticized by Admiral Inoue—submitted a draft "Maru Roku" (Number Six) Supplementary Armament Plan to a new conference in October of the same year. Elements of the plan are shown in the figure below.

The Imperial Navy felt it had won history's most perfect victory by the "decisive fleet encounter strategy" in the Battle of Tsushima during the Russo-Japanese War. In World War I the navy did not participate in major battles and failed to learn from the Battle of Jutland that a decisive fleet encounter was not likely unless both sides wished to engage in such a confrontation. Neither did the Japanese take serious note of the fact that even a continental power such as Germany was forced to surrender because of an internal collapse resulting from a sea blockade, despite the stalemate on the Western front.

The Imperial Navy leadership earnestly asserted that it could compensate for the inferiority in numbers of ships

Ship/Aircraft	Number
Battleship (*Yamato* type)	4
Supercruiser	4
Aircraft Carrier	3
Cruiser	12
Destroyer	34
Submarine	67
Miscellaneous	130
Total Displacement	more than 800,000 tons
Operational Air Squadron	68 squadrons
Training Air Squadron	68 squadrons
	(200 squadrons total at completion)

Source: "Maru Roku" (Number Six) Preliminary Requirement Armament Plan of the General Staff of the Navy (contained in official records of the Second Demobilization Liquidation Bureau, Liquidation Division, Repatriation Relief Agency, Welfare Ministry). The plan was for the period beginning 1945. In those days the last year of the previous plan overlapped the first year of the next. (See previous listing.)

established by the limitations of the naval disarmament treaties with an intangible: "quality." However, in this writer's opinion, this was fuzzy thinking which only considered the capabilities of individual combatants. *Quality*, after all, meant equipping existing ships with larger or more guns, and this concept really meant *quantity* as well. It is apparent that Admiral Inoue's "Modern Military Procurement Planning"—the essence of which was a strategy for fortification of Western Pacific islands and the best possible uses of land-based aircraft and submarines—was the best of its time. Its objective called for a qualitative revolution in naval strategy and tactics, and the concept contained a clear understanding of the nature of the coming war.

A Chess Game with No Checkmate. In the days prior to World War II, the General Staff of the Imperial Navy, bolstered by a tradition of successive victories and no defeat dating from the time of the Sino-Japanese War, assumed a "holier than thou" attitude. The General Staff kept Vice Adm. Yuzuru (which means "concede") Hiraga of the Imperial Navy's Construction Corps at a distance since he never agreed to their excessive requirements for ships' armament and gave Hiraga the nickname "Yuzurazu" (never concede). As a result of their design specifications, the destroyer *Sawarabi* and the torpedo boat *Tomozuru* overturned in storms in 1932 and 1934, respectively. Additionally, in a powerful typhoon of 1935 the bows of two destroyers, *Hatsuyuki* and *Yugiri*, broke off; the same storm destroyed the superstructures of several aircraft carriers and destroyers. Damage to these ships was the responsibility of naval planners (unlike Hiraga) who acceded passively to the General Staff's demands for excessively high speed and heavy armament relative to ship displacement. A commission was finally established for the implementation of improvements to such warships and then retired Admiral Hiraga was requested to join the commission as an adviser. Complete strength tests were conducted for all combatants, and all necessary improvements were made to reinforce defective ships. At the same time, naval ship designers adopted standards for safety in future ship construction. The typhoons of 1932, 1934, and 1935 pointed out the lack of realism in ship design, but the General Staff was still unwilling to seriously examine the conceptual faults in its armament planning.

Likening a future war between the United States and Japan to a chess game, Admiral Inoue would explain that Japan could not checkmate the United States, while the latter did have the capability to execute such a fate vis-a-vis Japan. He remained adamantly opposed to war with the United States, declaring it was foolish to try to engage in a "chess game" in which there was no chance for a checkmate. He was seriously worried about the inevitability of war with the United States, particularly following the signing of the Tripartite Pact.

The Imperial Japanese Navy at first opposed the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact. Through the Hiranuma, Abe, and Yonai Cabinets (January 1939-July 1940), primarily because of Navy opposition, signature of the agreement had been forestalled despite strong backing of the pact by the Japanese Army. The navy's opposition was led primarily by the trio of the Navy Minister (and onetime Prime Minister) Adm. Mitsumasa Yonai; the Vice Minister, Vice Adm. Isoroku Yamamoto; and the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, Shigeyoshi Inoue. The army was highly incensed by this opposition, and there were rumors of assassination attempts by ultrarightists on the lives of Yamamoto and Inoue. Finally, the Imperial Army purged the Yonai Cabinet with a poison—i.e., the Army Minister, Gen.

Shunroku Hata resigned and the army would not assign a replacement, thereby forcing Yonai's Cabinet to fail. The subsequent Konoe Cabinet forced the Imperial Navy to accede to the Tripartite Pact by appointing Admiral Oikawa as Navy Minister. Navy acceptance was induced by fears of a civil war pitting the army against the navy following the discovery of another army coup d'etat plan after the famous 2-2-6 incident of 1936.

The second Konoe Cabinet was followed by Tojo's Cabinet in which "army and navy cooperation" became, at the Emperor's request, a supreme order. The result was an assumption of leadership in the navy by a group of compromising men. Admiral Inoue was "banished" to the Naval Academy from October 1942 to August 1944 where as superintendent he prohibited the midshipmen from answering letters from army cadets. "The Imperial Army is like a shogunate which ignores the Greatest General of the Army [the Emperor]. Prussia was not a nation which had an army, but was an army which had a nation. Our cooperation with the Prussian-like Imperial Japanese Army will destroy our nation."[9]

Tojo began to rapidly lose his support among the people after the fall of Saipan in 1944, and on 18 July of that year his Cabinet finally fell. In the succeeding Koiso Cabinet, Admiral Yonai was recalled to active duty and assumed the post of Navy Minister. The rapidly expanding forces of the United States landed at Leyte and soon recaptured the Philippines. Premier Koiso, however, spoke only of continuing the war, stating loudly, "Leyte is a ten-no-zan" (decisive turning point in an old popular battle). Opposing the Prime Minister once again, the Imperial Navy began preparing the ground for peace. Soon after Yonai became Navy Minister he asked Inoue, still at the Naval Academy, to assume the post of Vice Minister. He did on 5 August. After 10 days of listening to morning battle reports, the new Vice Minister—astonished at how really desperate the situation was—stated to the Minister, "There is no use in continuing this war any longer. May I be permitted to begin preparing for peace henceforth?"

The minister replied, "It is quite all right. You are permitted."

On 29 August, exactly 1 year prior to the end of the war, the Vice Minister transferred Rear Adm. Sokichi Takagi from his job as head of the Education Bureau of the Navy Ministry to a minor post on the General Staff without routine duties. Takagi was also assigned as a researcher to the Naval War College, supposedly because of ill health, an arrangement that would allow him to maneuver behind the scenes.

The Koiso Cabinet resigned in April 1945 after the American forces had taken Iwo Jima and invaded Okinawa. General Koiso was succeeded as Prime Minister by Adm. Kantaro Suzuki, the most senior living naval officer; Yonai

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

Comdr. Sadao Seno, Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF), is a 1945 graduate of the Imperial Japanese Naval Academy, and before the conclusion of World War II served on the cruiser *Oyodo* and as a student in the Submarine School. Following the war he served on the carrier *Katsuragi,* transporting repatriated Japanese soldiers, and subsequently as commanding officer of a minesweeper, active in sweeping the Inland Sea. He is a graduate of the Gunnery Officers Ordnance School (U.S. Navy), of the Japanese Maritime Staff College, and has served as editor in the War History Office of the Defense College and as editor of the JMSDF periodical *Kansen to Anzen* (Naval Ships and Safety). Commander Seno is currently doing research at the Maritime Staff College on the Pacific War.

remained as Navy Minister; and Inoue also continued as Vice Minister. (On 15 May Inoue was promoted to full admiral and subsequently vacated the Vice Minister's job and was given the title of military counselor.) After 4½ months more of desperate fighting, the Suzuki Cabinet finally managed to conclude the war, a war in which Admiral Inoue foresaw no opportunity for successful prosecution by Japan, given its strategy and supporting weapons.

NOTES

1. In October 1920 the Imperial Navy obtained a U.S. Navy classified document entitled "Overseas Campaign" written by three naval officers: J.J. Yarnel, W.S. Pye, and H.H. Frost. Sokichi Takagi, *Shikan Taiheiyo Senso* (My Private Views on the Pacific War) (Tokyo: Bungei Shunju sha, 1969), pp. 64-66.

2. Louis Morton, *The War in the Pacific--Strategy and Command: the First Two Years* (Washington: Military History Department of the Army, 1962), pp. 21-44.

3. War History Office, *Hawaii Sakusen* (Hawaii Operation) (Tokyo: National Defense College, Japan Defense Agency, 1967), p. 38.

4. James E. Auer, *The Postwar Rearmament of Japanese Maritime Forces: 1945-71* (New York: Praeger, 1973), p. 276, n. 23.

5. Thirty-seventh Class, Imperial Naval Academy, *Kaigun Seikatsu no Omoide* (Recollections of Navy Life), 1957, v. II, pp. 38-39. Admiral Inoue was the number two ranking midshipman of the 37th graduating class of the Naval Academy.

6. An example of the frenzied atmosphere of the Navy Ministry is quoted as follows from Auer, p. 23: "Yale-educated Rear Admiral Zenshiro Hoshina, head of the Naval Ordnance Bureau, frankly warned at a prewar conference that adequate logistics for a war with the United States were impossible, but was pressured into reversing his position by several middle level officers."

7. Personal interviews with Admiral Inoue after the war.

8. The Chief of the General Staff of the Imperial Navy reported to the Emperor in November 1941 as follows: "Concerning a decisive battle with the United States Capital Fleet, we have acceptable odds in our favor, as I explained the other day, from the viewpoint of the enemy's and our potential power and [our] advantage in position . . ." "Heiki ni yoru Sakusen Keikaku Gosetsumei ni kansuru Ken" (Explanation of War Plan from War Games) (8 November 1941), *Josokankei Tsuzuri* (File of Reports to His Majesty) (Tokyo: War History Office, Japan Defense Agency), v. I.

9. Source unknown to publisher at time of printing.

Ψ

In times of peace the general staff should plan for all contingencies of war. Its archives should contain the historical details of the past, and all statistical, geographical, topographical, and strategic treatises and papers for the present and future.

Jomini: Précis de l'Art de la Guerre, 1838

THE JAPANESE SELF-DEFENSE FORCE

While the post-World War II world has witnessed a resurgence of Japanese economic and political power, her military strength has remained relatively insignificant. However, the implementation of the Nixon Doctrine has forced Japan into a position of seriously considering the necessity of rearmament. The extent and direction of this defense–oriented rearmament remains to be seen, but the nuclear potential of Japan removes the issue from the realm of domestic politics and places it squarely in the midstream of international concern.

An article prepared
by
Professor James H. Buck

Over 25 years have passed since the defeat and unconditional surrender of Imperial Japan in August 1945. During the intervening years she has been rebuilt into an economic superpower, but, unlike other superpowers, one rejecting military force as a means of foreign policy. Much of this reluctance to rearm has been based on the ability of Japan to rely on the United States-Japan Security Treaty to deter direct external aggression. The 1960 treaty continues to provide for the maintenance of U.S. bases in Japan, and both parties agree that an "armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous" to both and that each "would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes." So long as Japan has had confidence in its dependent relationship with the United States, there has been no motive to increase defense expenditures. In fact, many Japanese attribute much of their current economic prosperity to the relatively low level of defense expenditure.

The guidelines which have both directed and, at times, restricted the development of the Japanese Self-Defense Force (SDF) were set forth formally in the 1957 statement of "Basic National Defense Policy" quoted here in its entirety:

> The purpose of national defense is to prevent direct and indirect aggression, and, once invaded, to repel it in order to preserve the independence and peace of Japan which takes democracy for its basis.
>
> To achieve this purpose, the Government of Japan adopts the following principles:
>
> • To support the activities of the United Nations and its promotion of international cooperation, thereby contributing to the cause of world peace.

- To promote the national welfare and enhance the spirit of patriotism, thereby laying a sound basis for national security.
- To develop gradually an effective defensive power within the bounds of national capabilities to the extent necessary for self-defense.
- To cope with aggression by recourse to the joint security system with the United States of America, pending effective functioning of the United Nations in preventing and removing aggression.[1]

In pursuit of this basic policy, Japan has now completed three 5-year plans. The expenditures for these plans are shown in table I in terms of absolute yen expenditures, in terms of defense expenditures as a percentage of gross national product, (GNP) and as a percentage of the national budget. (Earlier expenditures were proportionally higher, peaking in FY 1952 at nearly 20 percent of the national budget and 3 percent of the GNP.)

This data may be interpreted to illustrate that defense funds allocated to the 5-year plans, when considered as a percentage of the GNP or a percentage of the national budget, have tended to decrease. Far more significant, however, is the fact that absolute yen expenditures for defense have nearly doubled with each succeeding plan. It is estimated that during the fourth 5-year plan (1972-76), if increases are spread evenly over the years, the annual increase in defense appropriations will approach 18 percent compounded annually, a percentage slightly in excess of the 15.7 percent annual rate of increase in Japan's GNP recorded for the years 1961-1970 inclusive.

Funds have not been used to increase manpower; indeed, as the figures indicate, the total numbers of armed personnel have increased by only 10,000 since 1957. Emphasis has instead been placed on improved equipment for the respective self-defense forces. Authorized active duty personnel strengths for the first and fourth 5-year plans are shown in table 2.[2]

The entire evolution of Japan's defense power under the various 5-year plans has been gradual, hardly commensurate with her economic growth, limited in comparison to Japan's Asian neighbors,[3] almost entirely defensive in nature, and strictly conventional.

The fourth 5-year defense plan (1972-76) is essentially a continuation of previous plans in its emphasis on the improvement of the overall triservice defense capability. This plan does put

TABLE I—JAPAN'S DEFENSE EXPENDITURES (IN BILLION YEN)

5-Year Plans	Defense Expenditures	Def. Exp. as % of GNP	Def. Exp. as % of National Budget
*1st (1957-61)	791.2	1.12%	10.1%
2d (1962-66)	1384.2	0.95%	8.1%
3d (1967-71)	2527.2 (est.)	0.80%	7.2%
4th (1972-76)	4630.0 (est.)	0.88% (est.)	7.0% (est.)

*The "so-called" first 5-year plan was decided in June 1957 and actually applied to FY's 1958-1960, but figures for a full 5-year period are included for ease of comparison.

Figures are for fiscal years which begin on 1 April of the year indicated. Dollar figure conversions for the 5-year plan at ¥360 = $1 are: first plan—$2.197 billion; second plan—$3.845 billion; third plan—$7.020 billion; fourth plan—$12.777 billion. With the rate of ¥270 = $1, the current fourth 5-year plan total is $17.037 billion. The second plan was 175 percent of the first; the third plan was 183 percent of the second; the fourth plan will be about 182 percent of the third, or 243 percent at the current dollar/yen exchange rate.

TABLE II

	GSDF	MSDF	ASDF	Total
1st "Five Year Plan" (1957-61)	180,000	34,000	41,586	255,586
4th "Five Year Plan" (1972-76)	180,000	37,000	48,000	265,000

added emphasis on making this capability "autonomous" and shifting as much as possible to domestic production of the advanced equipment and weapons systems needed. The GSDF, for instance, will increase its tank strength from 660 to 880, including 120 new-model, domestically built tanks. The armored vehicle inventory will remain at 650, but 136 new-model vehicles will be procured. The number of self-propelled artillery pieces will be more than doubled from 60 to 140 and will include pieces of 107mm., 105mm., and 155mm. Total helicopter strength will increase only from 280 to 320 aircraft, but 154 will be new. Three Hawk units (ground-to-air, short-range missile units) will be added and located in Okinawa, West Kyushu, and the Osaka-Kobe area. The general goal is more firepower and more mobility. The MSDF will decrease the number of vessels from 210 to 170 but increase tonnage from 170,000 tons to 214,000 tons. The naval forces seek new construction (96,000 tons) not only to enhance the defense capacity in Japan's coastal waters but for the security of sea transport as well. Two helicopter carrying escort ships and one surface-to-surface missile carrying ship are planned. Tactical naval combat aircraft and antisubmarine warfare (ASW) aircraft inventories will be increased slightly to 200 and 190 aircraft, respectively, but about half of these totals will be new aircraft. For the ASDF, aircraft strength will be reduced more than 10 percent, from 880 to 770, but new types of aircraft will be added. Most important was the much disputed decision to produce domestically the FST2, a ground support fighter aircraft, rather than to import similar aircraft from the United States. The air reconnaissance capability will be improved by acquiring the RF4E, also new to the ASDF. The inventory of the all-weather interceptor F4EJ's will be increased from 80 to 120. Significant increases will be made in the acquisition of the jet trainer aircraft T2 (from four to 60) and of transport aircraft C1 (from four to 30). ASDF Nike units (medium-range, surface-to-surface missiles) will be increased from four to six, with new sites to be established on Okinawa and in the Aomori-Hakodate area. Other objectives of the fourth plan are: (1) the development of research on electronics to increase the capabilities for early warning and ASW patrolling along with various types of guided missiles, including air-to-surface antiship missiles, (2) the establishment of an even wider base of support for defense power among the people by even more positive civil works and disaster relief operations, and (3) improvement in the treatment of SDF personnel and better preparation for their return to civilian society when the term of service is completed.[4] Thus, while some change is evident in this fourth plan, it represents no real expansion on the part of the JSDF.

The reasons for this "go slow" approach fall into two basic categories, the constitutional prohibition (article 9) on armed forces, which inhibits even those members of the governing Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) who would prefer more rapid and extensive rearmament, and domestic political opposition to rearmament. Although the LDP has controlled the Government of

Japan since the party was formed in 1955, it must constantly face opposition not only to increased defense budgets but even to the maintenance of armed forces of any type.

Opposition notwithstanding, the dominance of the LDP seems likely to endure without a serious challenge for at least the next few years. The conservative coalition of factions which comprises the LDP has had a rather successful stewardship of Japan's interests. Their basic policies have provided resources for enviable economic development and unprecedented individual prosperity. Japan's image in Asia may not be highly regarded everywhere, but at least the "threat from Japan" is now economic and not military. The long-hoped-for normalization of relations with China was accomplished with ease, and perhaps Soviet-Japanese relations will progress to mutually acceptable goals. The United States-Japan relationship, however, remains a problem, and its adjustment will have important consequences for both.

Some External Considerations. The U.S. foreign policy initiatives signaled by the announcement of the Nixon Doctrine at Guam in July 1969 have accompanied wide-ranging changes in interstate relationships and have perhaps provided the impetus to those parties in Japan seeking a more "autonomous" Japanese defense policy. It also seemed to President Nixon that the U.S. role was "too dominant, our presence too pervasive" in the changing circumstances of the times. The high cost of war in Vietnam with concomitant internal strains, worsening deficits in balance of payments and the willingness of adversaries to compromise led to the adoption of principles designed to strike a balance between "overextension and withdrawal." The Nixon Doctrine is stated as follows:

> First, the United States will keep all of its treaty commitments.
>
> Second, we shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security.
>
> Third, in cases involving other types of aggression we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility for providing the manpower for its defense.[5]

This set of ideas has provided a rationale for the withdrawal of 550,000 U.S. troops from Southeast Asia and more than 100,000 troops and dependents from other parts of Asia. Reduction of the U.S. participation in the war in Vietnam removed a major military justification for continuing U.S. control of the Ryukyu Islands. As such, they reverted to Japanese control in May 1972. In the view of the Nixon Doctrine, the return for these long-held islands may be seen as a means to encourage, if not force, Japan to accept widened area responsibility for self-defense. The JSDF now has forces in the Ryukyus in addition to the U.S. bases continued there. Also as a direct result of the return to Japanese control, the U.S. bases must be without chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons and are subject to the same restrictions which apply to other U.S. bases in the four main islands of Japan. These bases and facilities have been steadily reduced over the years (from 2,284 at the time of the 1952 peace treaty to about 90) but still occupy about 850 square kilometers of area and several million square meters of building space. Japan expects further reduction of U.S. bases area "in the light of the Nixon Doctrine."[6] The

total strength of combined U.S. and SDF forces in Japan has decreased from 362,000 in 1954 to less than 300,000 today.

In its apparent application to Japanese-United States relations, the Nixon Doctrine represents little change. It reaffirms that the United States intends to continue its security treaty with Japan (now susceptible to cancellation by either party with 1 year's notice), that the United States still provides the "nuclear shield" (from outside Japan), and that Japan has the main responsibility to provide manpower for its own defense. Commenting on the "doctrine," the Japanese Ambassador to the United States stated that Japan understands the Nixon Doctrine, is prepared to assume responsibility for its own security, and the most appropriate role for Japan is to be a strong partner in U.S. efforts to promote stability.[7]

Tradition breaking reorientations of U.S. policy toward the major military powers in East Asia—China and the U.S.S.R.—are of far more import to Japan than the specific content of the Nixon Doctrine. The Nixon "shocks" of the summer of 1971 may have been useful in the long run, perhaps necessary, for the eventual achievement of an "equal partner" relationship between Japan and the United States. However, the suddenness and secrecy of the policy shift was a serious, perhaps unnecessary, embarrassment to the LDP and the Government of Japan. The United States made new departures without consulting the nation the President has called "our major ally in Asia." No doubt the Japanese have once more learned the lesson that a country must, on occasion, pursue policies independent of its allies. Japan reacted by extending diplomatic recognition to Outer Mongolia and Bangladesh.

The gradual accommodation between China and the United States, the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations, the initial successes of SALT I, Soviet approaches to Japan, the apparently stabilizing influence of Chancellor Brandt's Ostpolitik, and the possibility of pursuing the Soviet-United States détente through SALT II negotiations and mutual balanced force reduction, and Japan's continuing economic gains and growing self-confidence make it difficult, but no less inviting, to coin terms to describe what is emerging. President Nixon has spoken of "five superpowers"—the United States, the U.S.S.R., Western Europe, China, and Japan—"each balancing the other, not playing one against the other, an even balance." Commentators have described the regional triangle in East Asia as consisting of the U.S.S.R., China, and the United States,[8] or the United States, China, and Japan,[9] but it would probably be accurate in any case to say that the world of the 1970's will be characterized by a continuing nuclear bipolarity and political and economic multipolarity.

Japan's proper place in this "new order" has been the subject of much debate and hard thought in Japan.

The first major public exposition of Japan's reoriented defense policy was the *Defense White Paper* of 1970. It reaffirmed Japan's subscription to the ideals of the United Nations but recognized "the rule of force in international society" and the limited nature of the U.N.'s peacekeeping functions.[10] Concerned with "military bi-polarization centering on the US and the USSR, and political multipolarization based on the keynote of independence," especially in the fluid and increasingly complicated politics of East Asia, Japan's inherent right of self-defense and the maintenance of defense power was reiterated[11] and in some respects amplified. For instance, national defense was spoken of primarily as a question of "the people's mental attitude," the very basis of defense being a "national consensus" to "defend the peace and independence of the country to the last."

The nation was warned not to fall into dependence on another, for this might bring a sense of irresponsibility toward national defense and degenerate the national spirit. Patriotism and "autonomous defense" were the key words to a policy of "defense of the nation . . . primarily by the people."[12] Defense remained the overriding consideration, and the Government again denied itself the right to possess weapons which pose a threat of aggression against other nations, including bombers like the B-52, attack carriers, and ICBM's. The "three-no" nuclear policy was restated: no manufacture, no possession, and no placing of nuclear weapons on Japanese soil, but this denial was qualified by the statement that it would be permissible for Japan to have nuclear weapons "falling within the minimum requirement for the capacity necessary for self-defense and not posing a threat of aggression to other countries."[13]

While striving for an "autonomous defense" capability, Japan continues to rely on the security treaty with the United States for the deterrence of nuclear war and the large-scale armed conflicts which might destroy Japan, apparently gaining assurance from statements such as that of Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird to JDA Director General Nakasone in 1970. The Director General was informed that the United States will abide by its commitments under the treaty and "will use all types of weapons for the defense of Japan." Nevertheless, Japan is aware of the asymmetry of the treaty provisions by which the United States is obligated to come to the defense of Japan although Japan is not required to come to the defense of the United States in any case where U.S. forces are attacked outside of areas not administered by Japan.[14]

The *Defense White Paper* confirmed that "the nation of Japan will become a great power in an economic sense but never in a military sense."[15] In economic terms Japan has achieved great power status and will become even more powerful, both absolutely and relatively. Compared with 1971, Japan's foreign trade for 1972 was up 19 percent to more than $52 billion, and the international balance of payments reserves held by Japan approached $17 billion in April 1973.

The Nomura Research Institute of Technology and Economics recently estimated that Japan's GNP will reach $846.7 billion in 1977, about half the GNP predicted for the United States in the same year. According to Nomura's predictions, the *real* GNP annual rate of increase will be about 10.4 percent, substantially the same as experienced in the past 5 years. The report also predicted that Japan's per capita income in 1977 will rank third ($6,287), behind Sweden ($7,200) and the United States ($6,500).[16]

Japanese are quick to point out that Japan's enormous economic power will not necessarily be used for stronger military forces. It is, nevertheless, a historical commonplace that nations with great economic strength are also nations with great military power. In Japan's particular case the pre-World War II pattern of economic development and the course of Japanese imperialism were not "inevitably related," according to Professor Hall, although Japanese scholars have insisted imperialist expansion was so related to the particular form of capitalism developed in Japan. Hall believes that much of the Japanese drive for military expansion "came as result of the competitive international environment into which the new state was plunged."[17]

Probably the most ready believers in the inevitable remilitarization of Japan were the Chinese. A campaign against United States-Japanese defense relations was mounted in great earnest immediately following the Sato-Nixon agreements in late 1969 which provided for reversion of the Ryukyus to Japanese control. The *Renmin Ribao* charged the

United States with using Japanese reactionaries as a "gendarme in Asia" in their joint "vicious conspiracy" and "criminal schemes to engineer a new war of aggression." Japan was said to be scheming to annex Taiwan and pay off Chiang's "bandit gang" by helping them against the mainland. In short, the monopoly capitalist groups in Japan intended to accelerate the revival of militarism, engage in aggression in a "big way," and to "realize | their | old dream of a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere."[18] But Sato is no longer Premier of Japan, the United States and China have exchanged "ambassadors," and China and Japan have "normalized" relations. Today the Peking press has a different line.[19] Whether Chinese leaders believed what they had published about the intent of a United States-Japanese "military-industrial complex" to wage aggressive war in Asia is open to question. Nevertheless, Japan's economic power and military potential are beyond doubt and the source of genuine concern both to Japan's neighbors and a significant segment of the Japanese public. One observer has written that Japan in the 1970's is "neither left nor liberal but archconservative." He further attempts to show, among other things, that there is a definite resurgence of military strength in Japan and that the "ruling elite" believes military power is necessary to maintain long-term economic power.[20]

On the other hand, equally sound reasons are advanced against Japanese rearmament, even if undertaken only for the purposes of protecting the rapidly expanding overseas investment and general foreign economic influence. Saburo Okita sees Japanese public opinion as decidedly antimilitaristic, simply because in the world today military strength cannot protect private assets overseas. A military buildup to protect such assets is judged "absurd" in terms of a cost-benefit calculation, suggesting that the best course in case of nationalization or seizure of Japanese assets overseas would be compensation paid by the Japanese Government. Many Japanese believe that Japan has a unique opportunity to demonstrate the possibilities of economic power without military strength. Such a goal is justifiable and perhaps more likely of realization in the "changed circumstance of security and defense strategy produced by nuclear weapons."[21]

These arguments about Japan's future use of economic resources vis-a-vis military power can be reduced to a perception of determinism at work. Certainly Japan's past experience, the knowledge of how other states have behaved, and even her conception of man's potential for change are involved in judging whether Japan is likely to succeed in what former Premier Sato called an "unprecedented era in foreign affairs." Simply stated, the goal is to "break all precedents in history and to give history an unheard of challenge by aiming at a new utopia where top priority shall be given to social welfare and world peace."[22] Attachment of high priority to the pursuit of economic values is a characteristic of modern industrial states and may be an appropriate goal to satisfy Japanese ambitions for international recognition and respect.

Without significantly increased military power, however, Japan cannot compete in all aspects of the five-sided multipolarity mentioned by Nixon. Japan tends to place less credibility in the American security guarantee and does not desire American military intervention even in the unlikely circumstance that Japan were to be invaded.[23] It is probably true that most Americans are equally unwilling to see more intervention and that most question the worth of the various security guarantees, Japan's included. Japan is certain to strive for greater independence and freedom of action, especially from the

United States, in broad-ranging efforts to enhance its own self-image as a "success" and as a nation with values to offer the rest of the world, not the least of which is that of a "nation of peace."

Whether Japan will "rearm" is no longer an issue. Rearmament is a fact. The important question is, What are the probable limits, qualitatively and quantitatively, on Japan's Self-Defense Forces?

The limits to Japanese defense power stated in the *Defense White Paper* are general of terms regarding conventional rearmament. Japan's defense power is for self-defense only, and its scale "must be what is proper and necessary." Defense power may not be used for any purpose which exceeds "the scope of self-defense," and overseas dispatch of troops will not be permitted. A proper balance must control the allocation of scarce resources for social security, education, and other high priority items. Furthermore, the simple determination of defense allocations on the basis of a percentage of the GNP is not "necessarily appropriate" to a "proper balance."[24]

An assessment of the proper balance is essayed by former Kyoto University Professor Inoki, now Superintendent of the Japan Defense Academy, in his recent book *Kuni wo Mamoru.*[25] Inoki is acutely conscious that it has been but a few years since the Japanese Empire raised such slogans as "High Degree Defense State" (*Koodo Kokuboo Kokka*), engaged in war, and "collapsed like a balloon," but he also rejects the argument current today that the only solution to Japan's security problem lies in having no military power so that Japan will threaten no nation. Inoki suggests that a state with "excessive" armaments certainly courts self-destruction, but a country with no armaments will likewise perish. He is also concerned that many Japanese fear too much the nuclear power of neighboring giants and "would like to make Japan one of their satellites."

Another piece of conventional wisdom Inoki treats is the assertion that it is impossible for civilized countries to commit aggression against civilized countries. Contemporary aggression, he argues, is not limited to the entry of tanks into a nation's capital. The forte of the great powers today is the skillful use of force short of war, thereby forcing weak and small countries to submit to their will. Given this situation the threatened side must "prepare its defense power appropriate to its national power," and, in the worst case, be determined to inflict some damage on the other partner. Only then will the great power honor the sovereignty and independence of the threatened party. This argument leads to the definition of the proper balance defense power is the "necessary condition" adequate to "protect the nation's independence and to prevent disdain from outside."

Whether Japan has "excessive" defense power can be decided only in terms of concrete circumstances. Comparing Japan's GNP, size of defense forces, characteristics of equipment and similar items, Inoki is certain that Japan's defense power is not "excessive," for it poses no threat to its neighbors. On the other hand, the simple possession of defense power is no guarantee of a nation's security. Any country which, like Japan in the 1930's and 1940's, treats its neighbors like enemies and errs in its foreign policies will end in defeat; it matters not how much power a nation has. Defense power remains a prerequisite for national security, but it never is the sole sufficient criterion.

Applying this theory to modern Japan, Professor Inoki recommends a "six-area" program of foreign policy objectives subsumed under the general theory that the dominant objective for Japan must be to minimize the number of nations hostile to Japan and to be

friendly with the maximum number. Top priority is given to relations with the United States, but reciprocity and equality between Japan and China are counted "the indispensable foundation of peace in East Asia." Japan's policy toward China must be based on the realization that it is clearly beneficial for China to be friendly to Japan. She must, thirdly, strive for better relations with the U.S.S.R., particularly in mutually beneficial projects such as the development of the Tyumen oilfields. Although there is some opinion that Japan cannot be friendly with both China and the U.S.S.R. at a time when the two are competing so intensely, this view ignores the fact of Japan's independence which must be the basis for relations with both. The fourth set of policies concerns North Korean-Republic of Korea (ROK) relations, events which Japan must follow with patience. Indeed, the best way to improve relations with the various countries of Southeast Asia is for Japan to strive "with humility and modesty to promote the image of Japan as a country of peace." In the fifth place, good relations are desirable with the former self-governing dominions of England—New Zealand, Australia, and Canada. The common thread running through these nations and Japan is the "invisible and powerful feeling of solidarity" among nations sharing democratic traditions. The last set of relations for Japan to cultivate are those with West European countries, mostly because they share the problems common to advanced industrial states with the possibility of increasingly comprehensive areas of cooperation. The same feeling of democratic solidarity also binds Japan to these countries, but Inoki emphasizes the similar postwar experience. Both West Europe and Japan have been "defended by the gigantic military power of the United States"; both have become very strong economically, but weak militarily; American military power is gradually being withdrawn from both areas; "Japan and the European Community have a common destiny in military matters." In summary, Inoki states the "one road to guarantee the security of Japan is to continue to develop a peace diplomacy in six directions" while simultaneously building "strong defense power" appropriate in scale.

The approach to Japan's security outlined here does not, and could not, deal in concrete terms with the specific programs which implement—or define—defense policy. The size and type of SDF which Japan will have by 1976 seems fairly clear. Decisions concerned with the program to follow the current fourth 5-year plan must, however, be made in the next couple of years. These decisions will be made in a complex matrix of Japan's perceptions of the programs, intent, policy, and goals of the U.S.S.R., the United States, and China and the interplay of the increasingly active contacts of all types among the four major states interested in East Asia. Decisions must also consider events in the Korean peninsula, Taiwan, and the postwar interplay between states in Southeast Asia and external powers. On another level, intangible but very real, factors will be brought to bear in terms of Japan's willed role in world affairs, feelings of patriotism or nationalism, however defined, and the desire of Japan to be treated as an independent nation controlling its own destiny so far as possible. The competitive nature of interstate relations in the Western Pacific is likely to become more intense, perhaps taking forms as yet unforeseen. In this situation it seems likely that the sense of security—the absence of external threat—which Japan has enjoyed for so many years may be diminished, if solely from the uncertainty attendant on these new relationships.

Nuclear Weapons Policy. The funda-

mental decision in Japan's postwar defense policy has been to rely on the Japan–United States Security Treaty for defense against external aggression, but another equally important decision lies in the future with respect to nuclear weapons. The initial "nuclear" decision has been articulated in a definite and frequently repeated manner: "no manufacture, no possession, and no introduction of nuclear weapons into the territory of Japan." However, this definitive assertion is not entirely believed, either in Japan or elsewhere.

Although one survey showed that only about 30 percent believed Japan would have nuclear weapons in the next decade, Hermann Kahn has pointed out that the "nuclear allergy" in Japan does not "represent a firm commitment to nuclear pacificism by a majority of the Japanese people." He believes that, given the economic and technological stature Japan will probably achieve, most Japanese will inevitably feel that Japan has the "right and duty" to secure for itself superpower status–and this means having a "substantial nuclear establishment."[26] Four years ago Professor Kei Wakaizumi suggested the probability "is not a small one" that in the time frame of 1975-1980, after carefully weighing all other alternatives, "Japan will choose the road to nuclear armament." He does qualify this statement by saying that, on balance, such a decision seems unlikely to be a "deliberate choice of the government of Japan."[27] A more recent prediction attributes a high degree of probability to the assertion that Japan will acquire nuclear weapons and should emerge in the 1980's as the "fourth nuclear superpower."[28]

The three fundamental statements of current Japanese policy on nuclear weapons deserve closer examination. "No possession" means that Japan will not accept nuclear weapons provided to Japan on any basis by another state. "No introduction" means Japan will not permit any other state to deploy nuclear weapons on Japanese territory. It would, indeed, require an imaginative scenarist to develop hypothetical situations in which either course of action would provide any clear benefit to Japan in terms of probable costs. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) prohibits signatories from supplying nuclear weapons to other states, and the common interest in nonproliferation would seem adequate to prevent it. Neither China nor France adhere to the NPT, but it is impossible to conjecture that providing nuclear weapons to Japan would enhance their own security or contribute to other national goals, even in the remote circumstance that Japan would seek nuclear armaments from either of them. The introduction of nuclear weapons into Japanese territory by another power could only infringe on Japanese sovereignty, limit Japan's independence, and make Japan hostage to another country's interests.

The question remains, however, as to whether Japan will decide to manufacture nuclear weapons. Many of those who answer affirmatively are not Japanese, and their arguments are rooted essentially in historical precedent, not military rationale. The major assumption underlying the *pro* argument is that never before has a nation with great economic strength and technological and managerial development foregone "commensurate" military power. The development of great military power is somehow seen as predetermined and inevitable.

This line of reasoning suggests that Japan's acknowledged "success" in economic and political matters entitles Japan to a larger voice in determining the shape of the world–by other means than example. A burgeoning nationalism and self-confidence will demand that Japan acquire more power in diplomatic circles, both regional and worldwide. A permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council may be an attainable objective

without great military power, but no Japanese who ponders the matter is unaware that the current five incumbents are, in fact, the five nuclear powers.

In its bilateral relations with the United States, "equality" may not be attainable under any circumstances, but in the terms of "mutual" security, "equality" is manifestly impossible if Japan does not have an independent nuclear capability. The apparent détente between the United States and the U.S.S.R., begun with SALT I and being sought in SALT II, may limit armament competition between the two superpowers, but China remains outside these agreements and is a factor to be dealt with by Japan.

Like Japan, the Chinese constantly deny any aspirations to "great power status," but Japanese officials remark that "China is surely a superpower in Asia."[29] Nor are Chinese denials of a desire for regional hegemony necessarily taken at face value in Japan. China's nuclear capability, although dwarfed by that of the United States and the U.S.S.R., does pose a threat to Japan. General opinion is that the probability of its active use against Japan is miniscule, yet the Japanese also know the potential of China which could make her a major nuclear power in 15-20 years.

The credibility of American commitments to various Asian countries, decreased by reduction of the American troop presence and constantly opposed by important segments of the congressional and intellectual communities, provides the possibility for a "vacuum" in regional power. Some believe it is the intent of the United States to create such a vacuum to be filled by a Japan that would consequently play the role of "balancer" in East Asia, if not that of "nuclear guarantor" played heretofore by the United States. But for Japan the "military rationale" for nuclear weapons seems to rest on the simple need to protect the lengthy sea routes for the $50 billion annual foreign trade and to protect the oil lifeline to the Middle East by which Japan receives 90 percent of its oil imports. Such a task is impossible with conventional armaments, one argues, and can be accomplished solely through the maintenance of a nuclear deterrent force, respect for which inhibits conventional interference with sea lines of communications.

It is argued that Japan's signature of the NPT in 1970 (2 years after the major signatories) has not been followed by ratification; therefore, Japan intends at some time to produce nuclear weapons. This argument is not totally convincing since it is more likely that Japan is simply keeping its options open. Statements of Japan's leaders a few years ago were indeed categorical on the subject of nuclear weapons; recently they have become highly contingent. For instance, Premier Tanaka's recent Diet policy speech repeated the "three principles" but included a statement that Japan does require a minimum defense capability—the "duty and responsibility of an independent nation"[30]—and that nuclear weapons are permissible if defensive in nature. If Japan does reject or fails to ratify the NPT, the production of nuclear weapons is still not certain. However, there are two nuclear weapons systems which could qualify as strictly "defensive," antiballistic missile (ABM) systems and antisubmarine warfare (ASW) systems. In neither case would nuclear warheads be directly targeted on any foreign land target. They would be usable only against enemy offensive nuclear weapons or to defend against enemy submarines.[31] If ratification of the NPT is frustrated, "pro-bomb tendencies will have been accelerated."[32]

Another view links the possibility of Japan's acquisition of nuclear weapons with actions by the United States. Professor Brzezinski states that the appearance of deep divisions about defense

policy in the United States cannot but impel Japan to develop a major military establishment of its own, eventually including a nuclear capability. He believes "it is almost axiomatic that an isolationist United States will definitely create a nationalist and militarist Japan."[33] Former Ambassador Ball has written that pressure for Japan to "go nuclear" is most likely to come from a desire for political status rather than from concern over national security or from "any informed calculation of economic interest." Japan, he feels, is likely to go nuclear only if it feels alienated from the West and strongly nationalistic—"the very conditions which might render Japan's nuclear power disruptive and dangerous."[34]

A major assumption underlying arguments that Japan will not manufacture nuclear weapons is that to do so would be more dangerous than not doing so; thus, security will be increased by self-denial. This is particularly true in cases where no significant external threat exists, and Japan simply does not perceive any serious threat from other nuclear powers. Whatever threat may have been perceived is likely to diminish with improving relations among Japan, China, and the U.S.S.R. Changing U.S. attitudes toward China and the U.S.S.R. have had complimentary demarches by Japan. America's major competitors in both Asia and Europe are moving from the "hostile" toward the "nonhostile" category. How much less reason is there for Japan openly to antagonize and challenge China and the U.S.S.R. by producing nuclear weapons. With her apparent progress in improving relations among major competitors, it is unlikely that the United States would appreciate Japan going nuclear.

Domestic attitudes on nuclear policy matters are of vital importance in Japan. Rather much has been made of the "shallow" character of the "nuclear allergy," but it is probably stronger and more persistent than some have thought.[35] Closely linked to general public disapproval of nuclear weapons is the possibility that their manufacture would require changes in the Constitution, a move opposed both domestically and internationally.

Long, narrow, and small in size, Japan is uniquely vulnerable to nuclear attack, and Japanese are acutely sensitive to this geographical fact. According to most nuclear scenarios, the assured destruction requirements are estimated to be 30 percent of the target country population. Japan would probably suffer this amount of damage from four nuclear weapons on Tokyo, Nagoya, Osaka, and Kita Kyushu, all vital centers for Government and military functions. If Japan desired an offsetting deterrent, it would necessitate an overwhelming nuclear superiority. It is patently impossible for Japan to deter the United States and the U.S.S.R. and only a little less difficult to deter China. Even the construction of a "purely defensive" ABM system would have serious drawbacks because of the extremely short warning time (2 minutes?) which could be provided against Chinese weapons. Aside from the costs of producing nuclear weapons and the lack of any test sites, the almost certain absence of any benefit which would accrue to Japan from attempting to develop a second strike capability—and this is what deterrence is all about—seems to prohibit nuclear weapons development by Japan.

The Future. Japan's defense policy cannot be considered as an entity unto itself; rather, it will be molded by broad political and economic considerations within the totality of Japanese domestic and foreign policy. Foreign policy will assuredly stress independence of action in a spirit illustrated by the recent editorial which cautioned, "The world is not something which follows the specifications established by one country—the US."[36] Of course, Japan has had several options opened to her by the current

restructuring of power relationships in East Asia. In gross terms, some of these are: (1) renunciation of the Japan-United States treaty and the acquisition of nuclear weapons, (2) continuation of the security relationship with the United States on a much narrower base, (3) continuation of the current relationship with the United States with close cooperation in security matters and even closer relationships on economic and political matters,[37] (4) alliance with the U.S.S.R. or China, (5) a withdrawal from the political conflict through regional neutralization and assumed reliance on such international organizations as the U.N., and (6) a "go-it-alone" policy under the concept of "fortress Japan."[38] These courses of action are not mutually exclusive and individually are susceptible to several variations in detail. What is certain is that Japan must in some manner accommodate itself to these changing relationships and probably will do so in ways least disruptive domestically and internationally.

Japan has for 25 years renounced any role as a world power in the historical sense of having military forces commensurate with economic power. But Japan cannot afford to be irresponsible about this economic strength. She must find ways to channel these tremendous resources into politically productive projects, both at home and abroad. Hopefully, these projects will preclude large Japanese investments in military technology markedly different from the past.

What one may expect of Japan's defense power throughout the fourth 5-year defense plan (1972-1976) is clear. Japan will continue a limited, defensive, and conventional (nonnuclear) defense program accenting qualitative improvement in materiel, making no significant increase in authorized personnel strengths, and devoting less than 1 percent of the GNP to defense but at a rate nearly doubling its absolute defense expenditures.

The central Japanese consideration for the post-1976 development of the SDF is once again the Japan-United States Security Treaty. Both sides agree that it should be based on equality and reciprocity, terms which probably are not agreed to in detail and which are necessarily viewed from different perspectives. The treaty is now susceptible to yearly revision (or abrogation), and changes are probably desirable to both sides toward lessening of U.S. responsibility and an increasing of Japan's. Special consideration should be given to the continued withdrawal of U.S. units and return of bases to Japanese control. These actions would certainly relieve some of Japan's domestic social and political problems which have arisen from treaty arrangements. Withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Japan with rights to use Japanese bases and facilities for training or in emergencies is a possibility.

The key element in continuation of the security relationship will be the Japanese decision as to whether she wants to depend, decisively and ulti-

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

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mately, on the United States for her security. If, temporarily at least, Japan must depend on one state, that state will undoubtedly be the United States. In the long run, however, Japan may turn away from excessive dependence on one state and seek security through multilateral means. It is possible that Japan may seek to achieve security solely through her own efforts, but the attempt would be severely circumscribed by strong domestic opposition, opposed by powers with interests in Asia, damaging the carefully cultivated postwar image of a peaceful Japan, uncertain in its consequences, and likely to decrease, rather than increase, Japan's sense of security.

NOTES

1. *Boei Nenkan 1972* (Tokyo: Defense Yearbook Publishing Co., 1972), p. 212.
2. *Ibid.*, pp. 210-211.
3. The personnel strengths of the armed forces of nations with major interests in northeast Asia are: (world ranking in parentheses):

Nation		Armed Forces (1,000 men)
U.S.S.R.	(1)	3,535
China	(2)	3,100
United States	(3)	3,066
Republic of Korea	(6)	645
Taiwan	(7)	522
North Korea	(12)	438
Japan	(21)	252

Figures are for 1970, extracted from U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures 1971* (Washington, D.C.), p. 50.

4. *Asagumo*, 12 October 1972.
5. U.S. Presidents, 1969-(Nixon) *U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: Shaping a Durable Peace*, A Report to the Congress by Richard Nixon, 3 May 1973 (Washington, D.C., 1973), pp. 109-110.
6. Japan Defense Agency, *The Defense of Japan* (Tokyo: October 1970), pp. 62-63. Figures as of 1970. (Hereafter cited as *Defense White Paper*.)
7. Nobuhiko Ushiba, "Japan- Her Role in World Affairs," *Naval War College Review*, April 1971, p. 18.
8. Hedley Bull, "The New Balance of Power in Asia and the Pacific," *Foreign Affairs*, June 1971, p. 669.
9. Pyong-choon Hahm, "Korea and the Emerging Asia Power Balance," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1972, p. 343.
10. One Director General of the JDA lost his job for stating the "UN was like a rural credit association" where even a small country had one vote. Naomi Nishimura was removed by Premier Sato on 3 December 1971. *Japan Times Weekly*, 11 December 1971.
11. *Defense White Paper*, p. 28, quotes the Sunakawa Judgment of the Supreme Court (16 December 1959), which states the Constitution

> does not in any way deny the inherent right of self-defense which our country possesses as a sovereign state; the pacificism of Japan's Constitution by no means implies no defense and no resistance . . .. That our country can take measures for self-defense necessary to maintain its peace and security and to insure its survival must be said to be a matter of course, as the exercise of the functions inherent to a state.

12. *Ibid.*, pp. 29-33.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 40.
14. *Ibid.*, pp. 41-44.
15. *Defense White Paper*, introductory statement by Yashuhiro Nakasone, Director General, JDA, p. ii.
16. *Japan Times Weekly*, 9 June 1973. The report made certain assumptions which included lowering of the official discount rate from 5.5 percent to 5.0 percent by April 1974, that corporate taxes would be increased, that there would be no reduction in Government

expenditures in 1974, and that the *yen* would continue floating until the market revalues it by 25.7 percent against the Smithsonian rate of ¥308 = $1. Foreign currency reserves were predicted to decrease to about $11 billion in 1977.

17. John W. Hall, "Aspects of Japanese Economic Development," John W. Hall and Richard K. Beardsley, *Twelve Doors to Japan* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), p. 577.

18. *Peking Review*, 5 December 1969, No. 49, pp. 14-16; reprint of *Renmin Ribao* editorial of 28 November 1969.

19. See Shinkichi Eto, "Japan and China," in *Problems of Communism*, November-December 1972, p. 1, for an analysis of the changes in Peking's public views on Japanese defense policies.

20. Albert Axelbank, *Black Star over Japan* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1972), pp. xii-xiii.

21. Saburo Okita, "Japan's Economy and Foreign Policy," *Survey*, Autumn 1972, pp. 133-134.

22. *Defense White Paper*, p. 3.

23. A recent public opinion poll reported that only 35 percent of Japanese surveyed would welcome U.S. intervention. Zygmunt Nagorski, "Asia in Transition," *Christian Science Monitor*, 4 June 1973.

24. *Defense White Paper*, pp. 39-40.

25. Masamichi Inoki, *Kuni wo Mamoru*, Jitsugyoo no Nihonsha, Tokyo, November 1972. Material in this portion is taken from the chapter titled "Nihon no Anzen Hoshoo no arubeki sugata," pp. 191-204.

26. Herman Kahn, *The Emerging Japanese Superstate* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970), p. 165.

27. Kei Wakaizumi, "Japan Beyond 1970," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1969, p. 517.

28. Thomas A. Marks, "The Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons by Japan," *Military Review*, March 1973, p. 48.

29. Statement of Foreign Minister Ohira, *Japan Times Weekly*, 3 February 1973.

30. *Japan Times Weekly*, 3 February 1973.

31. George H. Quester, "Japan and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty," *Asian Survey*, September 1970, pp. 775-776.

32. *Ibid.*, p. 777.

33. Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Fragile Blossom* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), p. 101.

34. George W. Ball.

35. See the excellent article by Douglas H. Mendel, Jr., "Japanese Defense in the 1970s: the Public View," *Asian Survey*, December 1970, pp. 1046-1069.

36. Editorial, "Takyokka suru Sekai wo Ugokasu mono," *Asahi Shinbun*, 5 January 1973.

37. Wakaizumi, pp. 516-520.

38. Franz Michael and Gaston J. Sigur, *The Asian Alliance: Japan and United States Policy* (New York: National Strategy Information Center, 1972), p. 80.

Ψ

Safety from external danger is the most powerful director of national conduct. Even the most ardent love of liberty will, after a time, give way to its dictates.

Alexander Hamilton: The Federalist, 1787

Both the United States and the Soviet Union face the world, and therefore each other, strong in the belief that they possess a monopoly on righteousness. Each feels the power of moral imperative. Similarly, each seeks to resolve problems in terms of its own limited philosophy. In any given crisis the superpowers are likely to possess the same empirical data but, because of intuitive, culturally determined factors, arrive at different estimations of the situation. If this inability to correctly perceive the intent or objectives of one's opponent is attached to the question of: When will the other side fire? the problem becomes serious indeed.

CRISIS MENTALITY:

A PROBLEM IN CULTURAL RELATIVITY

Prepared from some remarks given at the
Current Strategy Forum
by
Captain Robert B. Bathurst, U.S. Navy

In reaction to any perceived crisis in U.S. security, the currently most favored pattern of action is, whenever possible, to send an aircraft carrier to the vicinity of the disturbance. In turn, the Soviet reaction tends to come in the form of a missile cruiser stationed within range of our aircraft carrier. While these have become precedents and perhaps conditioned responses, such calm acceptance of military reality was not always the case. When the Soviet naval buildup in the Eastern Mediterranean forced new tactical realities upon us in the Jordan crisis in 1970, we had no planned reaction. We have since learned to expect Soviet missile tubes trained on our ships nearly anywhere in the world where the state interests of one or the other power are sufficiently involved. Inevitably, our initiative in foreign affairs is affected by that expectation, and our tacticians have had to adjust their plans accordingly.

The question which repeatedly presents itself is: Under what circumstances might one of the adversaries fire? A review of recent history suggests that U.S. analysts have a disturbing probability of arriving at the wrong answer.

Perhaps the two most flagrant examples of this miscalculation are invasions having taken place to our almost total surprise: into Czechoslovakia in 1968 and into the Sinai in 1973. We have been through a sobering lesson in the reevaluation of the Soviet interpretation of détente brought about by the planning, supply, and diplomatic support given the Arab attack against Israel. Indeed, the history of our calculations about the missions and functions of the

Soviet Navy since the 1950's, and thus its likely weapons program, now seems very limited and naive.

What we have witnessed is the skillful application of cover and deception, conditioning, and very long-range integrated planning. Furthermore, the scale of its application suggests that these have not been localized military demonstrations of tactical principles, the issue, as some would have it, of service jockeying for funds and missions. Rather they were the result of state plans and policy requiring high-level support and cooperation.

As the Israelis learned, although they hardly needed the lesson, in modern war you do not *get* ready. You have to *be* ready. That two large-scale invasions could take place without advance warning, in spite of the extraordinary sophistication of means of surveillance, should sober and frighten every political and military leader as nothing since World War II has done. If one attempts to put this in the proper perspective with a review of Soviet military literature which emphasizes that the outcome of a successful battle under modern conditions will be heavily influenced by surprise and readiness, one concludes that both invasions were successful applications of widely held doctrine.

The extraordinary paradox of these two invasions—and the one which this paper seeks to illuminate—is that the two events took the world by surprise, even though attention was focused on them. This suggests that there is a problem of comprehension going well beyond the mere technical identification of indications on the imminence of hostilities. The problem obviously involves mass psychology and conditioning—the misreading of the indications took place on a grand scale. The checks and balances which are assumed to be introduced by multiple readings and opinions did not appear to counter the force or power of conventional or popular wisdom.

Though Pavlov did not prove it in his laboratory, success in conditioning the subject also conditions the experimenter. He repeats techniques that prove his thesis. The Soviet military have now shown how to successfully use force in limited engagements in international disputes.

In 1968, as the Dubcek government opted for increasingly liberal reforms and the Soviet Government extracted more frequent testimonials of solidarity with the Warsaw Pact, it became clear that the problem might be solved with the same method used in Hungary in 1956. The U.S. Government established various watch committees where position papers were written and intentions were predicted. There was no lack of awareness.

Those who analyzed the situation fell, not irrationally, into two camps: those who thought there would be an invasion and those who thought that, on balance, there would not be an invasion. It is quite important to make it clear that nearly everyone conceded that the Soviets *might* invade. The situation, however, was a hypothetical one in which only a yes or no answer was valid. No qualifications were permitted.

Unfortunately, there is little actual record of the positions and opinions of that time, and the problem, in any case, is not to make lists and arrive at percentages. It is rather to describe the climate of opinion, the environment, the hunches, and intuitions out of which more concrete positions and eventually policy evolved. Anyone who has been in the bureaucratic policy-making environment knows that few forceful and definitive positions are taken until certain experts or seniors or groups have expressed themselves. It is then that a conventional wisdom begins taking shape that eventually obliterates dissent. At that stage of the deliberations, the majority of those involved, when forced to take one side or the other, believed that the Soviets would

not invade. Furthermore, this group tended to include the more senior, and therefore, the policymaking echelon.*

Among their arguments, the strongest were that: (1) Soviet security was not threatened (an argument which the Dubcek government repeatedly supported); (2) a brutal show of force would set back the cause of communism; (3) Rumania had increasingly asserted its independence without being threatened; (4) the Soviet Government in the post-Stalin period had mellowed; (5) Soviet leaders, being better educated, were less likely to use force; (6) in satisfying rising consumer expectations within the Soviet Union, the Soviets needed Western support, which implied détente.

These were all perfectly rational, reasonable, and supportable arguments. They were repeatedly advanced in one form or another in classrooms and lecture halls where Soviet foreign policy was discussed. As such, they developed the force of standard arguments, reappearing in a variety of contexts whenever attention focused on the Soviet Union.

Those who held the belief that the Soviets would invade had a difficult time making their case persuasive. On the whole they agreed with the rational arguments cited above, yet felt that, contrary to common belief, the Russians did feel their security threatened and that the Communist cause would not be materially hurt by using force. The thinking of most analysts was, however, dominated by the rational and reasonable arguments—after all, the Soviets had more to lose than to gain by an invasion—and was sufficiently conditioned by periodic Warsaw Pact maneuvers to see little threat in the buildup of Soviet tanks.

*The author, in the absence of any useful data, takes full responsibility for this statement. It is the result of his observations and those of colleagues and desk officers involved in the problem at that time.

Both groups were exposed to the briefings and opinions of experts in a setting common in cases of high tension with extreme consequences in which a clear, logical, brilliant briefing is given explaining why the Soviets would invade followed by an equally brilliant briefing on why they would not invade. The policymaker, who had felt decisive prior to this exposure, may tend to develop misgivings about his own conclusions.

The fundamental basis for the disagreement of those predicting the invasion was not rooted just in factual data but also in an emotional understanding of the Soviet policy. Many of them had experience in the Eastern bloc and had the additional dimension of Soviet cultural feelings about security. They could filter the data through one additional sieve, the Soviet point of view.

The speed of modern warfare, the destructiveness, and the equilibrium in the balance of power force us to concentrate on intentions and therefore the gray world of psychology. The contest between an aircraft carrier and a missile cruiser, a submarine and a destroyer, and, ultimately, one ICBM system and another is likely to be decided by the question of who fires first. The speed of missiles permits no time for succeeding stages of readiness or for the analytical development of countertactics on the battlefield or at sea. The timing in the contest between an Egyptian Styx missile and an Israeli Gabriel is a matter of miliseconds.

The problem in predicting intentions—a problem that all political and military leaders in the superpowers cannot now avoid—is that the application of rational faculties alone will not give us the correct answer. In fact, dependence on a purely rational analysis devoid of any appreciation for cultural relativity seems to promote an arrogance that leads to disastrously wrong answers. The problem in discussing these psycho-

logical and emotional elements, however, is that they are not subject to precision or quantification. Yet, serious decisions, possibly cataclysmic decisions, are and will be made on the basis of them.

The role of intuition and inner conviction in making decisions certainly needs to be explored.* The problem is serious. After the leader is given the briefings and computer read-outs, he has to answer "will they" or "won't they." That decision will probably be made on the basis of what in America would be called a "gut reaction." Those who make decisions on a high level have, quite rightly, developed a faith in their "gut reactions." They think—and empirical evidence appears to support this—that they have achieved positions of power over their equally qualified colleagues on the basis of generally correct intuition. However, a problem develops when these decisionmakers—who have risen to their positions on the basis of actions taken within the context of their own culture—are suddenly faced with intercultural problems. It is then that their "gut reactions" are likely to arrive at a faulty conclusion through the inadequate digestion of data available.

When the Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, returned from Moscow where he had successfully negotiated a cease-fire in the Middle East, he spoke of the historic responsibility of both powers to preserve peace. Both powers certainly recognize such a responsibility, but the kind of actions which each side feel are necessary to fulfill that responsibility, and thus the point at which one or the other might "squeeze the trigger," are often very different indeed. Let us examine them.

Contrary to American practice, the Soviets refer their decisions to the authority of a deterministic philosophy. In their interpretation of the historical process, the dialectic has established that the world proletariat will resolve all class conflicts. The Soviet Government, firmly controlled by the Communist Party, sees itself as the prime defender and interpreter of that historical process. Indeed, the very legitimacy of Soviet leaders is derived from their ability to make correct and loyal Marxist-Leninist deductions. They therefore experience the weight of a moral and historical imperative. No one can propose policy, write reports, present briefings, or even interpret events without reference to that general philosophy.*

In their view, imperialists, led by the United States, are obstructing the process of history—an unjustified and, in the end, hopeless undertaking. There is, therefore, a moral obligation to generations unborn to block this regressive policy and to advance the historical process. In fulfilling the exalted dictates of history, all methods are justified—morality is a cultural and class concept, not a historical one. In addition to the usual military and diplomatic tactics, blackmail and deceit are useful and justified. Force is obviously necessary and inevitable. History has, within the Soviet Union, already justified the liquidation of whole classes and nationalities. Would it show mercy during the liquidation of regressive nations?

These feelings, in a broader sense, have not been created by Marxism alone but are equally derived from and are culturally reinforced by the strong romantic, religious, and national sentiments toward the role of "Holy" Russia in preserving a kind of "purity" and

*Though by what methodology, the author, who apologizes for his own lack of it, does not know.

*The force of this ideological umbrella is strangely underrated in the United States. To understand a fraction of its power, one only has to recreate the atmosphere in the United States at the height of the McCarthy period. Who in Government would have dared to propose recognizing China or aiding the Soviet Union agriculturally and technically?

finding the way for the salvation of mankind.

The United States, too, sees itself as the servant of history by protecting the rights of free peoples to determine their own destiny. We too have a moral obligation to all mankind. Therefore, as Henry Kissinger pointed out, while we recognize our responsibility to maintain peace, there is a point at which we would be obliged to fire in a confrontation with the Soviets.

That "point" marks, of course, the future Armageddon. How can it be defined precisely? It is not a rational or mathematical measurement. It will not be decided by democratic processes. Yet, from the general acceptance of at least the reality of that point, it seems to embody a concept about which there is a kind of consensus.

The Soviet and American ways of looking at the world have at least one similarity—a historical, Messianic vision. In each case the vision provides a moral justification for violence, and in each case it provides guides to action which are in with the dictates of the opposing system. Under these circumstances détente can never be more than a temporary tactic for either side.

The Soviet Government is quite emphatic about its philosophical system and its view of events in terms of their contribution to the fulfillment of a preordained order. Having such a view of reality, the Soviet Government operates with considerable consistency. How then do we conclude that "this year" the Soviets will not invade Czechoslovakia?

Our difficulty in understanding the dictates of so all-encompassing an ideology is deep seated, at least among naval officers. Each visit by a head of state, each evidence of cooperation on some cultural or economic level lends itself to the desired interpretation that now we will be friends. Obviously there is a temptation to conclude that the individual, temporal manifestation of understanding proves the invalidity of the domination of ideology.

This recurring need to ignore or translate this hostile philosophy into a comfortable and friendly concept or a practical application is characteristic of the American experience and our philosophy. Pragmatism, a belief in testing truth by clearly visible results and which understands "thought" as primarily a guide to action, is a respected philosophy which evolved in America and appears to express the American spirit and analytical approach. Our foreign policy, our military strategy, and our economic life are often justified on the basis of pragmatism. When we make appeals to "the reasonable thing to do," it is most often the pragmatic philosophy that provides us with the standard of validity with which to define the reasonable.

Pragmatism, however, tends to distort any understanding of a deterministic philosophy such as Marxism-Leninism. For example, the pragmatist might expect that once a Marxist has seen how efficiently our agricultural system operates, he will return to the Soviet Union and recommend decollectivization. The philosophical bias recognizes only that an ideology which does not produce practical results should reasonably be discarded. Such reasoning was massively publicized during the Khrushchev visit to the United States.

The pragmatist, then, would be likely to overrate the force of facts in Soviet decisions. The Soviets, on the other hand, would be likely to exaggerate the force of America's economic drive (a desire to dominate world markets, for example) as the motive force in its foreign policy.

There is even a different perception of time operating which may suggest to one side that there is a crisis when the other side does not think so. For the Marxist, as for the Slavophile before him, history has decreed the ultimate triumph. History has not given assur-

ances that the path will be smooth with one inevitable success following another. Immediate results are neither expected nor required. Errors can be absorbed. The Cuban missile crisis, the expulsion from Egypt, and similar events are only illustrations of Lenin's phrase "two steps forward and one back." The timetable for the spread of communism is flexible to the extreme.

The pragmatist, however, is in a hurry for results and intellectually embarrased by failure. Time does not guarantee him a remission of sins. In order to know the truth, he must test it through action, translate a plan into practice, and demonstrate its positive value. His tendency, because of the pressure of time and the need to act, to test this data, is to arrive at hasty conclusions. From the Soviet point of view, he overreacts, manufactures crises where none exist.

Our time sense is certainly exacerbated by our rhythm of life. In our careers, time is money. Military personnel are geared to 2- or 3-year tours, and an aggressive, ambitious officer must make his mark quickly if he is interested in speedy promotion. The politician operates within a 4-year time frame, and the necessity of concrete results pressures the whole gamut of government employees working in foreign or domestic policy. There is a sense of impatience and urgency about problem solving which a Soviet officer probably does not share.

These cultural and, in our case, pragmatic and practical misconceptions color military decisions at every level. In naval analysis it is argued that the Soviets decided to build certain ships during specific years on the basis of *our* practical experience; because Soviet ships are sailing the world's oceans, it is argued that they have adopted *our* naval strategy of control of the seas as though they had just discovered Mahan, it is asserted that the Cuban missile crisis taught the Soviets the value of seapower, although Soviets, and before them Czarist Russians, had been writing and theorizing about it for decades.

It is difficult to comprehend the ability of preconceptions to obscure facts, even when they are striking. One example is the Styx missile. First appearing in 1959, it revolutionized naval tactics. Heretofore navies were rated on the basis of the number of bottoms and the size of ships. With the advent of the surface-to-surface missile, a small, fast boat could carry more firepower than a cruiser. The whole concept of naval tactics should have changed. And yet, it was not until 1967, when a Styx sank the Israeli destroyer *Eilat*, that this new development began to be taken with the seriousness it deserved. Perhaps this is because the pragmatist, concentrating on current problems and practical results, has difficulty shifting his attention to a general principle. Patterns that succeeded are repeated, and concentration is attracted to ever more detailed improvements. In the case of the Styx, since the immediate threat could be overcome by an F-4 launched from an aircraft carrier, the overall implications for naval warfare were, for a very long time, ignored.

On the other hand, the Soviet officer, protected by the movement of history, tends to see the world and foreign cultures as striving for uniformity. Details of national differences are blurred. Egyptian pride and Moslem religious fervor are difficult to understand in the light of the promised victory of the proletariat.

The danger is that the American, concerned with minute improvements in the operation of the carrier task force, will not notice that the Soviets have resolved the whole issue of the aircraft carrier. On the other hand, the Soviet officer, satisfied with the overall solution to a specific problem, will tend not to think of the variations in behavior which might temporarily obstruct that solution.

In order to test truths and examine practical results, the pragmatist tends to be bound by artificial categories which he has established for experimental purposes. The navy fights its wars without reference to the army or air force; sea lines of communication begin to take on distinct mental outlines as if they existed as permanent highways through the water; and ingenious improvements will be proposed in the operations orders for the resupply of NATO by sea although the total concept may no longer be valid.

The Soviet officer, in making decisions, will assume the overriding nature of ideological interest which insures the cooperation and support of other branches of the armed forces. Of course, there will be interservice jealousies and rivalries, but he would not think of planning a major strategy without reference to the participation of all elements of the military, the government, and the party. Since the dynamics of history are moved by universal laws, military, economic, political, diplomatic, and cultural action all merge into one another and are, at once, an expression and means of realizing the same end. As distinctions between civil, political and private society fade, so do distinctions between national and class interests.

The man of action is, almost by definition, easily conditioned. Since he finds fulfillment in acting and in achieving demonstrable results, he cannot resist responding to a stimulus. He is attracted by patterns and not ideologies. Annual Soviet naval exercises are contrasted and compared only with previous ones. Warsaw Pact exercises are minutely annotated. At first a new development may be watched cautiously, even reacted to, but once sufficiently repeated, such developments are accepted as normal. Missile submarines in Cuba, intelligence collectors off Norfolk, multiple ship declarations for Bosporus transits, all, once accepted, fail to cause alarm.

A knowledge of this reaction—the inability of man to keep constantly on the alert—is useful for military cover and deception. Conditioning, which gives one side the added benefit of training, also softens the opposition for the real thrust. Conditioning can proceed on another level as well. By interpreting every action as a manifestation of a reasonable and practical need judged by one's own standards—one loses all hope of accurately estimating the action of another, since the projection is merely one's own culture, one's self.

If it seems absurd that a modern nation could pursue an "irrational" policy or that a whole people could support "irrational" action, one only needs a short review of recent history. The Nazi madness or the Soviet purges of the thirties when the Soviet equivalent of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was solemnly reported to have been agents of Japan, England, or Czechoslovakia provides enough evidence to sober the

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

Capt. Robert B. Bathurst, U.S. Navy, did his undergraduate work in psychology at Northwestern University, earned a master's degree in English literature from Northwestern, and is a Ph.D. candidate at Brown University. He has had Russian language training at the Naval Language School in Washington, D.C., and attended the U.S. Army Advanced School of Slavic Studies at Oberammergau, Bavaria. As an intelligence officer, he has served in the Fleet Intelligence Center, Europe, as Head of Political Military Affairs, as Assistant Naval Attaché in Moscow, and as Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence for Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe. Captain Bathurst currently occupies the Edwin T. Layton Military Chair of Intelligence at the Naval War College.

most skeptical. Indeed, the Soviet preparation for World War II consisted of liquidating a majority of the military, government, and industrial leaders and then launching an attack on Finland.

The question remains: Who will shoot first and at what point? The question is far from answered, and the methodology for finding that answer is not even suggested. What this paper has tried to show is that the qualitative change in modern warfare has necessitated an overwhelming requirement to examine and improve the estimative process. We have been warned twice that we could be surprised. We have become accustomed to situations in which one or the other power might feel morally obliged to fire. The point at which that decision is made will be intuitive, culturally determined, and made to the roll of a different drum.

Ψ

. . . It is an amiable and common conceit that one's own behaviour is better than that of one's opponent, and it may even be true upon occasion. What is absurd is that we should expect an enemy to base its military policy on our own estimate of our own moral character.

P.M.S. Blackett, "A Critique of Defence Thinking," Encounter, April 1961

THE OPEN SECRET:

THE U.S. NAVY IN THE BATTLE OF THE ATLANTIC

APRIL-DECEMBER 1941

The issues of Executive secrecy and the role of the Commander in Chief versus the congressional right to declare war are not unique to the years of the Indochina war. The preservation of England in 1941 demanded U.S. involvement in the naval battle for the Atlantic long before the declaration of war with Germany. Due almost entirely to Presidential action, often undertaken in secret without approval of either the Congress or the public, the operations were a possible infringement on the warmaking powers of Congress. At the same time they were important to saving England.

An article prepared

by

Lieutenant Commander Douglas M. Norton, U.S. Navy

April 1941—England stood alone in Europe. In the Atlantic, German submarines, using the wolfpack tactics initiated the previous winter, had shifted their operations to the midocean area where convoys were largely unprotected because of a shortage of Canadian and British escorts. In Washington the Chief of Naval Operations, Adm. Harold R. "Betty" Stark, worked against a lack of time and resources to prepare the U.S. Navy to join that battle. Writing to Adm. Husband E. Kimmel, Commander of the Pacific Fleet, Stark gave his assessment of the situation in the Atlantic:

> I feel it is only a matter of time before King [then Commander of the Atlantic Fleet] is directed to convoy or patrol or whatever form the protective measures take.
>
> . . . The situation is obviously critical in the Atlantic. In my opinion it is hopeless except as we take strong measures to save it. . . . Without our giving effective aid I doubt if the British can much more than see the year through, if that. The situation is much worse than the average person has any idea.[1]

This view of the situation paralleled that of Stark's Commander in Chief. In fact, on 2 April, President Franklin Roosevelt discussed with advisers the idea of providing U.S. Navy escorts for British convoys and directed the Navy to prepare plans for such an undertaking.[2]

In order to fully appreciate the problems which faced Stark in April 1941, it will be helpful to first review the state of the Navy and the operations with

which it had been charged prior to that time. During the interwar years the physical size and technical development of the Navy had been constrained by the limitations imposed by the Washington Naval Conference and subsequent conferences, the desire of successive Presidents to hold down the size of the Federal budget, a widespread interest in disarmament, and the effects of Gen. Billy Mitchell's crusade for airpower as the panacea for the Nation's defense needs.

Nevertheless, despite these constraints, some significant developments were accomplished during this period. The importance of airpower had been realized within the Navy, and with the conversion of the collier *Langley* in 1921 the Navy began adding carriers to the fleet. By December 1941 there were eight carriers in operation. In 1933 a large building program involving ship types not limited under the naval treaties began, and even though treaty limitations restricted the building of battleships, a new class of these ships was designed. In June 1940, under the impetus of the war in Europe, Congress approved a building program which provided for an increase of 25 percent in carrier, cruiser, and submarine tonnage. One month later new ship construction programs accelerated with the appropriation of funds to build a "two-ocean Navy." In round numbers this meant an expansion of some 70 percent in the combat tonnage of the Navy, including capital ships.[3] In 1941, however, the two-ocean Navy existed only on blueprints and building ways and would continue to do so for at least another 2 years.

With an increase in ships must come the crews to man them. The Navy of 1943 would require over two million men; but at the end of 1940 the Navy had less than one-tenth this number.[4] The personnel shortage in early 1941 was further complicated by the fact that the Navy was not allowed to use the draft to augment its personnel needs.

During the 1920's the Navy's ships were organized as a single fleet which was stationed as required in the Atlantic or Pacific but assigned permanently to neither. In the 1930's, in response to growing concern over the power of Japan, all but a remnant of the fleet was assigned to the Pacific. In January 1939 the group remaining in the Atlantic was designated the Atlantic Squadron, and when war began in Europe it consisted of three aging battleships, three heavy cruisers, a squadron of destroyers, and the carrier *Ranger*, not then completely finished.[5] On 12 September 1939 the Atlantic Squadron began operating at sea to carry out the Neutrality Patrol ordered by President Roosevelt. Its task was to report and track any belligerent air, surface, or underwater forces which might approach the coast of the United States or the West Indies. This operation had been given Pan American sanction in October by the Act of Panama which declared that it was the united policy of the Americas to keep the war out of the Western Hemisphere. The act warned the belligerents against conducting "warlike" operations in the Atlantic west of a line running from Nova Scotia south along the meridian of 60° west to a point 20° north of the equator, thence to a point 600 miles south of the Cape Verde Islands, thence southwest roughly parallel to the coast of South America.[6] On 1 November 1940 an enlarged Atlantic Squadron was redesignated Patrol Force, U.S. Fleet.

In February 1941 Navy forces were reorganized to reflect the nature of American concern with the world situation. The U.S. Fleet was abolished and its former components redesignated as the Pacific, Atlantic, and Asiatic Fleets.

Admiral Stark's view of the European war from the outset had been that the United States could not afford to let Britain fall. Knowing that the U.S. Navy did not have the resources that would enable it to police the Atlantic while

simultaneously maintaining an adequate force in the Pacific, Stark was anxious to know what help could be expected from Britain in such an undertaking. In November 1940 he drafted a memorandum for the Secretary of the Navy and the President estimating the world situation to be such that he recommended an Atlantic-first strategy in the event of war with the Axis and urged that joint military planning be undertaken with Britain, Canada, and the Netherlands.[7] In December the Navy War Plans Division prepared a plan for the escort of convoys by the American Navy, and in mid-January 1941 the head of the division informed Admiral Stark that if preparations were immediately begun the Navy could be ready to escort convoys from North America to Scotland by the first of April.[8] This plan was entirely in accord with the President's view as expressed to Stark and other high officials at the White House on 16 January.[9]

In response to these plans, the American-British Conversations (ABC) took place in Washington from 29 January to 29 March 1941. The major decisions emerging from this conference were embodied in a document known as ABC-1 which, although not a binding agreement between governments, set forth the grand strategy upon which the war was eventually fought. Following the recommendations of Stark, it established the intent to pursue an Atlantic-first strategy, within which the main task of the American Navy was to be the protection of shipping. The initial area of U.S. responsibility would be the Western Atlantic, which was then defined as including all of that ocean west of 30^0 west longitude and north of 25^0 south latitude, save for a Canadian defense area and an area south of the Azores.[10] Perhaps the most significant provision of the document was the understanding, as Fleet Admiral King's memoirs later put it, " . . . that, without declaration of war, the United States Navy would assume responsibility for protecting transatlantic convoys at the earliest practicable date."[11]

With this object in mind Stark, on 15 February, ordered the creation of a Support Force from among the ships of the Atlantic Fleet. Formally inaugurated on 1 March under command of Rear Adm. Arthur L. Bristol, this group promptly began intensive ASW training. In another move toward assuming escort duties, a Central Atlantic Neutrality Patrol began operations in early April east of the 60^0 west longitude boundary established by the Act of Panama, out to 30^0 west longitude.[12]

Facing the difficult task of preparing a one-ocean navy for a two-ocean war, Stark was often frustrated by the shackles which the President—with his wider responsibilities and concerns—placed upon his efforts. He was "pressing," he wrote to Admiral Kimmel in late January, to be allowed to assume control of the Coast Guard, and " . . . I am hopeful that I may be able to after the Lend-Lease Bill is out of the road. Please don't mention this to anyone."[13] A few days later, in another letter to Kimmel, he described his personnel problem:

> I am struggling, and I use the word advisedly, every time I get in the White House, which is rather frequent, for additional men. It should not be necessary, and while I have made the case as obvious as I possibly can, the President just has his own ideas about men.[14]

During the first few days of April, Stark submitted a memorandum to the President in which he enumerated the naval strength necessary to provide effective ocean escort in the Atlantic west of 30^0 west longitude and noted that " . . . the Atlantic Fleet is unable to provide the minimum ocean escort considered necessary."[15] Accordingly, he recommended the secret transfer of three battleships, a carrier, four cruisers,

and several destroyers from the Pacific to the Atlantic, fully realizing the encouragement such action might give to Japan if it became known.

The man who would command these vessels was Adm. Ernest J. King, who had been President Roosevelt's personal choice to command the Patrol Force in 1940 and who had been advanced to four-star rank in February 1941 when he became the first Commander of the Atlantic Fleet. Three days after assuming command, King placed the Patrol Force on a wartime footing, requiring the ships to be habitually darkened at night, fuel and stores to be maintained at capacity, and that antimine, antisubmarine, and antiaircraft protective measures be taken. His philosophy of command could be summed up in two phrases: "initiative of the subordinate," and "make the best of what you have."[16] In a circular letter to his officers, he emphasized that war was inevitable, and subordinates would then be required to exercise a high degree of initiative—the time to build that was now: "subordinates are to be habituated to *think*, to *judge*, to *decide*, and to *act* for themselves"; if they do not, " . . . we shall be in sorry case when the time for active operations comes."[17]

Far to the north, in Greenland and Iceland, events occurred which would soon draw the Navy from the American Security Zone set forth at Panama into the heart of the U-boats' midocean hunting grounds. On 9 April 1941 the Danish Minister to the United States, whose nation had fallen to Germany in 1940, signed with the U.S. Government an agreement concerning the status of Greenland. Under the terms of this agreement the United States accepted the responsibility to assist Greenland in maintaining its existing status until such time as a liberated Denmark might be able to resume control of it. This act provided the United States with a vehicle to deter German occupation of Greenland and the establishment of bases from which to operate in the Western Hemisphere. On 21 April a group of Coast Guard cutters, under Admiral King's operational control as Task Force 11, was ordered to operate in the area northeast of Greenland as long as sea ice conditions permitted to " . . . prevent establishment of military, naval, and air bases, or landing of European nationals, except as authorized by the government of Greenland."[18] This meant that vessels of the U.S. Government would be operating within the zone in which Germany had declared that not only enemy but neutral vessels would be sunk on sight. On 25 March this zone had been extended to include the waters around Iceland and most of the Denmark Strait.

Simultaneously American concern over the status of Iceland grew, and for the same reason: it offered excellent potential for bases from which to either attack or defend the North Atlantic convoy routes. The British Government, which had sent troops to Iceland on invitation in March 1940, was anxious to be relieved of this responsibility by the United States. In preparation, while arrangements for such an event were still under negotiation between the British, Icelandic, and American Governments, President Roosevelt directed the Navy to undertake a reconnaissance of Iceland.[19]

The destroyer U.S.S. *Niblack*, with Commander Destroyer Division 13 embarked, was dispatched on such a mission in early April. On 10 April near the coast of Iceland, *Niblack* sighted three lifeboats and maneuvered to pick up their occupants. As the last of these survivors of a torpedoed Dutch merchantman were being rescued, *Niblack*'s sonar developed a contact, believed to be a submarine, range closing. COMDESDIV 13, Comdr. D.L. Ryan, ordered *Niblack*'s Commanding Officer, Lt. Comdr. E.R. Durgin, to drop depth charges. Thus were fired the first Ameri-

can shots of World War II, but whether at a submarine or at a false contact remains unclear, since *Niblack* encountered no further indications of a submarine and the postwar opening of German naval archives apparently has not revealed a report of the incident. Commander Ryan's decision seems to have been deemed correct by his superiors, and Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox stated in July before a congressional committee, "he very prudently exercised the right of self-preservation, for had there been a submarine there his destroyer might have been sunk."[20]

In March and April 1941 the Congress of the United States was much concerned with naval activities. Several Congressmen were quite alarmed about the prospect of an incident such as had, in fact, taken place, unknown to them, on 10 April. They felt that the activities of the Navy under the Neutrality Patrol concept offered ample opportunity for a repetition of the incidents involving American ships and German submarines which had precipitated the entry of the United States into World War I.

Speaking before the House on 14 April, Representative Roy O. Woodruff of Michigan noted that since the transfer of American destroyers to Britain in exchange for base rights it had become almost impossible for a German submarine commander to distinguish American from British "war boats," and added: "There can be no question, if we are to face this situation frankly, that the patrol operations of the Atlantic Fleet two or three thousand miles offshore necessarily involve increased hazards of some such 'incident' as an American war boat struck by a German torpedo." It was, he said, " . . . essential that the American people know the implications and potentialities of this new policy. . . . It undoubtedly means a shooting-war in the near future."[21]

Some members of Congress were troubled as well by the thought of more direct use of American naval forces to aid the British, specifically, convoy escort duties. This question, which had really been before the Nation ever since the decision was taken to become the "arsenal of democracy," turned upon the simple fact that aid to the Allies was useless until it arrived on the scene. As merchant sinkings mounted throughout the fall and winter of 1940-41, discussion increased on the question of whether the United States should take steps to ensure delivery. At a press conference in January 1941, Roosevelt had publicly backed away from escort of convoy, saying in effect, "convoys mean shooting, and shooting means war."[22] These words were often cited by Senators and Congressmen as a promise on Roosevelt's part to refrain from ordering escort of convoy. In the spring of 1941 American flag merchantmen were not allowed to enter the combat zones proclaimed by the President under the terms of the Neutrality Act of 1939. Yet, for Admiral Stark the realities of keeping Britain in the war required that the U.S. Navy assume responsibility for escorting in the mid-Atlantic area, where the U-boats were becoming increasingly active.

Roosevelt's statement of January not withstanding, in March several members of Congress proposed a resolution that would make it illegal for the President to order escort of convoy by the Navy. This, the proposed Tobey resolution, also reaffirmed the existing Neutrality Act by prohibiting the use of American merchant ships to transport cargo to belligerents. Although the resolution eventually died in committee, it provided the vehicle for the expression of such congressional views as "everybody knows that once we use our Navy to convoy on the high seas they will be attacked, and then we are in war, whether Congress declares it or not."[23] On the last day of March, Senator Taft delivered the opinion, backed by a lengthy supporting memorandum, that

the President had no constitutional power to order escort of convoy because, being "... war itself or inevitably leading to war ...," such an act was reserved to the Congress.[24]

Against this background of naval, congressional, and international action, let us now turn to the Presidential decisions of the first 2 weeks of April 1941, which placed the Navy squarely in the Battle of the Atlantic. Late in March, Roosevelt had received a message from Churchill which reported the grim facts of current shipping losses and requested that the Security Zone be extended farther from American shores and also that American ships and aircraft "cruise about" in this extended zone in order to inhibit German operations. As noted previously, Roosevelt apparently had decided by 2 April that strong American action would be required and had ordered the Navy to prepare plans calling for aggressive action against German submarines and surface raiders. The result was Navy Hemisphere Defense Plan Number One (HDP-1) which, according to Stark, specifically implemented the President's thoughts.[25] Meeting almost daily with his principal advisers during early April, Roosevelt decided on 10 April to extend the boundary of the Western Hemisphere (and thus the operations of the Neutrality Patrol) eastward to 25° west longitude. Roosevelt ordered that within this zone American warships and aircraft would "... patrol and follow the convoys ...," notifying the British of German units encountered.[26] This plan did not envisage aggressive action by the Navy against the Germans, except presumably if attacked by them, and thus represented a more cautious approach to the problem than that of 2 April. The boundary was later extended to 26° west longitude and curved somewhat to the east to include Iceland. On 11 April, Roosevelt cabled Churchill the news of his decision, asking that convoys be rerouted to take advantage of this zone and that the United States be kept informed as to convoy locations. He also asked Churchill to make no public announcement of this information, noting that, "I may decide to issue the necessary naval operations orders and let time bring out the existence of the new patrol area."[27] During this same period the President approved the transfer of naval forces from the Pacific as Stark had requested; however, after receiving news of the Russo-Japanese Neutrality Pact of 13 April he modified his approval, permitting the battleships to remain in the Pacific.

In spite of Roosevelt's message of 11 April, which appears for the moment to reject convoying, the issue seems to have remained very much in flux in the minds of his chief military advisers. Admiral Stark still seemed unsure of the President's intention as late as 19 April, when in a letter to Admiral Kimmel he said of HDP-1:

> Whether or not he will put it into effect, or altered, I cannot say. King is in this morning. His order is ready. The President is examining the situation further as a result of his conversation with Mr. Hull [Secretary of State Cordell Hull], who is counselling something less aggressive. I will add a P.S. when this is typed Monday.
>
> P.S.... King returned from Hyde Park and as a result Hemisphere Plan No. 1 goes by the board, and a substitute, with no teeth, is being prepared today.[28]

Navy Hemisphere Defense Plan Number Two (HDP-2), also known as WPL-49, the "toothless substitute," was issued by Admiral Stark on 21 April at the direction of the President. It stated the relatively cautious premise that "entrance into the Western Hemisphere by naval vessels and aircraft of belligerent Powers, other than those Powers which have sovereignty over Western Hemisphere territory [i.e., other than the Allies], will be viewed as

actuated by a possibly unfriendly intent toward territory or shipping within the Western Hemisphere." The general task of the Navy was to " . . . warn Western Hemisphere Powers against possible impending attack, and defend United States flag shipping against attack."

Specifically, the Atlantic Fleet was to:

- trail Axis naval ships and planes and broadcast, in the clear, reports of their movements at least every 4 hours,
- trail Axis merchantmen if suspected of being supply vessels or of assisting in the operations of naval ships or aircraft, reporting their movements to CNO,
- prevent interference with U.S. flag shipping by belligerents,
- avoid intervening or interfering with the armed engagements of belligerents.

This plan became effective on 24 April, with the proviso that port departures in support of these operations be made to appear routine.[29]

Atlantic Fleet Operational Plan Number Three, which provided detailed instructions to ships and aircraft, defined the Western Hemisphere as it had been delineated by the President: "The Western Hemisphere extends from approximately 26 degrees West, westward to the International Date Line and, in the Atlantic includes all of Greenland, all of the islands of the Azores, the whole of the Gulf of St. Lawrence, and the Gulf of Mexico."[30]

Unknown to Stark at this time, Admiral King and the President had discussed more than the enlarged patrol at Hyde Park on 19 April. According to King's memoirs, they met in absolute privacy in the President's secluded stone cottage, where the main object of their conversation was apparently Roosevelt's desire to meet Churchill at the leased American base near Argentia, Newfoundland. The President proposed to slip away from his scheduled visit to the Canadian Prime Minister, board a cruiser in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, and speed to a rendezvous at Placentia Bay. King was to investigate the feasibility of this scheme and report. Having been directed by the President to tell no one of this, upon returning to Washington, King told Stark and Knox only that the President had summoned him to discuss the situation in the Atlantic and measures that might be taken against U-boats.[31]

As he had indicated to Churchill, Roosevelt did not announce the new patrol operations. The Navy definitely had not assumed any responsibility for protecting British convoys under HDP-2, and at a press conference on 25 April the President vigorously denied reports that naval escorts were being provided for carriers of lend-lease materials. On the 17th he had, through his secretary Mr. Early, charged columnist John O'Donnel with a "deliberate lie" for publishing such allegations. However, the extension of the patrol was intimated to Congress and the public in a speech on 24 April by Secretary Knox.[32]

In spite of the increased activity of the Atlantic Fleet, however, the transatlantic convoy situation continued to deteriorate. A letter from Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel indicated that by the third week in May Stark felt that Britain might not even last through the coming fall without effective aid from the United States. The President seemed to share the feeling that more must be done. He approved the transfer of all the ships which Stark had said were necessary to enable the Atlantic Fleet to undertake escort of convoy operations, and, in a radio address on 27 May, told the Nation of the expanded patrol, evidently preparing the public for the advent of American convoying. Noting that the rate of sinkings by Nazi submarines far exceeded the combined shipbuilding capacity of the United States and Britain, he said: "We have, accordingly, extended our patrol in

North and South Atlantic waters. We are steadily adding more ships and planes to that patrol. These ships and planes warn of the presence of attacking raiders. . . . "

After stating that "our patrols are helping now to insure delivery of the needed supplies to Britain," the President described the shape of things to come:

> All additional measures necessary to deliver the goods will be taken. Any and all further methods or combinations of methods, which can or should be utilized, are being devised by our military and naval technicians, who, with me, will work out and put into effect such new and additional safeguards as may be necessary.

In closing the address Roosevelt declared a state of unlimited national emergency.[33]

Patrol operations continued to expand in June. The three Coast Guard cutters which had begun operations near Greenland in April were augmented by two more cutters and an icebreaker. This enlarged group was designated the Greenland Patrol and was attached to Rear Admiral Bristol's Support Force.[34] In mid-June a new patrol was established within the Trinidad-Cape Verde Islands-Natal triangle. Commanded by Rear Adm. Jonas H. Ingram, Task Force 3 consisted of four older light cruisers and five destroyers and was permitted by the Government of Brazil to utilize the ports of Recife and Bahia for logistic support.[35]

In discussions leading to ABC-1, plans were made for American ships and planes to be based in the United Kingdom after the United States assumed convoy escort duties, and, in fact, the selection of sites and assembly of construction materials began while the staff conversations were yet in progress. In mid-June the plan for American warships to escort convoys across the entire Atlantic was dropped, and when the time came the U.S. Navy would take responsibility only for the journey between Newfoundland and Iceland.

On 11 June the emaciated survivors of the American merchantman *Robin Moore*, which had been torpedoed in the South Atlantic during May, were rescued. Despite the urging of his friend and adviser Harry Hopkins, Roosevelt declined to sieze the opportunity to announce the escalation of the Navy's role from observation to the protection of American flagships.[36] That this was, of course, already a task of the Atlantic Fleet under the terms of HDP-2 had not been mentioned. As a result of this incident the Navy began on 17 June to issue instructions for the reporting and control of American merchant movements, the start of a naval shipping control organization which would eventually route over 200 American ships before Pearl Harbor.[37]

On 30 June, concerned about several press reports describing alleged encounters between the Navy and German submarines, Senator Burton K. Wheeler of Montana called for a senatorial investigation of the Navy's activities. Senate Resolution 138, introduced by Wheeler, called upon the Naval Affairs Committee to make " . . . a thorough and complete investigation of the charges that American naval units have destroyed by shooting or dropping depth bombs on German naval units. . . . ," and if true to find out " . . . upon what authority such acts were committed." The matter was referred to committee on that date.

Meanwhile, negotiations concerning the relief of the British garrison in Iceland had begun to bear fruit. On 16 June the President instructed Admiral Stark to undertake the operation, which would be conducted with Marines. As volunteers rather than draftees, these marines could legally be assigned to duties outside of the United States without congressional approval.[38] The initial American contingent, some 4,100

strong, was not to relieve the British garrison entirely, but rather would assist them in the defense of Iceland, the British withdrawing only after the American force had been strengthened. Stark felt that the despatching of an American expeditionary force was "practically an act of war" and sent a draft of the orders addressed to King and the Marine commander to the President for approval before he issued them.[39]

On 1 July the American naval force, which had assembled at Argentia in secrecy, set out for Iceland. Under the command of Rear Adm. D. Mc. LeBreton, Task Force 19 included six transports bearing Marines and equipment and an escort of two battleships, three light cruisers, and 13 destroyers. Fearing submarine attack, Admiral Stark was able to dissuade the President from announcing the existence of the expedition until it reached Iceland.[40] On 7 July the U.S. Government revealed both Iceland's request for the troops (made somewhat reluctantly under British pressure) and U.S. acceptance of the task. That evening TF 19 reached the harbor at Reykjavik after a tense but unmolested passage during which one of the destroyers recovered 14 survivors, including four American nurses, from a torpedoed Norwegian freighter.[41]

In his message to Congress describing the expedition to Iceland, the President on 7 July told of the increased role the Navy would play in the midst of the North Atlantic battleground through which passed the sealanes to Iceland:

> It is, therefore, imperative that the approaches between the Americas and these strategic outposts [Iceland and others yet to be named], the safety of which this country regards as essential to its national security, and which it must therefore defend, shall remain open and free of all hostile activity or threat thereof.
>
> As Commander-in-Chief I have consequently issued orders to the Navy that all necessary steps be taken to insure the safety of communications in the approaches between Iceland and the United States and all other strategic outposts.[42]

What exactly were the "necessary steps" to be? In this regard the President retained his ambivalence. On 11 July he approved the issuance of Navy Hemispheric Defense Plan Number Four (HDP-4, also known as WPL-51) under which the Atlantic Fleet, in addition to the location and reporting of Axis naval units as under HDP-2, was to:

- Protect United States and Icelandic flag shipping against hostile attack by escorting, covering, and patrolling "as required by circumstances," and by destroying hostile forces which threatened such shipping;
- Escort convoys of United States and Icelandic flag shipping, including shipping of any nationality which may join such convoys, between United States ports and bases, and Iceland; and
- Provide protection and sea transportation for the initial movements and continued support of overseas American garrisons.

After seeming to accept the responsibility of escorting British shipping, the President equivocated. On 26 July he ordered Admiral Stark to place the plan into effect, except that only United States and Icelandic flag shipping was to be escorted for the moment.[43]

Still somewhat uncertain as to precisely how the President wanted the Navy to carry out his orders, Stark was frustrated and upset at the President's ambivalence. On 31 July he wrote to his friend and former assistant, Capt. C.M. Cooke, then commanding the battleship *Pennsylvania:*

> To some of my very pointed questions, which all of us would like to have answered, I get a smile or a "Betty, please don't ask

me that!" Policy seems something never fixed, always fluid and changing. There is no use kicking on what you can't get definite answers. God knows I would surrender this job quickly if somebody else wants to take it up, and I have offered to, more than once.[44]

Such bouts of exasperation were somewhat tempered by a realization of the national security considerations Roosevelt faced. In a letter to Kimmel on 19 April he had written: "The President has on his hands at the present time about as difficult a situation as ever confronted any man anywhere in public life. There are tremendous issues at stake, to which he is giving all he has got. I only wish I could be more help to him."[45]

Free to make his own interpretations of HPD-4, Admiral King, in his Operation Plan Number Five, directed his ship and aircraft commanders to consider shipping under their protection as being threatened whenever "potentially hostile vessels were . . . actually within sight or sound contact of such shipping or its escort."[46] This was, of course, in effect an order to escorts to shoot on sight. It is unknown whether Roosevelt personally approved this directive, but Stark's previous concern for the wider implications of the Iceland op-order indicate that he probably brought this order to the President's attention. This operation plan also redefined the Western Hemisphere to include Iceland.

On 19 July Admiral King issued his Operation Plan Number Six to the Atlantic Fleet, establishing Task Force 1 to carry out HPD-4, minus the provision for escort of "shipping of any nationality which may join." TF1 was the largest force in the Atlantic Fleet, consisting of six battleships, five heavy cruisers, 50 destroyers, and 48 patrol planes. In addition, about 27 Canadian and three Free French escort vessels were available.[47]

During this same period in midsummer, naval bases were established at Argentia, Newfoundland, and Casco Bay, Me., to serve, along with the anchorage and base established on 1 July at Hvalfjordur, Iceland, as bases for the convoy escorts. Naval and airbases at Bermuda, other British possessions in the Caribbean, and British Guiana had been established previously and were already operating in support of the Neutrality Patrol.

On 11 July the Senate Naval Affairs Committee met in Executive Session to question Secretary Knox and Admiral Stark pursuant to the Senate investigation of naval activities. On 29 July Senator David I. Walsh reported the resolution out of committee, giving the Navy, albeit quite cautiously, a clean bill of health: ". . . up to date the Navy has confined itself to what was properly within its functions." Aware of the politically volatile nature of the issue, Walsh ignored the polite but persistent pressure from Senator Alben Barkley to recommend to the Senate either a continued investigation or declare it closed, and instead reported the resolution "without recommendation." The resolution died a quiet parliamentary death 2 weeks later.

A censored version of the hearing transcript was read into the Congressional Record by Senator Walsh. The committee members had questioned the witnesses about several stories then current in the press, ranging from a generally accurate account of the *Niblack* affair (which Knox acknowledged, as true without naming the ship or giving the date), to a wild story that U.S.S. *Ranger*'s bow had been blown off by a German bomb. Knox and Stark seem to have been quite truthful in their comments; however, Knox refused on security grounds to disclose the nature of the orders under which naval patrols were at that time operating or to reveal future Anglo-American plans. The following excerpt, relating to an alleged

incident of American convoying which was in fact false, coveys the flavor of the proceedings:

> Secretary Knox: . . . There isn't a particle of truth in it.
>
> Senator Bone: Then the entire statement is utterly false?
>
> Secretary Knox: The entire statement is utterly false.
>
> Senator Lucas: Every sentence?
>
> Secretary Knox: Every single word in it, without qualification.
>
> Senator Brewster: Nothing in it is true?
>
> Secretary Knox: Nothing whatever.
>
> Senator Tydings: Mr. Secretary, if I may ask you two or three questions. It may be somewhat superfluous, but I would like to put it out in the clear. There was no incident where one or more airplane carriers convoyed eighty or a lesser amount of British merchantmen across the ocean?
>
> Secretary Knox: Never.
>
> Senator Tydings: There was no case where a battle took place at sea which we inspired or that we stood by and listened to?
>
> Secretary Knox: Nothing of that kind whatever. We do not know a single thing about it, and we would know about it if it ever happened.
>
> Admiral Stark: We never heard of it.[48]

From 9 to 12 August, Roosevelt had his eagerly anticipated meeting with Churchill at Placentia Bay. As the original scheme for a departure from Gaspé had proved infeasible due to expected mid-May ice conditions and the difficulties of maintaining secrecy, the expedition departed instead from Martha's Vineyard. The President and his advisers secretly embarked on 4 August in King's flagship, the cruiser *Augusta*, accompanied by the cruiser *Tuscaloosa* and an escort of destroyers. The flotilla reached harbor without incident on the morning of 7 August, where it anchored to await the arrival of Churchill aboard H.M.S. *Prince of Wales* on the 9th.

The major result of the conference from a naval viewpoint was that British and American naval officers worked out the details of the ABC-1 plan under which the U.S. Navy would assume responsibility for the protection of British as well as American merchantmen in the Western Atlantic.

Although the Atlantic Fleet was already hard-pressed by existing commitments—". . . practically at the elastic limit" wrote Stark to Kimmel on 21 August—Stark was pleased that at last policy seemed finalized: "Thank God we should have things in full swing before long with plans fairly complete. It has changed so many times--but now I think we at last have something definite—maybe"[49]

On 13 August CNO modified HDP-4 to include the escort of convoy arrangements worked out at the Atlantic Conference,and on 25 August he notified King officially that his forces were "to destroy surface raiders which attacked shipping along the sea lanes between North America and Iceland or which approached the lanes sufficiently close to threaten such shipping." On 3 September Stark modified his earlier interpretation of HDP-4 to state that "hostile forces will be deemed to threaten United States or Iceland flag shipping if they enter the general area of the sea lanes which lie between North America and Iceland or enter the neutrality zone of the Atlantic Ocean described in the Declaration of Panama . . ."[50]

Given these orders and the conditions then prevailing in the North Atlantic, it was clearly only a matter of time until an American ship or airplane would feel obliged to attack a German unit. The first clash occurred almost immediately, though interestingly enough in a situation unrelated to the

new orders. At 0840 on 4 September a vintage American destroyer of the type previously given to the British, U.S.S. *Greer*, en route to Iceland with passengers and mail for the U.S. garrison there, was informed by a British patrol plane of the presence of a U-boat about 10 miles ahead of her. *Greer*, which was alone and not convoying at the time, at once increased speed and began to zigzag. As the ship approached the reported submarine position, her crew went to battle stations and began a sonar search. At 0920 *Greer* detected the submarine and maneuvered to maintain contact, making position reports as required by HDP-4. At 1000 the British pilot inquired whether *Greer* intended to attack, and after receiving a negative reply dropped four depth bombs. Just before 1100 the aircraft departed for its base. At 1240 the submarine turned toward *Greer* and, shortly thereafter, launched a tropedo which passed about about 100 yards astern. Accepting the challenge, the destroyer attacked with a pattern of depth charges, and several minutes later the U-boat missed with another torpedo. Having lost contact in the melee, *Greer* began a search of the area. At 1415 a British destroyer arrived and proposed a coordinated search, but departed when *Greer*'s captain declined the invitation. At 1512 *Greer* apparently regained contact and attacked, again producing no evidence of damage to the U-boat. Contact was broken and after searching until 1840 the destroyer resumed its voyage to Iceland.[51]

The U.S. Government announced the incident at once but said little beyond the bare facts that *Greer* had been attacked while en route to Iceland and had counterattacked with unknown results. After a week of increasing suspense, President Roosevelt addressed the Nation on 11 September. *Greer*, he said,

> . . . was carrying the American mail to Iceland. She was flying the American flag. Her identity as an American ship was unmistakable.
>
> She was then and there attacked by a submarine. Germany admits that it was a German submarine. The submarine deliberately fired a torpedo at the GREER, followed later by another attack . . . I tell you the blunt fact that the German submarine fired first upon this American destroyer without warning, and with deliberate design to sink her.

The President characterized this act of "piracy" and attacks upon American merchantmen (some of which had sailed under Panamanian flags) as part of a Nazi plan to destroy freedom of the seas as a prelude to the domination of the United States and the Western Hemisphere. Declaring that the time for "splitting hairs" and diplomatic notes had passed, he proceeded to the dramatic revelation of his orders to the U.S. Navy:

> In the waters which we deem necessary for our defense, American naval vessels and American planes will no longer wait until Axis submarines lurking under the water or Axis raiders on the surface of the sea, strike their deadly blow—first.
>
> Upon our naval and air patrol—now operating in large numbers over a vast expanse of the Atlantic—falls the duty of maintaining the American policy of freedom of the seas—now. That means, very simply and clearly, that our patrolling vessels and planes will protect all merchant ships—not only American ships but ships of any flag—engaged in commerce in our defensive waters.
>
> . . . let this warning be clear. From now on, if German or Italian vessels of war enter the waters the protection of which is necessary for American defense, they do so at their own peril.[52]

Thus ended the ambiguity which had prevailed in U.S. Navy orders since the issuance of HDP-4 and its companion Op-Plan 5 in July. Since then it had been clear that naval ships and planes escorting United States and Iceland flag merchantmen should attack Axis naval forces sighted or detected, but a unit on patrol but not engaged in escort had no such unqualified directives.

Events moved swiftly at sea; on 12 September the destroyer *Truxton*, escorting a U.S. convoy carrying Army troops to Iceland, moved out of one of the ubiquitous fogbanks along the route and came face to face with a U-boat on the surface. It crashdived before the destroyermen could open fire, but they immediately dropped depth charges.[53] This incident was not made public. On the 13th, Stark translated the President's speech into an operational directive, ordering the Atlantic Fleet to assume responsibility for transatlantic convoys of all flags in the Western Atlantic (west of 26^0 west longitude) as of 16 September.[54] This directive may have been merely for the record, since King's memoirs note that the Atlantic Fleet assumed this responsibility on 1 September.[55] Stark's letter to Kimmel on 22 September seems to confirm this. He wrote of the President's speech, "we were ready for this; in fact our orders had been issued."[56] From this point on the United States was engaged in a *de facto* war at sea with Germany. Said Stark to Kimmel in the above letter, "so far as the Atlantic is concerned, we are all but, if not actually, in it."

On the same day as the President's speech, Senator Gerald P. Nye had introduced a resolution calling upon the Senate Naval Affairs Committee "... to ascertain the facts ..." about the *Greer* episode, and to discover and report to the Senate the nature of the orders under which *Greer* and other Navy ships were operating between North America and Iceland. Responding on 20 September to a list of questions concerning the incident submitted by Senator Walsh, Admiral Stark told the Naval Affairs Committee quite candidly what had taken place, though he declined either to submit *Greer*'s log for examination or allow members of the ship's company to give testimony before the committee as had been requested. Stark's response made clear that the destroyer had hardly played the passive role implied by Roosevelt's speech and was made much of during the debate upon repeal of a part of the Neutrality Act. In October, Amos Pinchot, a well-known lawyer and conservationist, joined this controversy by sending Roosevelt an open letter in which he compared with telling effect the latter's description of the *Greer* incident and that given by Stark, concluding in outraged tones that the President's speech had been "... in direct conflict with the facts."[57]

On 17 September a group of five destroyers under the command of Capt. Morton L. Deyo assumed the escort of the first merchantmen to be convoyed by the U.S. Navy on the transatlantic route. In what was to become a familiar pattern, Captain Deyo's force relieved the Canadian escort of convoy HX-150 at a point south of Newfoundland and shepherded its 50 charges to a designated Mid-Ocean Meeting Point (MOMP), where on 25 September British warships took over escort of those ships en route to the United Kingdom, and the Americans turned north with the Iceland-bound merchantmen. No submarine contacts were made on this first run. On 24 September the first American-escorted westbound convoy, ON-18, was picked up from the British at MOMP and taken without incident to a prearranged dispersal point south of Newfoundland.[58]

On 11 October the Navy began operating under Hemisphere Defense Plan Number Five which restated that shipping of all nations was to be protected against Axis attack in the West-

ern Atlantic and that German and Italian military forces were to be destroyed if encountered in that area. The order went farther, however, and cautioned naval commanders that the United States was not at war in a legal sense and thus did not have belligerent rights. Axis merchantmen were therefore to be trailed and reported but not attacked.[59]

Escort duty proved to be physically and mentally exhausting for the officers and men of the Support Force, which had shifted its base to Argentia. In theory the ships would return to Argentia or Halifax after a convoy from MOMP, steam to Boston for a week's rest and upkeep, proceed to Casco Bay for a few days of training refresher and gunnery practice, and then head for Newfoundland and an eastbound convoy. In practice they were lucky to get 5 days in Boston out of every 45, while their time in the storm-tossed anchorages of Argentia and Hvalfjordur was, though safer than on the high seas, only slightly less physically taxing.

The North Atlantic winter made the simplest acts of life at sea, a constant irritation requiring extra effort. The following passages from a book by Griffith Baily Coale, an artist who talked the Navy into letting him go to sea to record the activities of the escorts in the fall of 1941, will strike a familiar chord in those readers who have endured the winter in the North Atlantic in a small ship: ". . . Running steeply uphill, I manage to make the chair that is lashed to my desk, squirm into it, only to have the whole damn thing carry away and land me in my shower bath. The wind is roaring and the water smashing against my cabin bulkheads." That, said Coale, was in normal weather. Then his destroyer hit a storm: ". . . wind roaring at sixty-five knots across black, ugly, moving hills of heavy water. . . . For awhile we roll forty-eight degrees every six seconds. . . . Ship's roll from bridge unbelievable, screws racing out of water, and ship falling on seas like thunder."[60]

Escort duty was, of course, dangerous as well as uncomfortable, and American luck, Hitler's desire to avoid for the moment an incident with the United States notwithstanding, could not last forever. In mid-October the first American destroyer was hit by a torpedo during a confused melee with several U-boats about 300 miles southwest of Iceland. The U.S.S. *Kearny*, a destroyer of a new class less than 2 years old, was cut almost in half by a torpedo, but in a convincing demonstration of the toughness of the new *Benson* class, *Kearny* was able to make the voyage to Hvaldfjordur under her own power, with 11 killed or missing and 24 wounded.[61]

Naval headquarters in Washington, though having little knowledge of the incident other than *Kearny*'s assignment when hit and the fact that she was proceeding to port, announced the torpedoing on 18 October. Apparently the fact that *Kearny* had been engaged in escort when struck was still considered politically sensitive, for it was stated only that she had been " . . . on patrol duty."[62] Bursting into the midst of the Neutrality Act debate, the incident was called "another *Greer*" by Senator Nye and another facet of the "conspiracy" to lead the country into war by a spokesman for the America First Committee.[63]

The President made little public comment until Navy Day, 27 October, when he delivered a histrionic speech in which he declared: " . . . the shooting has started. And history has recorded who fired the first shot. . . . we Americans have cleared our decks and taken our battle stations. . . . " In spite of this the torpedoing seems to have aroused neither public indignation against Germany for the act nor against the President for having sent the ship into the fray. There were, after all, no draftees involved, and the hazards of battle were

part of the bargain for the career man.

Admiral King seems to have shared this view. He wrote to a civilian friend on 24 October that . . . "'the powers that be' insist on making 'mountains' out of what are—to me—'molehills.' I am sure you realize that the KEARNY incident is but the first of many that, in the nature of things, are bound to occur." And some 2 weeks later, to Stark: "I suggest we go slow in this matter of making 'heroes' out of these people who have, after all, done the jobs they are trained to do. The earlier incidents loom large by peacetime conditions, but can be expected to become commonplace incidents as we get further along."[64]

During the time interval between those two letters, two more naval vessels were torpedoed, the oiler *Salinas* and the destroyer *Reuben James*. *Salinas* was hit by two fish during the night of 29-30 October, southwest of Iceland. While the crew was in the process of flooding control, the U-boat surfaced and got off three more torpedoes, one of which was a hit. *Salinas* was armed, however, and took the submarine under fire forcing it to dive; shortly after which the destroyer *Dupont* arrived and, it was thought, sank the U-boat with depth charges. Incredibly, there were no casualties aboard *Salinas*. Four days later the crippled oiler reached St. Johns, Newfoundland, but in order to avoid calling attention to her vulnerability the Navy did not announce the torpedoing until 4 November. No public mention was made of the purported sinking of the U-boat.[65]

On 31 October *Reuben James* was sunk. An old four-piper, she was blown in two by a torpedo which set off her forward magazine. One hundred fifteen of her crew perished, some of whom were killed by their own depth charges exploding as the stern of the ship sank. The ship had been engaged in escorting an eastbound convoy in the MOMP area about 600 miles west of Ireland. While the U-boat was not detected before the attack, which took place at 0525, one of *Reuben James'* consorts later had three sound contacts and launched attacks, but the submarine was thought to have escaped undamaged.[66]

Though it inspired a popular song, the news of the sinking was greeted by Congress and the public with unconcern equal to that of the *Kearny* affair. As one observer put it:

> . . . The bereaved families mourned, but among the general public there seemed to be more interest in the Army-Navy game. There was a sort of tacit understanding among Americans that nobody was to get excited if ships were sunk by U-boats, because that's what got us into the war the other time.[67]

It does seem to have taken some of the appeal out of Navy recruiting slogans. In mid-November Stark wrote to Kimmel that the loss of the ship had set recruiting back about 15 percent.[68] Observing this trend, Admiral King wrote a friend, "I am afraid that the citizenry will have to learn the bitter truth that war is not waged with words, or promises, or vituperation, but with the realities of peril, hardships, and killing. . . ."[69] The lesson was beginning.

Out of these early trials much experience was gained. When it was found from the first few runs to MOMP that the older destroyers were too short-legged to be effective escorts, the technique of refueling at sea from merchant tankers was adopted. The torpedoing of *Kearny* and *Reuben James* emphasized the need for evasive maneuvers at all times, even at night and in poor visibility. Since the surface attack at night or in bad weather was a U-boat favorite, the immense value of radar, then installed on only a handful of escorts, was quickly demonstrated and its fleetwide introduction hastened thereby. Valuable lessons were also learned about the stationing of escorts for maximum ef-

fectiveness, about tactical voice radio procedures, and about damage control.[70]

Perhaps the most important result of the quasi-war was that the officers and men of the Atlantic Fleet had a period of transition to wartime operations under Admiral King's demanding leadership and were able to put aside the habits and reactions of peacetime before being fully engulfed by war. In the Pacific, with no such introduction, it was only after a period in which the fleet took heavy losses without inflicting commensurate damage upon the enemy that this necessary change in thought patterns took place.

Further involvement in the Battle of the Atlantic was soon to arrive in the form of Armed Guard detachments, Navy gun crews for armed U.S. merchant ships. When section six of the Neutrality Act of 1939, which had prohibited the arming of American merchant vessels, came under attack in Congress, the Navy immediately began to train men to serve in this capacity.

Although there were to be no other Navy ships torpedoed until after the German declaration of war in December, the Atlantic Fleet continued to be heavily involved in the battle of the sealanes. Hitler at last allowed Admiral Doenitz to shift his submarine patrols farther into the Western Atlantic, and during November merchantmen were sunk northeast of Newfoundland and south of Greenland.[71] American warships made repeated sonar contacts and the attacks upon them produced oily evidence of success in some cases.[72] No public announcement of these attacks was made, although both British Government statements and occasional "leaks" from Navy men in letters home kept alive public speculation that the Navy was making its presence felt. In addition to this antisubmarine activity, Admiral King agreed informally that should major German surface ships break into the Atlantic, available ships of the Atlantic Fleet would be placed under temporary British command to help hunt them down.[73]

As tensions increased in the Pacific and the arduous pace of escort duty began to tell on the Atlantic Fleet, Stark struggled with the shortage of available ships and men. King bombarded him with requests for virtually anything afloat displacing 600 tons and capable of steaming at 12 knots for 3,000 miles,[74] and though the Coast Guard had at last been placed under his operational control on 1 November, Admiral Stark could not overcome the problem of limited resources. As he wrote to Kimmel on 25 November:

> We have sweat blood in the endeavor to divide adequately our forces for a two ocean war; but you cannot take inadequate forces and divide them in two or three parts and get adequate forces anywhere.
>
> . . . We are at our wit's end in the Atlantic with the butter spread extremely thin and the job increasing in toughness.
>
> . . . We have at last succeeded in getting the President to authorize the use of draftees. I have been after this for months.[75]

On 6 November, far in the South Atlantic, perhaps the most bizarre incident of the period of undeclared naval war took place. The cruiser *Omaha* and destroyer *Somers*, conducting a neutrality patrol, sighted a freighter displaying the American flag. Suspicious because the merchantman had failed to answer signal lights properly and had replied to his hail in heavily accented English, *Omaha's* captain dispatched a party by ship's boat to investigate. While the boat was en route, the crew of the merchantman, which had the name *Wilimoto* on her stern, ran up the signal "am sinking, send boats," and proceeded to abandon ship. Shortly thereafter two explosions occurred in her cargo holds.

A boarding party from *Omaha* stemmed the flow of water caused by the German attempt to scuttle the ship, the S.S. *Odenwald*, and the cruiser escorted her find to Port-of-Spain, Trinidad. Somewhat uncertain as to the legal basis of his action, Capt. T.E. Chandler reported that he had captured *Odenwald* as a suspected slave trader.[76] Government attorneys provided a more contemporary rationale: they announced that *Odenwald* had been abandoned by her crew and salvaged by *Omaha*.[77]

On 10 November the American Navy undertook its most ambitious convoy operation of the "short of war" period, the escort of convoy WS-124. President Roosevelt had secretly agreed to transport 20,000 British reinforcements to the Near East because the British were unable to provide enough ships for the long voyage via Capetown and the Persian Gulf. After being carried to Halifax in British ships, the troops embarked in six American transports and departed on the 10th for Trinidad escorted by the carrier *Ranger*, two heavy cruisers, and eight destroyers. After refueling, the convoy set out across the South Atlantic, but *Ranger* departed the group to return to American waters after only half the journey. Having successfully avoided any submarine contacts during the period of American escort, the British resumed the watch shortly after departing Capetown.[78]

While they were en route, however, the Japanese had attacked Pearl Harbor and the Pacific war began. On 8 December Hitler authorized the German Navy to attack American vessels on sight,[79] and 3 days later Germany declared war.

One of the several questions raised by this episode in American history is the degree to which the public had knowledge of the American role in the Atlantic sea war before 7 December 1941. The record recited above indicates that something less than a full accounting of naval activity was given to the public during the journey from patrolling to shooting. To recapitulate briefly:

- The *Niblack* incident, which occurred on 10 April, was not officially acknowledged until 29 July. Secretary Knox's statement to the Naval Affairs Committee on that date did not reveal the name of the ship or the date and location of the incident.
- The extension of the Neutrality Patrol from 60^0 west longitude to 26^0 west longitude began on 8 April and was completed on 24 April. The extension was not announced until 27 May. The President's speech of that date did not precisely define the limits of the extended area.
- The public was unaware until after the war of the understanding, albeit unofficial and nonbinding, reached during the American-British Conversations to the effect that the U.S. Navy would assume the duty of protecting all convoys in the Western Atlantic as soon as possible and without a declaration of war. Further, the fact that this understanding reached the status of official policy during the Atlantic Conference was not made public at the time.
- American warships escorting United States and Icelandic convoys were directed, in effect, to shoot on sight on 26 July. This was not announced until 11 September.
- Statements made by the American Government concerning U.S.S. *Greer* did not, until Admiral Stark's statement of 20 September, reveal the full record of *Greer's* actions prior to being attacked.
- It appears from Stark's correspondence that many clashes between American warships and U-boats during the period from 17 September until war was declared on 11 December were not made public.

Against these omissions, however, must be balanced the disclosures which *were* made by the executive branch:

- The Government stated on 12

September 1939 that ships of the U.S. Navy had been ordered to carry out a Neutrality Patrol within specified waters reaching eastward to 60^0 west longitude. The announced duty of the patrol was to track and report vessels flying belligerent flags.

- Secretary Knox's speech of 24 April hinted that the Government would help in securing the safe passage of goods across the Atlantic even though it gave no idea as to the depth of American involvement.
- The President's speech of 27 May announced that (1) the Neutrality Patrol had been extended to a larger area, (2) that the United States was then helping to get supplies delivered to Britain, and (3) that any additional steps which the President and his military advisers considered necessary to ensure delivery would be taken.
- Roosevelt's message to Congress on 7 July announced the extension of naval patrol activities to the sealanes between the United States and Iceland and that necessary steps would be taken to keep open not only these sea routes but as well those to other, unspecified "strategic outposts."
- The Presidential speech of 11 September stated that the Navy would escort foreign flag shipping as well as American shipping in the Western Atlantic. It further stated that ships of the U.S. Navy would attack German and Italian vessels on sight whenever encountered within American defensive waters.
- President Roosevelt's speech of 27 October announced that "shooting" was then taking place, that the United States had been attacked, and that the Nation was ready for battle.

In summary, it appears that the effect of the knowledge withheld from public and congressional scrutiny was in large measure offset by the general acknowledgments which were made, especially following the President's 27 May speech. It can be argued with some accuracy that during the period from the extension of the Neutrality Patrol on 24 April until the May speech there was no official information publicly available from which one might conclude that both the premise and the area of the patrol had been modified. After that date, however, the intent of the President to use whatever naval measures were necessary to insure the delivery of goods to Britain was clearly on the public record.

Nor was the public entirely dependent on the statements of the executive branch. Members of Congress made continual assessments of the apparent direction of U.S. policy and its probable consequences which were carried to the public by the press and radio and provided, at the very least, a guide to speculation by concerned individuals both in and out of Government. Though the Navy's role in the war at sea was in part a secret, it was certainly an open secret.

If nothing else, this account demonstrates that the issue of the public disclosure of military operations and diplomatic activity and the tension between the President's powers as Commander in Chief and the congressional power to declare war are not unique to the Vietnam era. It should also lead the reader to question whether a truly "open" government is always the best servant of the public interest. If the President had, through a policy of public disclosure and congressional debate, fully consulted "the people" and been prevented thereby from taking the actions recounted here, would Britain have been able to continue resistance alone? And if Britain had held on, what would have been the effect upon future Anglo-American cooperation, later so essential to making the Grand Alliance work. As John Roche, "antiwar activist" of that day and now university professor and syndicated columnist, has since written, it is not enough to have the courage of your convictions—you

must also have the courage of your consequences. From the standpoint of national security, the consequences of a more liberal interpretation of "the public's right to know" could conceivably have been both dangerous and far-reaching.

This paper depicts a President pressing his constitutional power in the field of foreign policy to a maximum, acting in advance of public opinion, often in secret, and frequently without specific congressional approval for war-like acts. Viewed in retrospect, Roosevelt's actions appear as necessary expedients during a time of national peril when congressional and public perception of danger lagged behind the rush of events.

Today, a significant body of opinion, apparently frustrated and bitter over the course of events in Southeast Asia—a course which many attribute largely to mistaken Presidential decisions—supports legislation making it difficult or impossible for future Presidents to play what one might call a "Roosevelt-ian" foreign policy role.

If Presidential foreign policy powers are to be tasked with having contributed greatly to "the making of a quagmire," historical accuracy requires that they also be credited with having founded the alliance which defeated Germany. Roosevelt played the major role, privately if not always publicly, in sustaining an essential ally at a time when no other participant in the foreign policy process was willing or able to do so. Any effort to foreclose this role to future Presidents should not be taken lightly and should represent more than a short-term reaction.

In closing we must take note of the performance of the officers who lived the events of this paper. The Nation was well served during the months of growing crisis by these professional naval officers. Through some 22 years of peacetime routine, arms limitations, inadequate operating budgets, and vocal isolationism, they kept their mental powder dry. When the call came they were ready—to anticipate requirements, to innovate, to sacrifice, to incorporate quickly the lessons of battle, to give their undiluted professional recommendations to their civilian superiors, and support the resulting decisions loyally, regardless of outcome. We who follow them could have no better model.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

Lt. Comdr. Douglas M. Norton is a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy and holds a master of public administration degree from the University of Washington. He has had a variety of duty in destroyers, is a graduate of the Destroyer School at Newport, R.I., and is currently serving in the U.S.S. *Coral Sea* (CVA 43) as the Damage Control Officer.

NOTES

1. Letter of 4 April 1941. U.S. Congress, *Hearings Before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack*, 79th Congress, 1st and 2d sess. (Washington: Govt. Print. Off., 1946), pt. 16, p. 2161. (Cited hereafter as *Hearings*.)

2. Robert E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins* (New York: Harper, 1948), p. 29. The result was Navy Hemispheric Defense Plan No. 1, which made definite provision for aggressive action by the Navy against German submarines and surface raiders.

3. U.S. Navy Dept. *U.S. Navy at War, 1941-1945, Official Reports to the Secretary of the Navy by Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King* (Washington: 1946), p. 12.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 22.

5. Samuel E. Morison, *History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Vol. 1, the Battle of the Atlantic* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1947), p. 14.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 15.

7. Mark S. Watson, Chief of Staff: *Prewar Plans and Preparations* (Washington: Govt. Print. Off., 1950), p. 118.

8. Morison, p. 45.

9. Roosevelt gave his private estimate of the situation in the year ahead to the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, the Chief of Staff of the Army, and Admiral Stark at a White House conference on 16 January 1941. Watson, p. 124-125.

10. "Report of United States-British Staff Conversations (Short Title: ABC-1)," 27 March 1941, *Hearings*, pt. 15, p. 1501.

11. Ernest J. King and Walter M. Whitehill, *Fleet Admiral King* (New York: Norton, 1952), p. 338. Such an understanding appears neither in ABC-1 nor its companion ABC-2 but is stated in Morison, p. 50, and strongly intimated by Watson, p. 379. William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, *The Undeclared War* (New York: Harper, 1953) contains a similar hint, p. 288. That such a crucial understanding should exist apart from the official record is a concrete example of the fact that history based solely upon the written record may have critical gaps.

12. Morison, p. 83. This occurred on 8 April.

13. Letter of 29 January 1941, *Hearings*, pt. 16, p. 2146.

14. Letter of 10 February 1941, *Hearings*, pt. 16, p. 2101.

15. Memorandum, "Ocean Escort in the Western Atlantic," April 1941, *Hearings*, pt. 16, p. 2101.

16. King and Whitehill, p. 325-326.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 313, 316.

18. Morison, p. 61.

19. Watson, p. 383.

20. Testimony before the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs, pursuant to Senate Resolution 138, 11 July 1941. U.S. Congress, Senate, *Congressional Record*, 77th Congress, 1st sess., p. 6398. Knox did not identify the ship involved, but it is clear from context that he was speaking about *Niblack*.

21. *Ibid.*, p. A2077.

22. 16 January 1941. James M. Burns, *Roosevelt: the Soldier of Freedom* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1970), p. 89.

23. Remarks of Representative Bernard J. Gehrman of Wisconsin relative to HJR 155, 1 April 1941, *Record*, p. A1556.

24. Remarks of Senator Taft, *Record*, p. A1496-A1500.

25. Letter of Admiral Kimmel, 19 April 1941, *Hearings*, pt. 16, p. 2164.

26. Roosevelt quoted by Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson in his diary; cited by Langer and Gleason, p. 427.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 435.

28. *Hearings, loc. cit.*

29. Details of HDP-2 from Admiral Stark's testimony, *Hearings* pt. 5, p. 2293.

30. Watson, p. 390.

31. King and Whitehill, p. 329-330.

32. Langer and Gleason, p. 448.

33. Complete text of speech in U.S. State Dept., *Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941* (Washington: Govt. Print. Off., 1943), p. 662-672.

34. Morison, p. 62.

35. *Ibid.*, p. 38.

36. Sherwood, p. 299.

37. Morison, p. 50.

38. Watson, p. 488.

39. Sherwood, p. 290-291.

40. Watson, *loc. cit.*

41. Morison, p. 76-77.

42. U.S. State Dept., p. 686-687.

43. Details of HDP-4 and its execution, from Admiral Stark's testimony, *Hearings*, pt. 5, p. 2294-2295.

44. *Ibid.*, pt. 16, p. 2177.

45. *Ibid.*, pt. 16, p. 2164.

46. Morison, p. 78.

47. OP Plan 6 in Morison, p. 79. Composition of TF 1 in Stark's testimony, *Hearings*, pt. 5, p. 2294-2295.

48. All concerning SR 138 from the *Record*, p. 6396-6401.

49. *Hearings*, pt. 16, p. 2181.

50. Admiral Stark's testimony, *Hearings*, pt. 5, p. 2295.

51. Letter of 20 September 1941 from Admiral Stark to Senator David I. Walsh of the Naval Affairs Committee. Postwar accounts by Morison; Walter Karig, *Battle Report: the Atlantic War* (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1946); and Theodore Roscoe, *United States Destroyer Operations in World War II* (Annapolis, Md.: United States Naval Institute, 1953) agree with Stark in all essential particulars, except that Morison states *Greer* resumed her voyage at 1416.

52. Complete text of Roosevelt's speech in U.S. State Dept., p. 737-743.

53. Roscoe, p. 32. In a letter to Kimmel on 22 September, Stark noted that this convoy reported seven submarine contacts en route and that one escort (probably *Truxton*) " . . . should have gotten at least one SS which was attacked under favorable circumstances." *Hearings*, pt. 16, p. 2209.

54. Admiral Stark's testimony, *Hearings*, pt. 16, p. 2295.

55. King and Whitehill, p. 344.

56. *Hearings*, pt. 16, p. 2209.

57. Pinchot's letter in the *Record*, p. 8311-8312.

58. Morison, p. 86-90.

59. Admiral Stark's testimony, *Hearings*, pt. 5, p. 2296.

60. Griffith B. Coale, *North Atlantic Patrol* (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1942), *passim*.

61. Roscoe, p. 36-38 and Karig, p. 74.

62. The vague description may also have been due to lack of knowledge. Stark told Kimmel in letters of 17 and 18 October that he had few details of the incident because *Kearny* was observing radio silence. *Hearings*, pt. 16, p. 2215. Text of initial Navy announcement in Turner Catledge, "*Kearney* Attacked," *The New York Times*, 18 October 1941, p. 1:8.

63. *Ibid.*; "Flynn Warns of 'Plot.'" *The New York Times*, 18 October 1941, p. 3:4.

64. Both letters in King and Whitehill, p. 345-346.

65. Karig, p. 77-79 and letter, Stark to Kimmel, 4 November 1941, in *Hearings*, pt. 16, p. 2218. Stark's letter mentions only two torpedo hits but may reflect oversight or lack of complete information at the time. Karig's version, written after the war from official reports, appears the more accurate of the two.

66. Roscoe, p. 40; and letter of 4 November 1941, Stark to Kimmel, in *Hearings*, pt. 16, p. 2118.

67. Sherwood, p. 382.

68. Letter of 14 November 1941, *Hearings*, pt. 16, p. 2224.

69. Letter of 24 October 1941 in King and Whitehill, p. 345-346.

70. Morison, p. 99-109.

71. *Ibid.*, p. 95.

72. Letter from Stark to the commanders of the Atlantic, Pacific, and Asiatic Fleets, 4 November 1941, in *Hearings*, pt. 16, p. 2218.

73. Morison, p. 81-82.

74. King and Whitehill, p. 339-340. These had been found in practice to be the minimum acceptable seakeeping specifications for an escort vessel.

75. *Hearings*, pt. 16, p. 2223-2224.

76. Roscoe, p. 40-41.

77. "Raider Is Hunted Near Canal Zone," *The New York Times*, 18 November 1941, p. 3:1. In addition, *Odenwald* was found to have violated section one of the Neutrality Act of 1939, which forbade any foreign vessels to fly the American flag.

78. Morison, p. 109-113.

79. Hans L. Trefousse, *Germany and American Neutrality, 1939-1941* (New York: Bookman, 1951), p. 150.

Ψ

The battle of the Atlantic was the dominating factor all through the war. Never for one moment could we forget that everything happening elsewhere . . . depended ultimately on its outcome.

Winston Churchill: Closing the Ring, 1951



THE BAROMETER

(Comdr. A.D. Wood, USNR-R, comments on the President's "Annual Report 1973," September-October issue.)

As a member of the Reserve community and as a graduate of both Naval War College Reserve Courses, I have watched the "reform" of the Naval War College with interest. Conversations with officers, articles in the *Review* and *Navy Times*, and other sources have left me with a confused picture of the changes taking place at the college. But there is one thing there can be no confusion on. Admiral Turner has given us, in his annual report, the best *Review* I have ever read.

The annual report is a potpourri of contemporary problems reaching far beyond the scope of a simple annual report. It's written in clear, blunt style and seems to an old reservist to be one of the most interesting and honest things he has ever seen about the military profession. I'm sure there are many who will be discomforted by his frank observations, but only exposing problems will overcome them. He's to be congratulated for both his articulate style and honesty.

Some comments on the key to his presentation—"Student Attitudes." Thanks to the Naval War College, the National War College, and annual ACDUTRA, I have interface with Regular and Reserve officers from all over the United States. I share the admiral's concern for certain attitudes that seem to prevail among the Officer Corps.

The modern officer finds himself in a changing environment. War may well be out of style. My generation, having seen three of them, is somewhat tired of them. Secretary Warner was right in his recent address to the graduating class at Annapolis when he charged them with being the first class to fulfill their mission—no armed conflict during their service careers. We must react to this peacekeeping environment with a more positive attitude than I find among my senior officer compatriots, both Reserve and Regular.

To close the main gate and sulk about the media or blindly accept national security goals or go aground on the rocks of intraservice competition for rank or to subvert our oath to the Constitution on the altar of pragmatism or blind obedience is a sure way for the military to die a slow death. We must meet the challenge of today's environment. When there's no active big-power war, no Communists under the bed, and when an airplane costs $11 million, the modern officer has to face the facts that he must present his case for national security in a new manner. I am delighted the President of the college found lack of conviction on current military programs. It is a good sign that the new Officer Corps is probing our national goals, not accepting them without question. The agnosticism that bothered the admiral may be the first step toward constructive criticism and more viable goals. I offer that turning this lack of conviction to constructive discussion and revision of national goals may well be a major goal of the college. The public is ill served by an Officer

Corps that annually participates in a congressional budget charade complete with announcements of Soviet strengths and new weapons, all timed for back-room deals with congressional committees. The junior officer must find a better way to develop, support, and sell our vital national security goals.

Perhaps our hope lies in the admiral's comments that the panelists from the Navy were a disappointment to the students. This year, at the National War College, I found the same thing. Each participant gave a "canned commercial" on his project. Hard questions on the volunteer force concept were, without exception, answered with a prepared statement. Even in an atmosphere of "nonattribution" open answers to hard questions were difficult to come by. My fellow student officers only supported this type of presentation. Questions from the floor about Watergate or détente were met with groans usually reserved for the arrival of a greataunt from Minnesota.

Taking one small example from Admiral Turner's remarks, the failure of the officer student body to come to a détente with the visiting journalists, is perhaps a good example of where the War College must encourage more open discussion and self-examination by the Officer Corps. It is time to openly discuss the contribution of the press and of the military in today's world. I offer that when you stack up the military briefings of Vietnam with the press's efforts to maintain a constitutional government, the military comes off a poor second. The press is our major weapon in getting acceptance for vital national security goals. To shut them out of our discussions and lives is to cut off the only source we have for public understanding of our military needs.

The Naval War College has an unusual opportunity to assist the Officer Corps in meeting the needs of today's world. No one who attends there can fail to be impressed by the quality of the faculty or the student body. I would put the regular naval officer up against any similar group of men—university faculties, professionals, businessmen—and know they would hold their own in that company. Yet we persist in ingraining a point of view that can only lead to lessening of our military effectiveness. The admiral is on the right track. Speaking out about how we look to others, exposing our attitudes, our strengths, and our weaknesses can only lead to improved communications and an improved military. In short—conservative or not—we must change or we will not survive as a vital force in the future of the United States.

I am pleased by the annual report. I am pleased to see a commitment for change at the War College. When the admiral seems buried in second-guessers and critics, I offer him Margaret Meade's comment on educational reformers: Those on the edge of reform seldom reap its benefits.

(Mr. William J. Vollmar, Archivist at the Ohio State University, comments on Brigadier General Gard's article "The Military Profession" and Professor Felix Moos' article "History and Culture: Some Thoughts on the United States All-Volunteer Force.")

The articles by Brigadier General Gard and Professor Moos in the July/August *Review* provided some very significant and thoughtful reading. The more one studies them in the light of current events, the more discouraged he can become over the present status and future prospects of America's military development. It is obvious that the AVF is here to stay, but it is equally apparent that America's social structure, both civilian and military, is not yet ready to accommodate it.

Both lectures show a certain weakness in their treatment of the history of American military policy. As examples of this deficiency, it might be pointed out to General Gard that the theory of

national defense based upon the British "Mare Clausum" ceased to exist long before the Korean war; while Professor Moos obviously forgot that the 4th Marines were stationed in China from 1927 till 1941. However, these small errors of history are not nearly as disturbing as is General Gard's repeated reference to America as a basically antimilitary society. This statement is totally unsupported and unacceptable. Antimilitarist, yes, but certainly not antimilitary. Perhaps there is too much of Samuel Huntington's influence here? Or it may be that General Gard has unrealizingly fallen error to the very trap he warns against—an attitude of "defensiveness" on the part of the military toward an unsympathetic public. After all, should the AVF fail to reach an accommodation with our altered society, it could always be claimed that it was due to America's "basically antimilitary tradition." Such an attitude on the part of a man in uniform is not surprising nor is it particularly alarming except that General Gard represents that new breed of flag-grade officer who is supposed to provide the sociological expertise needed to make the AVF work. As such, he can hardly afford the indulgent luxury of being defensive about the military's role, either past or future, in our society. Several of the points made by General Gard concerning the need for the military to be more creative and to revitalize itself are quite germane. Unfortunately, much of their validity is lost because the perceptive reader senses an undercurrent of "defensiveness" on the part of the author and is, therefore, inclined to take his recommendations with a grain of salt.

Dr. Moos briefly touched upon this defensive attitude in his cogent and penetrating analysis of the growing cultural and social gulf developing between civil and military America and the disturbing potential for disaster therein. This is the most frightening aspect of the AVF and the one that has been given the least attention. The Gates Commission in its report on the AVF simply denied any possibility of such isolation and alienation developing and scoffed at the questions raised by those concerned over this issue. Surely, for a matter of such great portent there should be something a bit more substantial upon which to base decisions than the "beliefs" of those 15 members. Besides, as both Dr. Moos and General Gard point out, social conditions have changed drastically in only a few short years. The structure of our society is significantly different today than when the Gates Commission made its report in early 1970. Somehow I think that if the commission were reconvened today, it might not take such a cavalier attitude toward the question of alienation and isolation, with all of its attendant dangers, as it originally did.

Others who have studied the AVF join Dr. Moos in sounding a warning alarm. Professor Morris Janowitz in an Adelphi Paper entitled "The U.S. Forces and the Zero Draft" (No. 94, January, 1973) argues that the AVF possesses "... the potential danger of excessive self-recruitment which would ... contribute to social isolation." He foresees an AVF officer corps in danger of losing its contacts with the larger, more liberal civilian society and, through "excessive in-service education," developing a "narrow and uniform outlook" alienated from American society.

Dr. Janowitz offers two possible saviors to such a development—the Reserve components and the ROTC. The first he views as a strong link connecting the full-time professional military with the civilian population from which the Reserve officer comes and in which he spends the vast majority of his life. The second element—the ROTC—Janowitz sees as a major source of liberal, non-self-selected officers who will help overcome inbreeding in the AVF. Yet neither of these groups appears to be able, in the present structure of things,

to fulfill Janowitz's expectations.

As the AVF becomes increasingly more professionalized and alienated from civilian society, the status of the Reserve officer may change greatly from what it was in the draft-supported Army. He may discover that he has become an interloper, an amateur military man who does not belong in the professional's class and who is so contaminated by his civilian background as to be untrustworthy of upholding the military's "true function" in a society that has deteriorated to the point where only the professional military retains the "true values and ideals" of America (the hypothetical scenario presented by Dr. Moos in his article). At the very least, the American Reserve officer could find himself in the role of the old German Landwehr officer—a nuisance who had to be tolerated and who could lead the cannon fodder but certainly not an individual to have any say in the direction of higher military affairs which are, of course, so intricate and important that only a "professional" can properly conduct them.

As for the ROTC, one cannot count too heavily upon it as a source of liberal officers. That entire program, like the military itself, is in need of major reorganization and revitalization in order to meet the demands of our altered society. Enrollments have fallen drastically and continue to decline. According to a recent article in *U.S. News & World Report*, the ROTC enrollment has fallen from over 210,000 in 1968 to between 75,000-80,000 in 1972. The Pentagon hopes that in 1973 there will be a slight increase, but it appears more likely that without some significant change in the program the enrollment level will remain fairly stable.

Of even more significance is the type of individual who is now opting to enter ROTC. No longer do those who enroll represent that broad cross section of our society that they once did. While it can be argued that the ROTC is now getting only the "true volunteer" (as is said of the AVF), it also may be argued that in reality it may be getting only those self-selected individuals who cannot get into the academies. Without the broad pool of participants, whether voluntary or forced by the draft, that existed in the 1950's and 1960's from which to draw, it is highly questionable that the ROTC will be able to provide the AVF with many liberal, non-self-selected officers in the future. Unless the services significantly alter their traditional attitude toward the Reserve Officer Training Corps as a source of officers and greatly improve the program, ROTC may soon cease to be a viable source of officer procurement.

The gulf between the civilian of 1973 and the military of the AVF is daily growing wider. Those seeking ways to eliminate that chasm are finding it increasingly difficult. Nor are the services doing all they can to help. As a case in point, while Admiral Turner is to be applauded for bringing about a long overdue revitalization of the Naval War College curriculum, there still remain two major flaws in that program. First, the severing of ties with the George Washington University program has denied Naval War College students of the opportunity of obtaining a master's degree while attending the college. This greatly limits their potential for continued education at the doctoral level in civilian universities. Such advanced academic work not only increases the value of the officer to the Navy, but also serves as an excellent opportunity for continued interrelations between the military and civilian graduate students and faculties. There is no reason why the Naval War College's curriculum could not seek accreditation for a master of arts degree on its own merits, and such a course of action should be seriously considered by the college's administration.

Secondly, in going over the student

roster for the College of Naval Warfare and the College of Naval Command and Staff Management Study in the July/August *Review*, one cannot find a single Reserve officer nor a single non-Government civilian out of 112 students. If the Reserve citizen/officer is to play any significant role in the structure of the AVF (and Dr. Janowitz holds that such a role is vital to the success of the AVF), it would be well worth the Navy's time and expense to include a number of selected Reserve officers who would be willing to return to active duty for a short period to attend the Naval War College. Similarly, there are numerous civilian students, at both the doctoral and postdoctoral level, working in national security studies, in such programs as the Mershon Center for Education in National Security at Ohio State, the Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia, the National Security Study Group at Wisconsin, and the Center of International Studies at Princeton to mention just a few, who would be most interested in attending the Naval War College for a year. It might greatly improve the quality of the classes if some provisions could be made to allow such students to attend the Naval War College.

At the present time, none of our three service War Colleges have provisions to permit Reserve officers or civilian students to enroll in their programs. The addition of such individuals would do much to "liberalize" War College classes and help prevent the development of any limited "military mentality" as the services are often accused of doing. As the distance between civilian and military broadens in our pluralistic society, it becomes increasingly important to maximize the possibilities of group interrelations. Every effort must be made to avoid an irreparable split that might ultimately lead to a coup d'etat or to emasculation of our military capability. While it is only one small facet to the possible solution of the alienation problem, the addition of Reserve officers and civilian scholars to War College classes should be seriously considered and, hopefully, the Naval War College will take the lead among the services in introducing such a program.

[Editor's comment: Proposals for legislation have been submitted to enable the Naval War College to enroll non-Government civilian students, and naval reservists would be welcomed at any time.]

(Capt. Brian R. Jackson, USNR-R, comments on Professor Moos' article "History and Culture: Some Thoughts on the United States All-Volunteer Force.")

Professor Moos warns that the all-volunteer force would produce an alienated officer corps, the explosive force which, if triggered by a national crisis, historically has toppled many governments. The point deserves serious consideration, even if we dismiss any possibility of a coup, because the tendency toward alienation is inherent in the military as a result of its natural isolation from civil institutions. If this tendency is unduly aggravated by social or political factors, the inevitable result is to produce antagonism toward the constituted civil authority, because the Government is the point of contact (and friction) with the society at large. It is understandable that a gap in understanding and perception can then grow between the military and Government; perhaps so gradually that it is not recognized until revealed by stress. Our concern in this should be whether, if the crisis happens to be an external threat of force, the disunity which has grown will prevent an effective response by the Nation. The conclusion is, then, that we cannot afford to risk this outcome by building into our military system factors which increase the tendency toward separatism.

In France, military separatism was

allowed to grow and intensify throughout the life of the Third Republic, marked along the way by incidents such as l'Affaire Dreyfus and the army mutinies of 1917, which unfortunately were not recognized as signs of the widening gulf between the French military and its Government. On the outbreak of war in 1939, there was still general confidence that France could defeat the Germans. Six months later France lay paralyzed, its High Command clamoring for an armistice despite its considerable resources for continuing the war. Some analysts contend that the military welcomed the armistice as a way to eliminate the despised Republic and to replace it with the Vichy regime. Admittedly this case history is an extreme example, since military separatism was not the only divisive influence operating in French society. Nevertheless, it is clear that the military's perceptions contributed greatly to the fall of France.

The hazards of military separatism in the all-volunteer force arise from the prospect that this force will come to represent an ever-narrower section of the population. In addition, Professor Moos notes the excessive cost of maintaining such a force and questions the moral viability of the basic mercenary aspect of the force. It should be noted that the Armed Forces Reserves are existing forces which overcome all these objections: They represent a good cross section of the population, are maintained at a small fraction of the cost of active forces, and are essentially all-volunteer. It would seem, therefore, that military thinkers could profitably devote more consideration to the appropriate role of Reserve forces in the future.

(Professor Edward J. Laurance of the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School comments on Capt. Wesley K. Clark's article, "The Best and the Brightest: a Critique," which appeared in the July-August issue.)

Wesley Clark's critique of *The Best and the Brightest* well fits the *Review's* desire to "help us to understand ourselves and our processes of government." However, in teaching U.S. foreign and defense policy and in extensively using the two books employed by Clark in his analysis, Allison's *The Essence of Decision* and Payne's *The American Threat*, I have arrived at some different conclusions, both on Halberstam's book and on decisionmaking in Vietnam.

The Role of Organization Process. One of Clark's major criticisms of *The Best and the Brightest* is its failure to give proper emphasis to the power of organization influence on decisions—"certain outcomes may have been unavoidable despite the personalities involved, the influence of the major figures was restricted by bureaucratic organizations" (Clark-51). Halberstam's book is about personalities, designed to inform us about the "best and the brightest" *people*, not organizations. Considering his emphasis, I feel, as Clark does, that "he does attempt to portray the impact of organizations upon the 'best and the brightest.'" Unlike Clark, I feel his attempt was quite adequate. Probably the clearest example is Halberstam's analysis of one of the most crucial decisions, that of deciding to back the French and not Ho in 1945. In describing the politics of that decision, he shows how the Asian desk officers (committed to Asian nationalism) were outmanned by the European desks and clearly points to the organizational process as the cause. "The very organization of the |State| Department in those days was the basic problem for the Asian officers" (Halberstam-88). Another example is Halberstam's analysis of the military *organization*, which concludes that the "foot-in-the-door"

syndrome was in no way caused by personalities.

> While the President had the illusion that he had held off the military, the reality was that he had let them in . . .. Dealing with the military, once their foot was in the door, both Kennedy and Johnson would learn, was an awesome thing . . .. It meant that there would be an inexorable pressure for more–more men, more hardware, more targets. (Halberstam-178)

I agree with Clark, that this process was "hardly mysterious," but the point is that it was an *organizational* output, not a function of the personalities involved. In general, I feel that Halberstam displays superb balance in contrasting personalities and their organizations. Some examples: General Harkins was ill-suited for the job (personality) *vs.* "despite all the faddishness of counterinsurgency it was all very conventional, with a dominating belief that more and more force was what really was needed" (organizational) (Halberstam-185); the bombing proceeded because of Rostow's power and personal view that it would work (personality) *vs.* the critical anti-bombing Johnson report had little impact because it was written at the wrong time and was "off the beaten path" (organizational) (Halberstam-357-59).

The Bureaucratic Politics Approach. When reading Halberstam's book in light of Allison's conceptual models of decisionmaking, I was struck by the relevance of Allison's "bureaucratic politics" model to the Vietnam decisionmaking process. In Clark's analysis the models he stresses are the organizational and rational process models, and he criticizes Halberstam for overemphasizing the bureaucratic politics model. "Surely some policies are also understood through their rationales" (Clark-51). But my reading of Allison is that he made no prejudgment as to which model is most applicable. The bureaucratic politics model consists of "bargaining along regularized channels among players positioned hierarchically within the government . . . making government decisions not by rational choice but by the pulling and hauling that is politics" (Allison-707). In order to analyze decisionmaking using this model, one needs in-depth analysis of the players and conflict between them. This Halberstam has given us, and some brief examples follow.

> In Saigon, Nolting and Harkins were committed to a policy of the past; now, in Washington, Harriman was under orders to modernize the Administration's Asian policies and personnel. The result was an inevitable conflict. (Halberstam-188) . . .. Though Nolting had participated in the debate [1963], he was almost finished as a player; he was no longer ambassador and he had little post-tour credibility as a witness. What credibility he did have was systematically destroyed by Harriman. (Halberstam-268) . . .. As it got darker the play became more tightly held in Washington, with the bottom-ranking players being Bill Bundy and McNaughton. (Halberstam-504) . . .. Bundy, a man with an awesome reputation of his own, was a strong and forceful player, and in a divided bureaucracy his word was crucial. (Halberstam-504)

I put forth these examples merely to show that Halberstam's analysis and style illuminate the bureaucratic politics process that resulted in the Vietnam decisions. The purpose of a conceptual model is to clarify the decisionmaking process. Allison's models applied to Halberstam's substantive study clearly accomplish that purpose, in regard to both organizational process and bureaucratic politics.

The Commitment Rationale. Clark mentions just briefly another analytical framework which, when applied to Halberstam's work, produces significant enlightenment of the decisionmaking process. I refer to James Payne's *The American Threat*. In this work Payne posits three models of the process of U.S. intervention in Third World conflicts. First, we do so to stop communism. Second, we do so for humanitarian reasons. Both of these models are merely strawmen for Payne, which he astutely knocks down, opting for a third model, that of commitment. By using selected examples from the post-1945 scene, he demonstrates how the principle of "honoring commitments" dominates the decisionmaking process. Halberstam clearly shows this process at work, especially in regard to Vice President Johnson's trip to Southeast Asia in 1961. "It not only committed the Kennedy Administration more deeply to Diem and Vietnam, . . . but it commits the person of Lyndon Johnson. To him, a man's word was important. He himself was now committed both to the war and to Diem personally" (Halberstam-133). Other examples show how the commitment grew, even when things did not look good (Halberstam-148). But the thrust of Payne's theory is that a lack of resolve in Vietnam would have effects on U.S. policy in other parts of the world. As Captain Clark puts it, "a logical case, founded on the necessity to maintain the credibility of American commitments, could be made for the early and continued commitment in Indochina" (Clark-51). I submit that Halberstam clearly shows how this concept of commitment developed, from Johnson's visit in 1961 to General Taylor's 1964 report, "Failure in Southeast Asia would destroy and severely damage our standing elsewhere in the world" (Halberstam-45); to McGeorge Bundy, "he would finally give as a major reason for his conversion the need to keep our reputation to back an ally credible with our European friends." (Halberstam-317); to Rusk in 1965, "Rusk believed in mutual security, that this was the way to peace; South Vietnam was now linked to mutual security. Thus it must stand; Vietnam had an importance far beyond its own existence" (Halberstam-621). These examples all have one thing in common, in addition to their reference to commitment, and that is their *supportive* character. However, Halberstam's account of Clark Clifford's trip to Asia in 1968 shows that the commitment rationale for U.S. involvement was on the wane. "Clifford was bothered by the fact that the other Asian nations showed no great interest in sending additional men . . . . The threatened dominoes, Clifford discovered, did not seem to take the threat as serious as we did" (Halberstam-651). In dealing with the rationale of commitment, Halberstam has dealt with Vietnam in terms of the rational approach to decisionmaking. I maintain that Halberstam does deal with the many reasons which supported the leader's decisions and is not operating in the vacuum which Clark paints in his review.

Effects of War on the Military. Captain Clark's criticism of Halberstam's treatment of the effect of the war on the military is puzzling. Clark is simply wrong when he states in a footnote that Halberstam bases his conclusion "The war, of course, had ravaged the Army" (Halberstam-657) on discussions with only five officers. Numerous references to frustrated junior officers appear throughout (e.g., pp. 278, 284, 306). But more importantly, Clark is much too demanding in regard to evidence. Halberstam was not writing a book on dissent in the Army and is not obliged to document by name each man he talked to in regard to this issue. But as Captain Clark knows, he could have and many did. Clark also states "the gap between the Army and society to which

Halberstam refers seems questionable as well" (Clark-49). But many well-documented works outline the growth of this gap, the latest of which (*The Army in Crisis*—Lt. Col. William L. Hauser) is instructive. Hauser states that "it seems almost simplistic to conclude that a disjuncture between the Army and society has brought this long litany of troubles, but that is what the evidence suggests" (Hauser-186). I feel that Captain Clark has firmly stated his beliefs but has committed the common error of book reviewers, expecting the author to write a book about everything. I find Halberstam's conclusions about what Vietnam did to the Army hardly new but rather a simple statement of the consensus of observers over the entire ideological spectrum.

The Emergence of Truth about Vietnam. Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of Clark's article is the philosophy and method he advocates to seek out the truth about Vietnam.

Clark is disturbed by Halberstam's partisanship, his "perspicacity" and passion. He rejects Halberstam's work because, after all, it was written by a newsman highly critical of the war and those who made the decisions.

Clark's own objective, dispassionate, rational analysis of Vietnam is nowhere to be found, nor should it be. John Stuart Mill, in discussing the liberty of thought and discussion, said that "on every subject on which differences of opinion is possible, the truth depends on a balance to be struck between two sets of conflicting reasons." Therefore, to best arrive at "truth," one must be able to hear the conflicting arguments from persons who believe them, who defend them in earnest, and do their utmost for them. *The Best and the Brightest* clearly fits into this category.

Those of us charged with the *education* of military officers should constantly remind ourselves of Mill's advice. If one is to understand revolution and insurgency in Guatemala, one must read the views of insurgents as well as the governments concerned. If one is examining the pros and cons of defense spending, one must read Barnet, McGovern, Melman, *et. al.*, as well as DOD reports. Yes, Halberstam is one of the foremost members of the school of "advocacy journalism" and his book is partisan, journalistic, and contains its share of nuance and innuendo. But these are the very reasons that it should be read by all those who seek the truth about Vietnam.

New opinions are always suspected, and usually opposed, without any other reason but because they are not already common.

John Locke: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 1690



PROFESSIONAL READING

Alden, John D. and Holm, Ed. *The American Steel Navy: a Photographic History of the U.S. Navy from the Introduction of the Steel Hull in 1883 to the Cruise of the Great White Fleet, 1907-1909.* Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press; New York: American Heritage Press, 1972. 396p.

In writing the introduction to a famous collection of photographs, Carl Sandburg remarked that the visual record was "a camera testament, a drama of the grand canyon of humanity, an epic . . ." Looking into the portraits and snapshots of both great and ordinary men, he understood their personalities and feelings in the moment that had been recorded on film. "Often the faces speak," he said, "what words can never say. Some tell of eternity and others only the latest tattlings."

So it is with this excellent collection of photographs compiled by Alden and Holm. Within these pages one can find views of the warships that served in the U.S. Navy between 1883 and 1909 and also a great deal about the men who manned these ships, the condition of their lives, and the world in which they lived.

Here one can see, on board the Presidential yacht, the earnest face of "Fighting Bob" Evans as he received final instructions for the Great White Fleet from Theodore Roosevelt. The reader looks in on a meeting of the General Board in a mapstrewn room at the Naval War College, the reading of regulations to a ship's company at sea under sail, divine services on the deck of the battleship *Texas*, and the addition of a tattoo to an already fully decorated sailor. The glimpses of a seaman's life range from the galley and sickbay to "Sharkey" Smith's victorious boxing match on the deck of *Oregon*. Some faces reflect the painful regimentation of posed photographs, while others, like the impish grin of an apprentice boy in *Brooklyn*, echo the vitality of life across the decades.

The ship portraits by famous photographers such as Enrique Muller and E.H. Hart are well represented, along with views depicting the important naval events of the era: the Samoan Hurricane, the *Bennington* disaster, the sinking of the *Maine*, the Spanish-American War, and the cruise of the Great White Fleet.

Beautifully bound and well laid out, the book is organized into three major sections: "Ships of the American Steel Navy," illustrations of all the major ships; "Forging a Modern Steel Navy," a consideration of construction and repair, arms, engineering, communications, command, and the Shore Establishment; and "Men and Operations of the American Steel Navy." Following the main portion of the book is a 30-page appendix devoted to reference material: biographical sketches and portraits of important individuals, technical data, a typical shipboard daily routine, a glossary of terms, and 50 line drawing profiles of the major warship classes by Arthur D. Baker III.

Throughout the book great attention has been paid to technical details, ship design, and construction. In this regard,

naval buffs will find the book of great interest. On the photographic side, the work is excellent. With the exception of a misplaced caption (pp.42-43), and the lack of an illustration of *Dewey* drydock, little more can be asked. Certainly the tow of that mammoth floating drydock from the east coast to the Philippines in 1906 was one of the great feats of seamanship in the era.

The text which accompanies the photographs provides an adequate and generally accurate description of events. It is focused on technical matters and operational details. In this sphere it is excellent and well written, but the text provides little new insight into a complex era. There seems to be little appreciation for these years as seminal ones in a time of transition. This was a period of change in all aspects of the naval profession, and the new trends were characteristically reflected in the professional controversies of the day. In some areas the text omits discussion of some of these major debates. For instance, a controversy in training and education raged through this period. On one side were those who advocated training apprentices at sea under sail and steam; on the other side were those who promoted military training ashore in marching platoons. At the same time, the leaders of educational reform led by Stephen B. Luce promoted abstract, strategical education and practical application of theory. Others advocated additional technical training. The issue and the viewpoint expressed in this controversy were reflected time and again in nearly every area of the profession from ship construction and strategy to organization.

The battleship *North Dakota* is completely omitted, along with the violent controversy over her design instigated by Albert L. Key and William S. Sims at the time of the Great White Fleet's cruise. The "Key Board" and the reorganization attempts during the administration of Theodore Roosevelt marked the end of this era and planted the seed for the beginning of a new period in naval management. This reviewer cannot agree with the authors' dismissal of the reform effort under Roosevelt and Taft (p. 242). The work of the Moody Board in 1909, the refinements to its recommendations, and the establishment of the "Aid" system by Secretary Meyer culminated in the creation of the Chief of Naval Operations in 1915. The drive for reform in the Navy Department continued throughout the period considered by this book. The early attempts and innovations in organization may have faltered, but they can hardly be considered "minimal or even regressive." Rather they were the foundation stones for an organization that was still being constructed in 1966 and is in use today.

In spite of these shortcomings, the book as a whole is valuable and worthwhile. With the authors, one hopes that its publication will encourage the discovery and preservation of additional photographic records of this type. Providing more than a mere gratification for the details of mechanical gadgetry, the selection of these photographs demonstrates a sympathetic appreciation and understanding of the Navy. Although concentrating on the forms of a passing phase, they succeed in presenting some of the eternal elements in naval life.

JOHN B. HATTENDORF
Pembroke College, Oxford

Engle, Louise and Paananen, Lauri. *The Winter War: the Russo-Finnish Conflict, 1939-40.* New York: Scribner, 1973. 176p.

During recent years revisionist historians and politicians in Finland have come to view the two conflicts between Finland and Russia in 1939-1940 (the Winter War) and 1941-1944 (the Continuation War) as the consequence of a Finnish failure to understand the Soviet

Union's difficult geopolitical and military situation in the late 1930's and 1940's. This interpretation of Finnish history, which runs counter to the opinion of most historians, was most forcefully stated by Finnish President Urho Kekkonen's address at Helsinki in April 1973 on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the Russian-Finnish mutual assistance and friendship treaty (1948). President Kekkonen's new version of Finnish history occasioned some surprised reactions in the Finnish press and some resentment on the part of many Finns.

But the older view cherished by most Finns is given added support by Louise Engle and Lauri Paananen in their new book *The Winter War*, which reviews the course of the 1939-1940 war and sets it in the context of the Russian demands which preceded the opening of the war in November 1939. A reading of their book leaves no doubt that the Soviet Union's invasion was a blatant and ruthless violation of Finland's sovereignty predicated upon flimsy excuses and a staged border incident.

In their analysis of the war, Engle and Paananen show how the tiny Finnish army, under Field Marshal Carl Gustav Mannerheim, was able to stymie and terrorize the Russian attacking forces of 1.5 million men and *kill* 1 million of them in 105 days (both figures confirmed by Nikita Khrushchev in *Khrushchev Remembers*, published in 1970). The Russians, under General Meretskov, had expected to win the war in no more than 10 or 12 days and sent their badly trained and poorly equipped forces to the Karelian front in summer uniforms and with minimum logistic support. The Finns fought bravely and stubbornly, with all the perseverance suggested in the Finnish word *sisu* (guts), and in the end were not militarily defeated. Only when it became clear that there was to be no meaningful military aid from other nations (who supplied reams of sympathetic messages and righteous denunciations of the Soviet Union) and that there was no hope of stalling the Russians forever did the Finns sign a truce in March 1940. For her magnificent defensive sacrifices, Finland was forced to give up to the Russians 10 percent of her land area (the home of 12 percent of her population), her military base at Hanko, her second largest city (Viipuri), her Arctic port and mines at Petsamo, and much of her industrial capacity in wood, chemicals, metals, and textiles. She also lost 25,000 dead and 55,000 wounded.

The book is admirably illustrated with photographs, maps, and some rather bittersweet cartoons of the period by Jussi Aarnio. In our present age of highly technological and impersonal warfare, it is intriguing to read of what a few thousand good men with meager arms and great patriotic fervor could do against a monstrously large and seemingly irresistible military machine.

ROBERT C. STEENSMA
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Kirkpatrick, Lyman B., Jr. *The U.S. Intelligence Community: Foreign Policy and Domestic Activities.* New York: Hill and Wang. 212p.

The postwar rise in the involvement of the United States in worldwide intelligence operations is the subject of this tidy, reasonable, and balanced work by a former War College faculty member, Professor Lyman Kirkpatrick of Brown University.

The strength of the study rests in its moderation. As Kirkpatrick repeatedly points out, American intelligence operations grew up as a direct result of our increased international role in an era of "cold war." Intelligence, Kirkpatrick observes sagely, was but a new weapon brought on by the lessons of World War II and the exigencies of our postwar policies. Professor Kirkpatrick is also at pains to indicate, quite properly, that

the development of the American intelligence community was in line with administration and congressional wishes; it would not have happened, otherwise. This is an important point to note, especially today when the furies of frustration reach out to indict and accuse the CIA and the FBI of lives independent of control. Nonetheless, the experienced Kirkpatrick is realistic and candid enough to recognize that authorization for an intelligence organization is one thing and implementation and control of operations is quite another. In fact, there is a refreshing implication, at least, that not all intelligence (especially covert) operations are brilliantly conceived and executed.

The book is grouped about seven basic chapters which simply and effectively detail the need, legal basis, organizational makeup, and the operations, at home and abroad, of the intelligence community, comprising principally the CIA, FBI, the various military intelligence services, and the National Security Agency.

The book describes with interest and fullness three prime examples of covert intelligence failures: the U-2 incident, the Bay of Pigs in Cuba, and, for good measure, the Vietnam operation known as "Phoenix" which sought to identify and remove the NLF infrastructure.

The book will be a primer for intelligence specialists, a revelation for novices, and a tribute to its author who has done a doubting American citizenry a public service with this forthright report on U.S. intelligence, warts and all.

R.F. DELANEY
Forrest Sherman Chair of Public Diplomacy

Price, Alfred. *Aircraft versus Submarine.* London: Kimber, 1973. 268p.

The author, Alfred Price, writes not as an interested layman or a military historian, but from the vantage of operational experience as an officer in the Royal Air Force (American readers must remember that the RAF has the mission of long-range maritime patrol). Evidence of the author's expertise in electronic warfare and aircraft weapons can be found throughout the book. However, it should be stressed that *Aircraft versus Submarine* is eminently readable with sufficient explanation of both tactics and weapons to include the layman in its audience.

Our story commences in 1916 when two flying boats from the now defunct Austro-Hungarian naval air arm chanced upon the French submarine *Foucault.* After an initial iron bomb attack, the damaged submarine surfaced—a prudent move when in a minefield. To his horror, the French captain found his ship face to face with two angry flying machines. Following a few more attacks, the French scuttled their boat and became the first submarine victim to the flying machine. In the name of chivalry, the flying boats taxied up to the scene and allowed the crew to cling to the floats until rescuers arrived. However, each Austrian aircraft returned home with a humiliated French officer, a trophy of the victory.

Stories of light humor and keen insight abound throughout the volume. The progression of tactics comes under scrutiny in the following example. Early masochists devised a plan whereby a seemingly helpless seaplane would alight on the sea, baiting an enemy submarine to surface and take the cripple under fire. Meanwhile, a submerged submarine, in league with the aircraft, would maneuver to torpedo its gullible opponent. Today some flippant aviators may claim this "live worm" tactic to be a credible role for destroyers.

This reviewer would be remiss if he were to overemphasize sea stories in this review. The pattern of innovation in the ASW duel reveals the elements of a management case study. A crucial part in the World War II Battle of the Atlantic was played by the technocrats.

The race between lower frequency radars (British) and passive receivers (German) resulted in a lost battle for the submarine. The challenge of wedding technology and tactics gave birth to a thought process which commands our attention today, systems analysis. Perhaps the words of Lord Blackett (scientific adviser to Britain's Coastal Command) in 1941 should be embossed on the backside of all Pentagon security badges or framed in each corridor.

> One of the tasks of an Operational Research Section is to make possible at least an approach to a numerical estimate of the merits of a change-over from one device to another, by continual investigation of the actual performance of existing weapons, and by objective analysis of the likely performance of new ones . . .
>
> In general, one might conclude that relatively too much scientific effort has been expended hitherto in the production of new devices and too little in the proper use of what we have got.

Unfortunately, Alfred Price seemed to tire of writing after 235 pages. His last chapter of less than 20 pages covers the period from 1945 through 1972. Devoting a paragraph to carrier borne aviation and two pages to helicopters, the author continues to emphasize the RAF role of patrol aviation at the expense of naval ASW aircraft.

Admittedly, security and classification begin to hamper the military writer as he approaches the present. Nonetheless, considerably more attention could have been devoted to the use of helos on destroyers, and the new capital ships of ASW, the Soviet's *Moskva*, the Royal Navy's through-deck cruiser *Invincible*, and the American sea control ship. Discussion of the interaction between seabed sonar systems and patrol aircraft was needed.

Finally, the author held out the perennial hope that science would wave its wand and make the sea transparent with a "supersensor." We might just as well request some deity to part the waters of the Atlantic and leave all the submarines high and dry. The application of Lord Blackett's advice holds more promise.

In summary, *Aircraft versus Submarine* offers a fascinating and useful history of ASW aviation from which the reader can gain a valuable historical perspective. The book's shallow coverage of the current picture does not hamper the knowledgeable officer and fulfills the needs of the layman.

W.W. PRICE, III
Lieutenant, U.S. Navy

Summersell, Charles G., ed. *The Journal of George Townley Fullam.* University: The University of Alabama Press. 229p.

Few events in a nation's history can match the brutality and horror of that self-inflicted disaster, the civil war. The American "War Between the States" was no exception. Fought with the rudiments of technology that would mature in future wars (the ironclad, rifled gun, and submarine, to name a few), this semimodern war retained many of the romantic characteristics of an earlier age. Nowhere was this paradox more apparent than in the adventures of the commerce raider C.S.S. *Alabama.*

The Journal of George Townley Fullam, boarding officer of the *Alabama,* is not and was not written to be another of the many historical documentations of her cruise. Indeed, the account ends with the unresolved entry, "This afternoon our commander . . ." dated several days before the climactic confrontation with the U.S.S. *Kearsarge.* The *Journal* is, however, one man's record of the day to day life and labor aboard the most famous of Confederate war cruisers, and as such it succeeds well.

Fullam, one of the first officers who signed on with hull #290, an alias the ship often used, begins his report with the deceptive departure of the vessel from the Laird Bros. shipyard in England on "trials" and follows her virtually around the world, faithfully recording the emotional reactions of men on a long and, at times, tedious voyage. The reader is led to understand that, in the eyes of the crew at least, the voyage was more of a pirate venture than the actions of a ship of war. The potential for combat was eagerly looked forward to by everyone on board, Fullam included, and the greatest disappointment to the crew during the entire cruise was apparently the inability to attack the ships in New York harbor due to a shortage of coal. Much of this may have been simple bravado, but in the only actual engagement of the *Alabama* outside her disastrous defeat off Cherbourg, that with the U.S.S. *Hatteras*, the crew of the raider performed well. "Everyone [was] delighted at the prospect of a fight," he writes. "The watch . . . of their own accord commenced preparing the guns," and during the actual combat ". . . our fellows peppering away as though the action depended on each individual."

A far more serious enemy of the crew, as evidenced by Fullam, was the boredom of the long periods between prize captures. Apparently afraid of little, the tedium of shipboard life drove ever-increasing numbers of the ship's company to "jump ship" at any available port of call, all of which is recorded with painstaking detail from the desertion to the subsequent trial and sentence of the unfortunate sailor.

In addition to and, in my opinion, secondary to the accounts of life at sea are the records of *Alabama's* many captures. These are passed over as more or less routine by Fullam, but are extensively commented on by the editor, Charles Summersell. Expanding on the writings of Fullam, Summersell provides the reader with the background knowledge assumed by Fullam, as well as letters, official documents, and other material to substantiate the basic text.

At 21, George Townley Fullam provided a blend of thorough marine education and youthful enthusiasm. Charles Summersell has added to this meticulous scholarship to produce a book that should be a welcome addition to the library of any true lover of the sea.

J.P. BACHER
Ensign, U.S. Naval Reserve

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When a book raises your spirit and inspires you with noble and courageous feelings, seek no other rule to judge the event by; it is good and made by a good workman.

Jean de la Bruyère

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